Going native in logic : a psychophilosophical approach to deduction
This work is concerned generally with the relationship between logic and psychology, and in particular with the psychophilosophical foundations of deductive reasoning. This is against the recurrent background of logicians and psychologists knowing of the existence of each other but ignoring each others' work. However, cognitive psychology needs logic, not only as all sciences do to ensure coherence and consistency, but as an essential element of a general theory of cognition. This is a substantive claim, yet in its narrower form it highlights the need to study the precise way in which logic enters the theory of cognition. The contention here is that a theory of mental logic may satisfy both requirements: namely, to be the best explanation for everyday deductive reasoning and to offer an insight into the cognitive architecture. The theory maintains that deductive, reasoning consists of operations on internal representations in accordance with logical rules implemented in procedures activated by the forms of mental representation. Thus, the foundations of the logic(s) at which logicians aim, viz. the logical precepts and ideals, must be psychologically real in the sense of being instantiated in some form in
Amini, Majid
Deductive reasoning
Going native in logic : a psychophilosophical approach to deduction. This work is concerned generally with the relationship between logic and psychology, and in particular with the psychophilosophical foundations of deductive reasoning. This is against the recurrent background of logicians and psychologists knowing of the existence of each other but ignoring each others' work. However, cognitive psychology needs logic, not only as all sciences do to ensure coherence and consistency, but as an essential element of a general theory of cognition. This is a substantive claim, yet in its narrower form it highlights the need to study the precise way in which logic enters the theory of cognition. The contention here is that a theory of mental logic may satisfy both requirements: namely, to be the best explanation for everyday deductive reasoning and to offer an insight into the cognitive architecture. The theory maintains that deductive, reasoning consists of operations on internal representations in accordance with logical rules implemented in procedures activated by the forms of mental representation. Thus, the foundations of the logic(s) at which logicians aim, viz. the logical precepts and ideals, must be psychologically real in the sense of being instantiated in some form in
going native logic deduction work concern generally relationship logic psychology particular foundation deductive reasoning recurrent background psychologist know existence ignore others work however cognitive_psychology need logic science ensure coherence consistency essential_element general_theory cognition substantive claim yet narrow form highlight_need study precise way logic enters theory cognition contention theory_mental logic may satisfy requirement namely best explanation everyday deductive reasoning offer_insight cognitive architecture theory maintains deductive reason consists operation internal_representation accordance logical rule implement procedure activate form mental_representation thus foundation logic aim viz logical precept ideal must psychologically real sense instantiate form