Wittgenstein and semantic presuppositions of definite descriptions in subject-position
The purpose of this work is to characterize the problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in subject-position in the light of a reassessment of the semantic framework of the Russell/Strawson controversy and analyze what would be the early and the later Wittgenstein's solution to such a problem. In the first part, the Russell/Strawson controversy is characterized. On the basis of Strawson's account, a general concept of semantic presupposition against which other theories may be tested is constructed. This allows the formulation of the problem above mentioned. Further analysis of the accounts involved reveals that Frege's concept of a 'semantic prerequisite' generated by definite descriptions in subject-position is an instance of the general concept. But Frege also held the view that simple proper names do not generate semantic prerequisites. The Fregean referential dualism suggests that the Russell/Strawson controversy, as far as only these authors' accounts are involved, is undecidable at the purely semantic level. This is the semantic framework against which Wittgenstein's philosophies are tested in the second part. The ~Tractatus~ adopts a modified version of the Russellian
Margutti Pinto, Paulo Roberto
philosophy ; Russell/Strawson controversy ; semantic presupposition ; semantic referent ; speaker's referent
Wittgenstein and semantic presuppositions of definite descriptions in subject-position. The purpose of this work is to characterize the problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in subject-position in the light of a reassessment of the semantic framework of the Russell/Strawson controversy and analyze what would be the early and the later Wittgenstein's solution to such a problem. In the first part, the Russell/Strawson controversy is characterized. On the basis of Strawson's account, a general concept of semantic presupposition against which other theories may be tested is constructed. This allows the formulation of the problem above mentioned. Further analysis of the accounts involved reveals that Frege's concept of a 'semantic prerequisite' generated by definite descriptions in subject-position is an instance of the general concept. But Frege also held the view that simple proper names do not generate semantic prerequisites. The Fregean referential dualism suggests that the Russell/Strawson controversy, as far as only these authors' accounts are involved, is undecidable at the purely semantic level. This is the semantic framework against which Wittgenstein's philosophies are tested in the second part. The ~Tractatus~ adopts a modified version of the Russellian
wittgenstein semantic presupposition definite_description subject_position purpose work characterize problem semantic presupposition generate definite_description subject_position light reassessment semantic framework russell controversy analyze would early later wittgenstein solution_problem first_part russell controversy characterize basis account general concept semantic presupposition theory may test construct allows formulation problem mention analysis account involve reveals frege concept semantic prerequisite generate definite_description subject_position instance general concept frege also hold_view simple proper_name generate semantic prerequisite fregean referential dualism suggest russell controversy far author account involve purely semantic_level semantic framework wittgenstein philosophy test second_part tractatus adopts modify version russellian