Time, Objects, and Identity
The first third of this thesis argues for a B-theoretic conception of time according to which all times exist equally and the present is in no way privileged. I distinguish 'ontological' A-theories from 'non-ontological' ones, arguing that the latter are experientially unmotivated and barely coherent. With regard to the former, I focus mainly on presentism. After some remarks on how to formulate this (and eternalism) non-trivially, I review the non-relativistic case against presentism. I then consider the impact of Special Relativity on the debate, and attempt to deepen this impact by supplying a modal variation on the standard arguments. The middle third of the thesis investigates p'ersistence, contending that both endurance and perdurance are consonant with the eternalism already endorsed. After introducing these theories of persistence, and discussing in particular how best to formulate an eternalist endurance, I proceed to defend the coherence of this combination. The Problem of Change is addressed here. I then respond in some detail to recent allegations of relativistic threats to endurance. The final third of the thesis questions the validity of the endurantistperdurantist dispute. I criticize two recently
Gibson, Ian
Time, Objects, and Identity. The first third of this thesis argues for a B-theoretic conception of time according to which all times exist equally and the present is in no way privileged. I distinguish 'ontological' A-theories from 'non-ontological' ones, arguing that the latter are experientially unmotivated and barely coherent. With regard to the former, I focus mainly on presentism. After some remarks on how to formulate this (and eternalism) non-trivially, I review the non-relativistic case against presentism. I then consider the impact of Special Relativity on the debate, and attempt to deepen this impact by supplying a modal variation on the standard arguments. The middle third of the thesis investigates p'ersistence, contending that both endurance and perdurance are consonant with the eternalism already endorsed. After introducing these theories of persistence, and discussing in particular how best to formulate an eternalist endurance, I proceed to defend the coherence of this combination. The Problem of Change is addressed here. I then respond in some detail to recent allegations of relativistic threats to endurance. The final third of the thesis questions the validity of the endurantistperdurantist dispute. I criticize two recently
time objects identity first third argues theoretic conception time accord time exist equally present way privilege distinguish ontological theories non ontological argue_latter unmotivated barely coherent regard former focus_mainly remark formulate non review non case consider impact special relativity debate attempt deepen impact supply modal variation standard argument middle third investigates contend endurance consonant already endorse introduce theory_persistence discuss particular best formulate endurance proceed defend coherence combination problem change address here respond detail recent allegation threat endurance final third question_validity dispute criticize recently