Subject and person : an essay on self-reference and personal identity
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the relations between the topics of self-reference and personal identity and to demonstrate that, and how, certain misconceived views concerning self-reference have influenced the interpretation of various 'thought-experiments' cited in recent discussions of personal identity. The problem posed by personal identity, I argue, is not so much an ontological problem concerning the special nature of a particular kind of substances (i.e. persons), but consists rather in the fact that I (and all other persons) are tempted to take our identity to be governed by a criterion of identity different from the criterion governing the identity of all other kinds of concrete particulars (namely spatio-temporal continuity). I argue that this temptation stems from the possibility of adopting a first-person point of view towards personal identity. This possibility is shown to be intimately connected with a person's ability to refer to himself-as-subject (i.e. without the application of any criteria of his identity). This particular kind of self-reference displays certain epistemic idiosyncracies which make us susceptible to certain systematic illusions with regard to the nature of
Spitz, Roland
Identity (Philosophical concept) ; Self (Philosophy)
Subject and person : an essay on self-reference and personal identity. The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the relations between the topics of self-reference and personal identity and to demonstrate that, and how, certain misconceived views concerning self-reference have influenced the interpretation of various 'thought-experiments' cited in recent discussions of personal identity. The problem posed by personal identity, I argue, is not so much an ontological problem concerning the special nature of a particular kind of substances (i.e. persons), but consists rather in the fact that I (and all other persons) are tempted to take our identity to be governed by a criterion of identity different from the criterion governing the identity of all other kinds of concrete particulars (namely spatio-temporal continuity). I argue that this temptation stems from the possibility of adopting a first-person point of view towards personal identity. This possibility is shown to be intimately connected with a person's ability to refer to himself-as-subject (i.e. without the application of any criteria of his identity). This particular kind of self-reference displays certain epistemic idiosyncracies which make us susceptible to certain systematic illusions with regard to the nature of
subject person essay self reference personal_identity main_aim investigate relation topic self reference personal_identity certain view concern self reference influenced interpretation various thought cite recent_discussion personal_identity problem_pose personal_identity argue much ontological problem_concern special nature particular_kind substance person consist rather fact person tempt take identity govern criterion identity different criterion govern identity kinds concrete particular namely spatio_temporal continuity argue temptation stem possibility adopt first_person point_view towards personal_identity possibility show intimately connect person ability refer himself subject without application criterion identity particular_kind self reference display certain epistemic make susceptible certain systematic illusion regard_nature