Animals, anthropocentrism, and morality : analysing the discourse of the animal issue
This dissertation identifies and criticises a fundamental characteristic of the philosophical discourse surrounding the animal issue: the underlying anthropocentric reasoning that informs the accounts of both philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. Such reasoning works from human paradigms as the only possible starting point of the analysis. Accordingly, the aim of my dissertation is to show how anthropocentric reasoning and its implications distort the inquiry of the animal debate. In extracting the erroneous biases from the debate, my project enables an important shift in the starting line of the philosophical inquiry of the animal issue. In chapters one and two, I focus on philosophy of mind. I show how philosophical accounts that are based on anthropocentric a priori reasoning are inattentive to the relevant empirical findings regarding animals' mental capacities. Employing a conceptual line of argument, I demonstrate that starting the analysis from a human paradigm creates a rigid conceptual framework that unjustifiably excludes the possibility of associating the relevant empirical findings in the research. Furthermore, I show how the common approaches to the issue of animals' belief and intentions deny
Kohavi, Zohar
anthropocentric reasoning
Animals, anthropocentrism, and morality : analysing the discourse of the animal issue. This dissertation identifies and criticises a fundamental characteristic of the philosophical discourse surrounding the animal issue: the underlying anthropocentric reasoning that informs the accounts of both philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. Such reasoning works from human paradigms as the only possible starting point of the analysis. Accordingly, the aim of my dissertation is to show how anthropocentric reasoning and its implications distort the inquiry of the animal debate. In extracting the erroneous biases from the debate, my project enables an important shift in the starting line of the philosophical inquiry of the animal issue. In chapters one and two, I focus on philosophy of mind. I show how philosophical accounts that are based on anthropocentric a priori reasoning are inattentive to the relevant empirical findings regarding animals' mental capacities. Employing a conceptual line of argument, I demonstrate that starting the analysis from a human paradigm creates a rigid conceptual framework that unjustifiably excludes the possibility of associating the relevant empirical findings in the research. Furthermore, I show how the common approaches to the issue of animals' belief and intentions deny
animals morality analysing discourse animal issue identifies criticise fundamental characteristic philosophical_discourse surround animal issue underlying anthropocentric reason informs account philosophy_mind moral_philosophy reason work human paradigms possible start_point analysis accordingly aim_show anthropocentric reason implication distort inquiry animal debate extract erroneous bias debate project enable important shift start line philosophical_inquiry animal issue focus philosophy_mind show philosophical account base anthropocentric priori reason relevant empirical_finding regard animal mental capacity employing conceptual line_argument start analysis human paradigm create rigid conceptual_framework exclude possibility associate relevant empirical_finding research furthermore show common approach issue animal belief intention deny