Kierkegaard's reception of Hamann : language, selfhood and reflection
This thesis investigates SĂžren Kierkegaardâs (1813-1855) reception of the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). I focus on four specific topics. In chapter one I examine Kierkegaardâs early reception of Hamann which I argue provides the basis for Kierkegaardâs conception of his own authorial task. In particular, I examine concepts of humour and systematicity and the centrality of the figure of Socrates. Central to my argument is a contrast between Kierkegaardâs reception of Hamann and that of Hegelâs review. In chapter two I show that Kierkegaard develops an argument against speculative philosophy and its claims to have achieved the absolute beginning. I argue that Kierkegaard appeals to Hamannâs critique of Kant which centres around the possibility of a priori cognition and the dependency of reason on language. I contend that Kierkegaard takes up Hamannâs critique in order to show that the absolute beginning which speculative philosophy claims to have achieved in the form of pure thinking is unachievable because of the dependency of thought on language. Chapter three examines the conception of selfhood in Hamann and Kierkegaard. I address their views of the self as unified and their
Martz, Steven David
Kierkegaard ; SĂžren ; Hamann ; Johann Georg ; post-Kantian ; language ; self-hood ; reflection ; Socrates ; reason ; imagination
Kierkegaard's reception of Hamann : language, selfhood and reflection. This thesis investigates SĂžren Kierkegaardâs (1813-1855) reception of the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). I focus on four specific topics. In chapter one I examine Kierkegaardâs early reception of Hamann which I argue provides the basis for Kierkegaardâs conception of his own authorial task. In particular, I examine concepts of humour and systematicity and the centrality of the figure of Socrates. Central to my argument is a contrast between Kierkegaardâs reception of Hamann and that of Hegelâs review. In chapter two I show that Kierkegaard develops an argument against speculative philosophy and its claims to have achieved the absolute beginning. I argue that Kierkegaard appeals to Hamannâs critique of Kant which centres around the possibility of a priori cognition and the dependency of reason on language. I contend that Kierkegaard takes up Hamannâs critique in order to show that the absolute beginning which speculative philosophy claims to have achieved in the form of pure thinking is unachievable because of the dependency of thought on language. Chapter three examines the conception of selfhood in Hamann and Kierkegaard. I address their views of the self as unified and their
kierkegaard reception language selfhood reflection investigates kierkegaard reception writing focus four_specific topic examine kierkegaard early reception argue provide_basis kierkegaard conception authorial task particular examine concept humour systematicity centrality figure socrates central_argument contrast kierkegaard reception hegel review show kierkegaard develop_argument speculative_philosophy claim achieve absolute beginning argue kierkegaard appeal critique kant centre_around possibility priori cognition dependency reason language contend kierkegaard take critique order_show absolute begin speculative_philosophy claim achieve form pure think dependency think language three_examines conception selfhood kierkegaard address view_self unify