The Seinsfrage and the place of the objective in Heidegger's early work
The thesis is guided by the question: What is the subject matter of Heideggerâs philosophy in the period of Being and Time? I start by arguing that Heideggerâs formulation of the question of being is ambiguous because the term âbeingâ is open to at least two interpretations. I claim that this ambiguity has motivated two types of reading of Heideggerâs early work. On the first reading, Heideggerâs philosophy is understood as attempting to infer metaphysical claims (claims about what-is, or being in a traditionally metaphysical sense) on the basis of claims about the structure of Daseinâs understanding. This reading typically renders Heidegger an idealist. On the second reading, Heideggerâs philosophy is taken to have no metaphysical ambitions, and thereby to be limited to elucidating the structure of Daseinâs understanding. I argue that both types of reading are inadequate and diagnose them as grounded in a Cartesian presupposition that Heidegger rejects. On the basis of direct textual evidence and a number of theoretical considerations I assert that although the second type of reading is right in that the primary object of Heideggerâs philosophy is the conditions of understanding and that
Hernandez, Juan P.
B Philosophy (General)
The Seinsfrage and the place of the objective in Heidegger's early work. The thesis is guided by the question: What is the subject matter of Heideggerâs philosophy in the period of Being and Time? I start by arguing that Heideggerâs formulation of the question of being is ambiguous because the term âbeingâ is open to at least two interpretations. I claim that this ambiguity has motivated two types of reading of Heideggerâs early work. On the first reading, Heideggerâs philosophy is understood as attempting to infer metaphysical claims (claims about what-is, or being in a traditionally metaphysical sense) on the basis of claims about the structure of Daseinâs understanding. This reading typically renders Heidegger an idealist. On the second reading, Heideggerâs philosophy is taken to have no metaphysical ambitions, and thereby to be limited to elucidating the structure of Daseinâs understanding. I argue that both types of reading are inadequate and diagnose them as grounded in a Cartesian presupposition that Heidegger rejects. On the basis of direct textual evidence and a number of theoretical considerations I assert that although the second type of reading is right in that the primary object of Heideggerâs philosophy is the conditions of understanding and that
place objective heidegger early_work guide question subject_matter heidegger_philosophy period_time start argue heidegger formulation question ambiguous term open least_two interpretation claim ambiguity motivate two_type read heidegger early_work first reading heidegger_philosophy understood attempt infer metaphysical claim claim what traditionally metaphysical sense basis_claim structure dasein understanding read typically render heidegger idealist second reading heidegger_philosophy take metaphysical ambition thereby limited structure dasein understanding argue type read inadequate diagnose ground cartesian presupposition heidegger reject basis direct textual_evidence number_theoretical consideration assert although second type reading right primary_object heidegger_philosophy condition