Belief and imagination
Two assumptions are often made about the nature of the cognitive attitudes that allow us to engage with fiction and in pretence: the uniformity and the non-doxastic assumptions. The uniformity assumption tells us that both of these activities involve the same cognitive attitudes. The non-doxastic assumption tells us that these cognitive attitudes are not beliefs, but belief-like states that we can call belief-like imaginings. I will challenge both of these assumptions in this thesis. In the case of the uniformity assumption, I will draw a distinction between voluntary and involuntary imaginative counterparts. I will argue that if a belief-like counterpart is involved in our engagement in pretence, it will be a voluntary counterpart, whereas an involuntary one will have to be associated with our engagement with fiction. Against the non-doxastic assumption, I will argue that we can explain our engagement with these activities by introducing beliefs with distinct contents. In the case of pretence, I will suggest that the relevant beliefs are of the form â[I believe] I PRETEND that âpââ. In the case of fiction, I will argue that the relevant beliefs are of the form âI believe p [in the fiction]â. This
Davis, Jack Frank
Belief and imagination. Two assumptions are often made about the nature of the cognitive attitudes that allow us to engage with fiction and in pretence: the uniformity and the non-doxastic assumptions. The uniformity assumption tells us that both of these activities involve the same cognitive attitudes. The non-doxastic assumption tells us that these cognitive attitudes are not beliefs, but belief-like states that we can call belief-like imaginings. I will challenge both of these assumptions in this thesis. In the case of the uniformity assumption, I will draw a distinction between voluntary and involuntary imaginative counterparts. I will argue that if a belief-like counterpart is involved in our engagement in pretence, it will be a voluntary counterpart, whereas an involuntary one will have to be associated with our engagement with fiction. Against the non-doxastic assumption, I will argue that we can explain our engagement with these activities by introducing beliefs with distinct contents. In the case of pretence, I will suggest that the relevant beliefs are of the form â[I believe] I PRETEND that âpââ. In the case of fiction, I will argue that the relevant beliefs are of the form âI believe p [in the fiction]â. This
belief imagination assumption often make nature cognitive attitude allow engage fiction pretence uniformity non doxastic assumption uniformity assumption tell activity_involve cognitive attitude non doxastic assumption tell cognitive attitude_belief belief like state call belief like imaginings challenge_assumption thesis case uniformity assumption draw_distinction voluntary imaginative counterpart argue belief like counterpart involve engagement pretence voluntary counterpart whereas associate engagement fiction non doxastic assumption argue explain engagement activity introduce belief distinct content case pretence suggest relevant beliefs form believe pretend case fiction argue relevant belief form believe fiction