Legal rhetoric in Plato and Aristotle
This thesis deals with certain aspects of Aristotelian rhetoric, its relationship to earlier and contemporary authors, in particular to Plato, and its influence on Hellenistic rhetoric. The focus is on the theory of judicial rhetoric throughout. In Chapter I, a reconstruction of Platoâs view of rhetoric is intended to set the background against which the characteristic traits of Aristotelian judicial rhetoric will be examined. It is argued that Plato is consistently hostile towards âordinaryâ rhetoric, i.e. rhetoric that is aimed at persuasion and accessible to the citizens of the polis without restrictions. He finds no place for this kind of rhetoric in a properly functioning society. Chapter II focuses on Aristotleâs appraisal of judicial rhetoric: its possible function and relative value. The main contention of the chapter is that unlike Plato, Aristotle regards rhetoric as useful for eliciting just decisions. Aristotle does not, as often argued, limit the task of the courtroom orator to the discussion of facts, nor does he consider judicial rhetoric inferior to the deliberative branch. Chapter III looks at what Aristotle calls the specific arguments of judicial rhetoric. Its aim is to clarify the
Konczol, Miklos
Legal rhetoric in Plato and Aristotle. This thesis deals with certain aspects of Aristotelian rhetoric, its relationship to earlier and contemporary authors, in particular to Plato, and its influence on Hellenistic rhetoric. The focus is on the theory of judicial rhetoric throughout. In Chapter I, a reconstruction of Platoâs view of rhetoric is intended to set the background against which the characteristic traits of Aristotelian judicial rhetoric will be examined. It is argued that Plato is consistently hostile towards âordinaryâ rhetoric, i.e. rhetoric that is aimed at persuasion and accessible to the citizens of the polis without restrictions. He finds no place for this kind of rhetoric in a properly functioning society. Chapter II focuses on Aristotleâs appraisal of judicial rhetoric: its possible function and relative value. The main contention of the chapter is that unlike Plato, Aristotle regards rhetoric as useful for eliciting just decisions. Aristotle does not, as often argued, limit the task of the courtroom orator to the discussion of facts, nor does he consider judicial rhetoric inferior to the deliberative branch. Chapter III looks at what Aristotle calls the specific arguments of judicial rhetoric. Its aim is to clarify the
legal rhetoric plato_aristotle deal certain_aspect aristotelian rhetoric relationship earlier contemporary author particular plato influence hellenistic rhetoric focus theory judicial rhetoric throughout reconstruction plato view rhetoric intend set_background characteristic trait aristotelian judicial rhetoric examine argue_plato consistently hostile towards ordinary rhetoric rhetoric aim persuasion accessible citizen polis without restriction find place kind rhetoric properly functioning society focus aristotle appraisal judicial rhetoric possible function relative value main_contention unlike plato_aristotle regard rhetoric useful decision aristotle often argue limit task orator discussion fact consider judicial rhetoric inferior deliberative branch iii look aristotle call specific argument judicial rhetoric aim_clarify