Disagreement and the normativity of truth beneath cognitive command
This thesis engages with three topics and the relationships between them: (i) the phenomenon of disagreement (paradigmatically, where one person makes a claim and another denies it); (ii) the normative character of disagreements (the issue of whether, and in what sense, one of the parties is âat faultâ for believing something that's untrue); (iii) the issue of which theory of what truth is can best accommodate the norms relating belief and truth. People disagree about all sorts of things: about whether climate is changing, death penalty is wrong, sushi is delicious, or Louis C.K. is funny. However, even focusing on disagreements in the evaluative domain (e.g., taste, moral and comedic), where people have the intuition that there is âno fact of the matter' about who is right, there are significant differences that require explanation. For instance, disagreement about taste is generally perceived as shallow. People accept to disagree and live comfortably with that fact. By contrast, moral disagreement is perceived as deep and sometimes hard to tolerate. Comedic disagreement is similar to taste. However, it may involve an element of âintellectual snobbery' that is absent in taste disagreement. The immediate
Ferrari, Filippo
Truth ; Normativity (Ethics)
Disagreement and the normativity of truth beneath cognitive command. This thesis engages with three topics and the relationships between them: (i) the phenomenon of disagreement (paradigmatically, where one person makes a claim and another denies it); (ii) the normative character of disagreements (the issue of whether, and in what sense, one of the parties is âat faultâ for believing something that's untrue); (iii) the issue of which theory of what truth is can best accommodate the norms relating belief and truth. People disagree about all sorts of things: about whether climate is changing, death penalty is wrong, sushi is delicious, or Louis C.K. is funny. However, even focusing on disagreements in the evaluative domain (e.g., taste, moral and comedic), where people have the intuition that there is âno fact of the matter' about who is right, there are significant differences that require explanation. For instance, disagreement about taste is generally perceived as shallow. People accept to disagree and live comfortably with that fact. By contrast, moral disagreement is perceived as deep and sometimes hard to tolerate. Comedic disagreement is similar to taste. However, it may involve an element of âintellectual snobbery' that is absent in taste disagreement. The immediate
disagreement normativity truth beneath cognitive command engages topic relationship phenomenon disagreement paradigmatically person make claim another normative character disagreement issue whether sense party fault believe something iii issue theory_truth best accommodate norm relate belief truth people disagree sort thing whether climate changing death penalty wrong louis however_even focus disagreement evaluative domain taste moral people intuition fact matter right significant_difference require explanation instance disagreement taste generally perceive shallow people accept disagree live fact contrast moral disagreement perceive deep sometimes hard tolerate disagreement similar taste however may involve element intellectual absent taste disagreement immediate