Cause, explanation and theory in Plato's Phaedo
This work is an investigation into a passage in Platoâs <i>Phaedo</i> in which Socrates tells his audience that, in the teeth of a certain difficulty, he can only establish the conclusion he wants - that the soul is immortal - if he comes up with a theory about coming to be and passing away generally. There then follows a discussion in which Socrates rejects the professed causes of those who had thought abut the matter before him, and then proceeds to outline his own method for getting at the truth. I begin in Section 1 with a detailed textual argument for the conclusion that the adjective <i>Î±ÎčÏÎčÎżÎœ</i> and the noun <i>Î±ÎčÏÎčÎ±</i> refer to logically different kinds of beings, a conclusion whose liability to misunderstanding leads me to a general discussion of Platonic teleology in Section 2. Section 3 argues at length against the thought that Socrates rejects the purported causes of others because of their susceptibility to logical controversies about opposites, concluding instead that he is using an epistemological indifference argument. The debate returns again to the details of the text in Section 4, where I arbitrate between two scholars in the debate about what exactly Socratesâ hypothesis
Bailey, Dominic Timothy John
Cause, explanation and theory in Plato's Phaedo. This work is an investigation into a passage in Platoâs <i>Phaedo</i> in which Socrates tells his audience that, in the teeth of a certain difficulty, he can only establish the conclusion he wants - that the soul is immortal - if he comes up with a theory about coming to be and passing away generally. There then follows a discussion in which Socrates rejects the professed causes of those who had thought abut the matter before him, and then proceeds to outline his own method for getting at the truth. I begin in Section 1 with a detailed textual argument for the conclusion that the adjective <i>Î±ÎčÏÎčÎżÎœ</i> and the noun <i>Î±ÎčÏÎčÎ±</i> refer to logically different kinds of beings, a conclusion whose liability to misunderstanding leads me to a general discussion of Platonic teleology in Section 2. Section 3 argues at length against the thought that Socrates rejects the purported causes of others because of their susceptibility to logical controversies about opposites, concluding instead that he is using an epistemological indifference argument. The debate returns again to the details of the text in Section 4, where I arbitrate between two scholars in the debate about what exactly Socratesâ hypothesis
cause explanation theory plato work investigation passage plato socrates tell audience teeth certain difficulty establish conclusion want soul come theory come pass away generally follow_discussion socrates reject profess cause think matter proceeds outline method get truth begin section detailed textual argument_conclusion adjective noun refer logically different_kind being conclusion whose liability misunderstand lead general_discussion platonic section section argues length think socrates reject purport cause others susceptibility logical controversy opposite conclude instead use epistemological indifference argument debate return detail text section scholar debate exactly socrates hypothesis