Psychological reductionism about persons : a critical development
There is a need to distinguish two questions in the philosophy of persons. One of these is the factual question of identity. This is the question of the conditions of personal identity over time. The other is the first person question of survival. This can be expressed as, ~Under which circumstances should I consider a person at another time to be my survivor, who I have reason to care about just as much if he were me?~ This second question does not presuppose that the survivor is numerically identical with her predecessor and is the question considered in this thesis. Answering this question requires us to resolve the tension in our concept of a person between, on the one hand, the view of persons as purely physical beings, no more than the sum of their particular parts, bound to the here and now, and on the other hand, as somehow transcendent, beings who exist beyond the here and now. The conception built upon is that offered by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Two errors in Parfit's account are explained and amendments suggested. The first is Parfit's explanation of the unity of a mental life over time in terms of connectedness and continuity between individual, independent thoughts, and secondly his
Baggini, Julian Guiseppe
Philosophy ; Logic & Metaphysics
Psychological reductionism about persons : a critical development. There is a need to distinguish two questions in the philosophy of persons. One of these is the factual question of identity. This is the question of the conditions of personal identity over time. The other is the first person question of survival. This can be expressed as, ~Under which circumstances should I consider a person at another time to be my survivor, who I have reason to care about just as much if he were me?~ This second question does not presuppose that the survivor is numerically identical with her predecessor and is the question considered in this thesis. Answering this question requires us to resolve the tension in our concept of a person between, on the one hand, the view of persons as purely physical beings, no more than the sum of their particular parts, bound to the here and now, and on the other hand, as somehow transcendent, beings who exist beyond the here and now. The conception built upon is that offered by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Two errors in Parfit's account are explained and amendments suggested. The first is Parfit's explanation of the unity of a mental life over time in terms of connectedness and continuity between individual, independent thoughts, and secondly his
psychological reductionism person critical development need distinguish_two question philosophy person factual question identity question condition personal_identity time first_person question survival express under circumstance consider person another time survivor reason care much second question presuppose survivor numerically identical predecessor question consider thesis answering question require resolve_tension concept_person one_hand view person purely physical being sum particular part bound hand somehow transcendent being exist beyond now conception build_upon offer reasons persons error account explain amendment suggest first explanation unity mental life time term continuity individual independent thought secondly