Requirement and rationality : two problems concerning supererogatory acts
Urmson famously suggested that the supererogatory acts of saints and heroes warranted separate classification in a moral theory. I support his suggestion, but justifying it poses a number of problems for the theorist. I examine two. Firstly, there is the pressure of requirement. Supererogatory acts are optional, yet they are good and better than an act which an agent may permissibly perform instead. Why, therefore, are they not required? The second problem concerns the rationality of supererogatory acts. If an agent has good reasons to support an alterative permissible act to the supererogatory one, how can we avoid describing the supererogatory act as irrational? I suggest that supererogatory acts possess four key characteristics of optionality, rationality, betterness and moral worth and that ordinary morality considerers not just the acts of saints and heroes to have those characteristics but also small acts of kindness and mercy. I examine Shelly Kaganâs account of consequentialism which brings the problems of requirement and rationality to bear on all type of supererogatory act. Under the maximising principle of consequentalism, acts normally considered supererogatory will be required and not optional
Young, Elizabeth Drummond
Requirement and rationality : two problems concerning supererogatory acts. Urmson famously suggested that the supererogatory acts of saints and heroes warranted separate classification in a moral theory. I support his suggestion, but justifying it poses a number of problems for the theorist. I examine two. Firstly, there is the pressure of requirement. Supererogatory acts are optional, yet they are good and better than an act which an agent may permissibly perform instead. Why, therefore, are they not required? The second problem concerns the rationality of supererogatory acts. If an agent has good reasons to support an alterative permissible act to the supererogatory one, how can we avoid describing the supererogatory act as irrational? I suggest that supererogatory acts possess four key characteristics of optionality, rationality, betterness and moral worth and that ordinary morality considerers not just the acts of saints and heroes to have those characteristics but also small acts of kindness and mercy. I examine Shelly Kaganâs account of consequentialism which brings the problems of requirement and rationality to bear on all type of supererogatory act. Under the maximising principle of consequentalism, acts normally considered supererogatory will be required and not optional
requirement rationality problem_concern act famously suggest act saint hero warrant separate classification moral_theory support suggestion justify pose number problem theorist examine firstly pressure requirement act optional yet good good act agent may perform instead therefore_require second problem_concern rationality act agent good_reason support permissible act avoid describe act irrational suggest act possess four_key characteristic optionality rationality moral worth ordinary morality act saint hero characteristic also small act mercy examine account consequentialism bring problem requirement rationality bear type act maximise principle act normally consider require optional