Towards a hybrid theory of Property Entitlement, from a combination of Lockean and Humean elements
John Lockeâs approach to property rights is often seen as inherently unsatisfactory in todayâs world, because of problems in a number of areas, significant amongst which are difficulties in tracing a historical chain from just initial acquisition to current title and a certain imprecision which seems unavoidable within the theory. As a result, a more conventional approach has tended to predominate. This might be thought to be exemplified by the writings of David Hume. In this essay, I argue that liberal rights assumptions can give rise to genuine Lockean-style property claims, because these seem to do justice to a number of our ethical intuitions, and that these need to be incorporated in our ideas of how property title is justly acquired. I suggest that these intuitions relate to the genesis of property rights, whilst Humean thoughts are often more relevant when we are unable to properly trace such genesis. I also suggest that conventionalists should not dismiss Locke, nor vice versa. Instead we need a hybrid theory that incorporates both elements. I do not reach a final conclusion on how the two might be brought together, but suggest a way forward for this endeavour. Lockeâs theory is one about how
Humphries, Simon James
Towards a hybrid theory of Property Entitlement, from a combination of Lockean and Humean elements. John Lockeâs approach to property rights is often seen as inherently unsatisfactory in todayâs world, because of problems in a number of areas, significant amongst which are difficulties in tracing a historical chain from just initial acquisition to current title and a certain imprecision which seems unavoidable within the theory. As a result, a more conventional approach has tended to predominate. This might be thought to be exemplified by the writings of David Hume. In this essay, I argue that liberal rights assumptions can give rise to genuine Lockean-style property claims, because these seem to do justice to a number of our ethical intuitions, and that these need to be incorporated in our ideas of how property title is justly acquired. I suggest that these intuitions relate to the genesis of property rights, whilst Humean thoughts are often more relevant when we are unable to properly trace such genesis. I also suggest that conventionalists should not dismiss Locke, nor vice versa. Instead we need a hybrid theory that incorporates both elements. I do not reach a final conclusion on how the two might be brought together, but suggest a way forward for this endeavour. Lockeâs theory is one about how
towards hybrid theory property combination humean element john_locke property_right often_see inherently unsatisfactory today world problem number area significant amongst difficulty trace_historical chain initial acquisition current title certain seem within theory conventional tended predominate might_think writing david_hume essay argue liberal right assumption give_rise genuine style property claim seem justice number ethical intuition need incorporate ideas property title justly acquire suggest intuition relate genesis property_right whilst humean thought often relevant unable properly trace genesis also_suggest dismiss locke vice_versa instead need hybrid theory incorporates element reach final conclusion might bring_together suggest_way forward endeavour locke theory