'Non-truth-conditional' meaning, relevance and concessives
This thesis is concerned with the semantic function of linguistic elements which do not seem to contribute to the truth conditions of an utterance, that is, with 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic devices. The first part of the thesis is devoted to theoretical considerations, while the second part concentrates on 'concessive' linguistic devices, which form a sub-class of 'non-truth-conditional' expressions. The first chapter outlines the way in which traditional semantic theories have employed the notion of truth conditions to capture linguistic meaning and a series of problems with this approach are pointed out. The chapter ends with an overview of 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic devices. Chapter 2 is concerned with ways in which fundamentally truth-conditional theories of linguistic semantics have attempted to accommodate such expressions in their frameworks. In chapter 3, the discussion focuses on Argumentation Theory, which does not just accommodate non-truth-conditional meaning but, ultimately, treats all linguistic meaning in non-truth-conditional terms and leads to the untenable conclusion that the general intuition that utterances can give information about the world is an illusion. This is followed
Iten, Corinne
Linguistic devices; Semantic theories; Cognitive
'Non-truth-conditional' meaning, relevance and concessives. This thesis is concerned with the semantic function of linguistic elements which do not seem to contribute to the truth conditions of an utterance, that is, with 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic devices. The first part of the thesis is devoted to theoretical considerations, while the second part concentrates on 'concessive' linguistic devices, which form a sub-class of 'non-truth-conditional' expressions. The first chapter outlines the way in which traditional semantic theories have employed the notion of truth conditions to capture linguistic meaning and a series of problems with this approach are pointed out. The chapter ends with an overview of 'non-truth-conditional' linguistic devices. Chapter 2 is concerned with ways in which fundamentally truth-conditional theories of linguistic semantics have attempted to accommodate such expressions in their frameworks. In chapter 3, the discussion focuses on Argumentation Theory, which does not just accommodate non-truth-conditional meaning but, ultimately, treats all linguistic meaning in non-truth-conditional terms and leads to the untenable conclusion that the general intuition that utterances can give information about the world is an illusion. This is followed
non_truth conditional meaning relevance concerned semantic function linguistic_element seem contribute truth_condition utterance non_truth conditional linguistic device first_part devote theoretical_consideration second_part concentrate concessive linguistic device form sub class non_truth conditional expression first_outline way traditional semantic_theory employ notion truth_condition capture linguistic_meaning series problem point_out end overview non_truth conditional linguistic device concerned way fundamentally truth_conditional theory linguistic semantics attempt accommodate expression framework discussion focus argumentation theory accommodate non_truth conditional meaning ultimately treat linguistic mean non_truth conditional term lead untenable conclusion general intuition utterance give information world illusion follow