Naturalising aesthetics : beauty, emotion and the cognitive sciences
In this thesis, I attempt to show how taking the naturalistic turn with regard to certain debates in aesthetic theory might result in philosophical progress. Specifically, I ask: are any of the entities that are the subject of philosophical debate in aesthetic theory â such as the aesthetic or related notions such as beauty â part of, or intimately related to, the furniture of human nature? Drawing on a range of anthropological data, I argue that a broad conception of beauty appears to pick out something natural on the grounds that this conception, along with a characteristic range of relevant folk beliefs, reliably appear across cultures. In attempting to account for these explananda, I consider two kinds of philosophical accounts of beauty â namely those that suggest that beauty might be intimately related to a commonplace mental state in a disinterested form, and those that suggest that beauty might be related to a sui generis mental state. Drawing on a range of psychological and neuroscientific data, I argue that the latter kind of account is correct. More specifically, I argue that beauty not only reliably causes a sui generis emotion â ecstasy â but is constituted by the disposition to give
Doran, Ryan
Naturalising aesthetics : beauty, emotion and the cognitive sciences. In this thesis, I attempt to show how taking the naturalistic turn with regard to certain debates in aesthetic theory might result in philosophical progress. Specifically, I ask: are any of the entities that are the subject of philosophical debate in aesthetic theory â such as the aesthetic or related notions such as beauty â part of, or intimately related to, the furniture of human nature? Drawing on a range of anthropological data, I argue that a broad conception of beauty appears to pick out something natural on the grounds that this conception, along with a characteristic range of relevant folk beliefs, reliably appear across cultures. In attempting to account for these explananda, I consider two kinds of philosophical accounts of beauty â namely those that suggest that beauty might be intimately related to a commonplace mental state in a disinterested form, and those that suggest that beauty might be related to a sui generis mental state. Drawing on a range of psychological and neuroscientific data, I argue that the latter kind of account is correct. More specifically, I argue that beauty not only reliably causes a sui generis emotion â ecstasy â but is constituted by the disposition to give
naturalising aesthetic beauty emotion cognitive_science attempt_show take naturalistic turn regard certain debate aesthetic_theory might philosophical progress specifically ask entity subject philosophical debate aesthetic_theory aesthetic related notion beauty part intimately relate furniture human_nature drawing range anthropological data argue broad conception beauty appear pick something natural ground conception along characteristic range relevant folk belief reliably appear across culture attempt account consider two_kind philosophical account beauty namely suggest beauty might intimately_related commonplace mental_state disinterested form suggest beauty might relate sui_generis mental_state drawing range psychological data argue_latter kind account correct specifically_argue beauty reliably cause sui_generis emotion ecstasy constitute disposition give