How things persist
In chapter 1 I introduce the initially most plausible account of persistence, called ~endurance theory~. According to endurance theory, objects are wholly present at every moment at which they exist. I consider three major problems for the theory. First, there is the problem of change: how can a single object have different properties at different times, without contradiction? Second, the theory must explain how, for example, a statue relates to the lump of clay which makes it up, given that they have different histories. Third, the theory must explain how there can be vague matters of identity over time. I conclude that this initially plausible account of persistence has great difficulty in dealing with these three problems. In chapter 2 I introduce a rival account of persistence, ~perdurance theory~. According to perdurance theory, persisting objects are four-dimensional, and are present at different moments by having different temporal parts at those different moments. This account is much less appealing on the surface, but I show that it makes a better job of solving the three problems, presented in chapter 1. In chapter 3 I assess the metaphysical consequences of an argument by Saul Kripke about the persistence
Hawley, K.
How things persist. In chapter 1 I introduce the initially most plausible account of persistence, called ~endurance theory~. According to endurance theory, objects are wholly present at every moment at which they exist. I consider three major problems for the theory. First, there is the problem of change: how can a single object have different properties at different times, without contradiction? Second, the theory must explain how, for example, a statue relates to the lump of clay which makes it up, given that they have different histories. Third, the theory must explain how there can be vague matters of identity over time. I conclude that this initially plausible account of persistence has great difficulty in dealing with these three problems. In chapter 2 I introduce a rival account of persistence, ~perdurance theory~. According to perdurance theory, persisting objects are four-dimensional, and are present at different moments by having different temporal parts at those different moments. This account is much less appealing on the surface, but I show that it makes a better job of solving the three problems, presented in chapter 1. In chapter 3 I assess the metaphysical consequences of an argument by Saul Kripke about the persistence
thing persist introduce initially plausible account persistence call endurance theory according endurance theory object wholly present every moment exist consider three_major problem theory first problem change single object different property different time without contradiction second theory must_explain example statue relates clay make give different history third theory must_explain vague matter identity time conclude initially plausible account persistence great difficulty_deal problem introduce rival account persistence theory according theory persist object dimensional present different moment different temporal part different moment account much_less appeal surface show make good job solve problem present assess metaphysical consequence argument kripke persistence