Honesty and cooperation : emotions as cues and the evolution of the prisoner's dilemma
I argue that cooperative behaviour can evolve in a modified prisoner's dilemma (PD) that includes signalling. My broad project is one of explaining the emergence of cooperation at a societal level without Hobbesian enforcement. The strategy that I adopt is to use an evolutionary game theoretic approach to study the cultural evolution of a micro-level interaction, in this case the one-shot PD. I begin, in chapter two, by analysing Brian Skynns' model of the PD within which I find an important weakness. Any model that incorporates signalling into the PD requires an account of how the honesty of those signals is secured. Without such security, and Skynns does not address this, a deceptive strategy can invade and drive cooperation to extinction. In chapter three, therefore, I investigate mechanisms that prevent signals from being subverted, Chapter four goes on to examine empirical and theoretical literature on deception and its detection. I find that human deception detection ability is better than chance but not by an impressive margin. The study of deception detection is tightly linked to that of emotional responses. Hence I target such responses as potential signals in the PD. In chapter five I see what light
Grose, Jonathan
Honesty and cooperation : emotions as cues and the evolution of the prisoner's dilemma. I argue that cooperative behaviour can evolve in a modified prisoner's dilemma (PD) that includes signalling. My broad project is one of explaining the emergence of cooperation at a societal level without Hobbesian enforcement. The strategy that I adopt is to use an evolutionary game theoretic approach to study the cultural evolution of a micro-level interaction, in this case the one-shot PD. I begin, in chapter two, by analysing Brian Skynns' model of the PD within which I find an important weakness. Any model that incorporates signalling into the PD requires an account of how the honesty of those signals is secured. Without such security, and Skynns does not address this, a deceptive strategy can invade and drive cooperation to extinction. In chapter three, therefore, I investigate mechanisms that prevent signals from being subverted, Chapter four goes on to examine empirical and theoretical literature on deception and its detection. I find that human deception detection ability is better than chance but not by an impressive margin. The study of deception detection is tightly linked to that of emotional responses. Hence I target such responses as potential signals in the PD. In chapter five I see what light
cooperation emotion cue evolution prisoner dilemma argue cooperative behaviour evolve modify prisoner dilemma include broad project explain_emergence cooperation societal level without enforcement strategy_adopt use evolutionary game theoretic study cultural_evolution micro_level interaction case begin analyse model within important weakness model incorporate signal require account signal secure without security address deceptive strategy invade drive cooperation extinction therefore_investigate mechanisms prevent signal subvert four_examine empirical_theoretical literature deception detection human deception detection ability well chance impressive margin study deception detection tightly link emotional_response hence target responses potential signal see light