Scepticism and presuppositionlessness : Hegel and the problem of beginning
This thesis is concerned with what I call âthe problem of beginning.â This problem expresses the difficulty involved in getting the type of critical, rational thinking proper to philosophical work underway in a manner that is not problematically arbitrary. This amounts to a dilemma between beginning dogmatically by depending upon unexamined presuppositions, and beginning dogmatically with some fundamentally arbitrary assertion. After motivating the problem and explicating it in some detail in the introduction, I identify a number of possible, but unappealing ways to respond. In Chapter 1 I argue that, motivated by his relationship with Pyrrhonism, Hegel is engaging with this same problem at the start of his Science of Logic. I identify a distinctive form of a solution to the problem in Hegel's work which amounts to isolating a beginning which is both presuppositionless and non-arbitrary, or, in his terminology, both immediate and mediated. In Hegel's work I identify two different possible ways in which the form of this solution can be fleshed out. They differ in terms of what they designate as the element of mediation in the beginning. In the first case, this element is stated to be the project of phenomenology,
Dunphy, Robert John
B2948 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831
Scepticism and presuppositionlessness : Hegel and the problem of beginning. This thesis is concerned with what I call âthe problem of beginning.â This problem expresses the difficulty involved in getting the type of critical, rational thinking proper to philosophical work underway in a manner that is not problematically arbitrary. This amounts to a dilemma between beginning dogmatically by depending upon unexamined presuppositions, and beginning dogmatically with some fundamentally arbitrary assertion. After motivating the problem and explicating it in some detail in the introduction, I identify a number of possible, but unappealing ways to respond. In Chapter 1 I argue that, motivated by his relationship with Pyrrhonism, Hegel is engaging with this same problem at the start of his Science of Logic. I identify a distinctive form of a solution to the problem in Hegel's work which amounts to isolating a beginning which is both presuppositionless and non-arbitrary, or, in his terminology, both immediate and mediated. In Hegel's work I identify two different possible ways in which the form of this solution can be fleshed out. They differ in terms of what they designate as the element of mediation in the beginning. In the first case, this element is stated to be the project of phenomenology,
scepticism hegel problem beginning concerned call problem beginning problem express difficulty_involve get type critical rational thinking proper philosophical_work underway manner problematically arbitrary amount dilemma begin depend_upon unexamined presupposition begin fundamentally arbitrary assertion motivate problem explicate detail introduction identify number possible way_respond argue motivate relationship hegel engage problem start science logic identify distinctive form solution_problem hegel work amount isolate begin non arbitrary terminology immediate mediate hegel work identify two_different possible way form solution flesh out differ term designate element mediation beginning first case element state project phenomenology