Making moral judgements : internalism and moral motivation
<i>Making Moral Judgements </i>addresses an apparent tension between the internalist view that there is a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation and the cognitivist view that such judgements express beliefs about how the world is morally. This thesis argues that to resolve this tension we need first to distinguish the act of making a moral judgement from the content of a moral judgement. Act internalism asserts a necessary connection between the act of making a moral judgement and motivation. This is perfectly consistent with there being no connection between the truth of moral propositions - the content of moral judgements - and motivation. The act internalist approach is developed using speech act theory. Speech acts that do more than simply state facts or express motivating states are ubiquitous in our linguistic practice. Moral judgements can be construed as a type of compound speech act that involves assertion and motivation. This approach, it is argued, can help us better understand the complexities of moral motivation and of moral practice. On the speech act approach, an agent in making a moral judgement goes beyond description or cognition in holding herself and others to account
Millar, Matthew James Denver
Making moral judgements : internalism and moral motivation. <i>Making Moral Judgements </i>addresses an apparent tension between the internalist view that there is a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation and the cognitivist view that such judgements express beliefs about how the world is morally. This thesis argues that to resolve this tension we need first to distinguish the act of making a moral judgement from the content of a moral judgement. Act internalism asserts a necessary connection between the act of making a moral judgement and motivation. This is perfectly consistent with there being no connection between the truth of moral propositions - the content of moral judgements - and motivation. The act internalist approach is developed using speech act theory. Speech acts that do more than simply state facts or express motivating states are ubiquitous in our linguistic practice. Moral judgements can be construed as a type of compound speech act that involves assertion and motivation. This approach, it is argued, can help us better understand the complexities of moral motivation and of moral practice. On the speech act approach, an agent in making a moral judgement goes beyond description or cognition in holding herself and others to account
making moral_judgement internalism moral motivation making moral address apparent tension internalist view necessary connection moral_judgement motivation cognitivist view judgement express beliefs world morally argues resolve_tension need first distinguish act make moral_judgement content moral_judgement act internalism assert necessary connection act make moral_judgement motivation perfectly consistent connection truth moral proposition content moral_judgement motivation act internalist develop use speech_act_theory speech_act simply state fact express motivate state ubiquitous linguistic practice moral_judgement construe type compound speech_act involve assertion motivation argue help good complexity moral motivation moral practice speech_act agent make moral_judgement beyond description cognition hold others account