Wittgenstein and Austin on 'what is in common' : a neglected perspective?
This thesis seeks to shed light on what I claim is a neglected aspect in the writings of later Ludwig Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. I badge this the âunity problemâ. Many interpreters tend to underestimate, or ignore, this important aspect, and to focus instead on what I will call the âcompatibility problemâ. The compatibility problem focuses on cases where philosophers say something which we would not say in ordinary language, or when philosophers violate its rules. According to this reading, Austin and Wittgenstein show philosophers that this is a source of traditional philosophical troubles. I argue for a different reading. My claim is that Austin and Wittgenstein think, instead, that in some specific cases philosophical trouble arises because philosophers look for one common thing in all cases where the same word is used. The aim in these cases is not to identify strings of words that we would not ordinarily say, rather it is to show that looking for something common to all cases in which we use the same word is problematic. This is the âunityâ problem. I will examine how both philosophers characterise the unity problem, and how they demonstrate that there is something misleading in looking
Al Zobi, Odi
Wittgenstein and Austin on 'what is in common' : a neglected perspective?. This thesis seeks to shed light on what I claim is a neglected aspect in the writings of later Ludwig Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. I badge this the âunity problemâ. Many interpreters tend to underestimate, or ignore, this important aspect, and to focus instead on what I will call the âcompatibility problemâ. The compatibility problem focuses on cases where philosophers say something which we would not say in ordinary language, or when philosophers violate its rules. According to this reading, Austin and Wittgenstein show philosophers that this is a source of traditional philosophical troubles. I argue for a different reading. My claim is that Austin and Wittgenstein think, instead, that in some specific cases philosophical trouble arises because philosophers look for one common thing in all cases where the same word is used. The aim in these cases is not to identify strings of words that we would not ordinarily say, rather it is to show that looking for something common to all cases in which we use the same word is problematic. This is the âunityâ problem. I will examine how both philosophers characterise the unity problem, and how they demonstrate that there is something misleading in looking
wittgenstein common neglect perspective seek shed_light claim neglect aspect writing later wittgenstein unity problem many interpreter tend underestimate ignore important_aspect focus_instead call compatibility problem compatibility problem focus case philosopher say something would say ordinary language philosopher violate rule according reading wittgenstein show philosopher source traditional_philosophical trouble argue different reading claim wittgenstein think instead specific_case philosophical trouble arise philosopher look common thing case word_use aim case identify string word would ordinarily say rather show look something common case use_word problematic unity problem examine philosopher characterise unity problem something mislead look