Instruments of power : how emotions contribute to oppression
In analytic philosophy, discussion of oppression has focused on its definition. However, whilst definitional approaches are valuable as a means of achieving conceptual clarity, they tend to underplay a key aspect of oppression: its embodied, emotional dimension. If we attend to the descriptions of oppression offered in narratives and first-personal accounts, by the oppressed, the centrality of emotions comes to the fore. In this thesis I argue that attending to the role of emotions is crucial to producing an explanatorily rich account of racial and gender oppression. In contrast to those philosophical models that conceive of emotions as primarily episodic, disruptive and short-lived, I argue that we need to think of emotions as long-lived ~patterns~ (Goldie, 2012) or ~attunements~ (Bartky, 1990). Only by doing so can we properly explain their role in oppression. Moreover, attending to the relational aspect of emotions (Ahmed, 2004) allows us to account for the ways structures of power operate. Not only are some emotional phenomena partly shaped by oppressive structures, they also play an instrumental role in sustaining and reinforcing them. I contend that, by conceptualising emotions as mechanisms for reproducing
SaÌenz-Benavides, MariÌa Laurencia
Instruments of power : how emotions contribute to oppression. In analytic philosophy, discussion of oppression has focused on its definition. However, whilst definitional approaches are valuable as a means of achieving conceptual clarity, they tend to underplay a key aspect of oppression: its embodied, emotional dimension. If we attend to the descriptions of oppression offered in narratives and first-personal accounts, by the oppressed, the centrality of emotions comes to the fore. In this thesis I argue that attending to the role of emotions is crucial to producing an explanatorily rich account of racial and gender oppression. In contrast to those philosophical models that conceive of emotions as primarily episodic, disruptive and short-lived, I argue that we need to think of emotions as long-lived ~patterns~ (Goldie, 2012) or ~attunements~ (Bartky, 1990). Only by doing so can we properly explain their role in oppression. Moreover, attending to the relational aspect of emotions (Ahmed, 2004) allows us to account for the ways structures of power operate. Not only are some emotional phenomena partly shaped by oppressive structures, they also play an instrumental role in sustaining and reinforcing them. I contend that, by conceptualising emotions as mechanisms for reproducing
power emotion contribute oppression analytic_philosophy discussion oppression focus definition however_whilst definitional approach valuable mean achieve conceptual clarity tend key_aspect oppression embody emotional dimension attend description oppression offer narrative first personal account oppress centrality emotion come fore argue attend role_emotion crucial produce rich account racial gender oppression contrast philosophical model conceive emotion primarily episodic disruptive short_lived argue need think emotion long_lived patterns properly explain role oppression moreover attend relational aspect emotion allow account way structure power operate emotional phenomenon partly shape oppressive structure also play instrumental role sustain reinforce them contend conceptualise emotion mechanism reproduce