An eco-dispositional theory of colour
My thesis develops a novel theory of colours as real properties: âeco-dispositionalismâ.Â  This view construes colour-properties as response-dependent dispositions, but not as simple dispositions to cause colour-experiences. Instead, I hold that at least certain basic colour categories are âaffordancesâ or opportunities for environmental exploitation. Eco-disposition about the colours assumes a causal theory of properties that analyses a property as something that either is (or is individuated by) a set of causal powers. I argue for the existence of a special set of âcontextualâ powers. These powers are <i>functional</i> properties of cybernetic systems. Because they are highly sensitive to initial conditions, systemic properties have a narrower modal extension than the basic physical properties from which they are constructed. Nevertheless, contextual powers qualify as genuine scientific properties. I claim that colours are external powers that, nevertheless, owe their individuations to the responses of perceiving organisms. Organisms are self-organising systems that depend on their ongoing engagements with the external environment: this process might well include <i>representation</i>. Because
Brenner, S. D.
An eco-dispositional theory of colour. My thesis develops a novel theory of colours as real properties: âeco-dispositionalismâ.Â  This view construes colour-properties as response-dependent dispositions, but not as simple dispositions to cause colour-experiences. Instead, I hold that at least certain basic colour categories are âaffordancesâ or opportunities for environmental exploitation. Eco-disposition about the colours assumes a causal theory of properties that analyses a property as something that either is (or is individuated by) a set of causal powers. I argue for the existence of a special set of âcontextualâ powers. These powers are <i>functional</i> properties of cybernetic systems. Because they are highly sensitive to initial conditions, systemic properties have a narrower modal extension than the basic physical properties from which they are constructed. Nevertheless, contextual powers qualify as genuine scientific properties. I claim that colours are external powers that, nevertheless, owe their individuations to the responses of perceiving organisms. Organisms are self-organising systems that depend on their ongoing engagements with the external environment: this process might well include <i>representation</i>. Because
eco dispositional theory colour develops novel theory colour real property eco view construe colour properties response_dependent disposition simple disposition cause colour experiences instead hold least certain basic colour category affordances opportunity environmental exploitation eco disposition colour assume causal_theory property analyse property something either individuate set causal_power argue existence special set contextual power power functional_property system highly sensitive initial condition systemic property modal extension basic physical_property construct nevertheless contextual power qualify genuine scientific property claim colour external power nevertheless owe individuation response perceive organism organisms self system depend ongoing engagement external environment process might well include representation