Autonomy, fraternity and legitimacy : foundations of a new communitarianism
In this thesis I explore the possibility for a renewed communitarianism. Rather than present this as a rival to liberalism, however, I present it as a supplement. I start from the viewpoint that there are two basic facts with normative consequences the reconciliation of which is the central task of moral and political philosophy. One fact is the fact of individuality, which I believe produces a normative requirement that all and only obligations that respect a certain kind of individual autonomy are legitimate. This fact is well explained by liberalism, and so I am to that extent a liberal. Where I differ from contemporary liberalism, and where I think there is room for a renewed communitarianism, is in explaining the limits of autonomy. There are, I contend, a wide array of basic and legitimate obligations that cannot be adequately explained (i.e. the legitimacy of which cannot be explained) by autonomy alone. The role for communitarianism, then, is to explain the nature of a second legitimating principle and how these two principles â respect for autonomy and respect for (what I call) fraternity â can work together to explain when various maxims and policies are legitimate or illegitimate. In the first
Critch, Raymond Glenn
political philosophy ; moral philosophy ; fraternity ; solidarity ; liberalism ; communitarianism
Autonomy, fraternity and legitimacy : foundations of a new communitarianism. In this thesis I explore the possibility for a renewed communitarianism. Rather than present this as a rival to liberalism, however, I present it as a supplement. I start from the viewpoint that there are two basic facts with normative consequences the reconciliation of which is the central task of moral and political philosophy. One fact is the fact of individuality, which I believe produces a normative requirement that all and only obligations that respect a certain kind of individual autonomy are legitimate. This fact is well explained by liberalism, and so I am to that extent a liberal. Where I differ from contemporary liberalism, and where I think there is room for a renewed communitarianism, is in explaining the limits of autonomy. There are, I contend, a wide array of basic and legitimate obligations that cannot be adequately explained (i.e. the legitimacy of which cannot be explained) by autonomy alone. The role for communitarianism, then, is to explain the nature of a second legitimating principle and how these two principles â respect for autonomy and respect for (what I call) fraternity â can work together to explain when various maxims and policies are legitimate or illegitimate. In the first
autonomy fraternity legitimacy foundation_new explore_possibility renew rather present rival liberalism however present supplement start viewpoint two_basic fact normative consequence reconciliation central task moral_political philosophy fact fact individuality believe produce normative requirement obligation respect certain_kind individual_autonomy legitimate fact well explain liberalism extent liberal differ contemporary liberalism think room renew explain limit autonomy contend wide array basic legitimate obligation adequately explain legitimacy explain autonomy alone role explain nature second legitimate principle principle respect autonomy respect call fraternity work together explain various maxim policy legitimate illegitimate first