The demonstrative structure and methodology of the Aristotelian science of being qua being
The dissertation contends that the Aristotelian science of being <I>qua</I> being falls under the rubric of 'demonstrative' science, as defined in the <I>Posterior Analytics</I>. This argument is set forth in response to a well-entrenched interpretation, which regards the science of being as a special variant of dialectical inquiry, and not a proper science. The central interpretative crux underlying this debate about the 'scientific' status of ontology is the problem of the homonymy of being (ÏĂČ Ăł<I>Îœ</I>). According to the doctrine of the <I>Posterior Analytics</I>, the principles and properties investigated in a single science must fall under the ambit of a single genus of entities. But it has appeared to the majority of commentators that this condition of homogeneity cannot be met by the science of being. Beings, for Aristotle, are heterogeneous; they all under a multiplicity of categories. These categories do not have a generic unity, but are connected only in virtue of their shared dependency on the primary category, viz. <I>oÎœÌÏĂ­Î±</I>. Commentators insist that this ÏÏĂČÎ¶Î"ÌÎœ structure of relations cannot be identified with the strictly homogeneous structure of apodeictic science. In response,
Fraser, K. A.
The demonstrative structure and methodology of the Aristotelian science of being qua being. The dissertation contends that the Aristotelian science of being <I>qua</I> being falls under the rubric of 'demonstrative' science, as defined in the <I>Posterior Analytics</I>. This argument is set forth in response to a well-entrenched interpretation, which regards the science of being as a special variant of dialectical inquiry, and not a proper science. The central interpretative crux underlying this debate about the 'scientific' status of ontology is the problem of the homonymy of being (ÏĂČ Ăł<I>Îœ</I>). According to the doctrine of the <I>Posterior Analytics</I>, the principles and properties investigated in a single science must fall under the ambit of a single genus of entities. But it has appeared to the majority of commentators that this condition of homogeneity cannot be met by the science of being. Beings, for Aristotle, are heterogeneous; they all under a multiplicity of categories. These categories do not have a generic unity, but are connected only in virtue of their shared dependency on the primary category, viz. <I>oÎœÌÏĂ­Î±</I>. Commentators insist that this ÏÏĂČÎ¶Î"ÌÎœ structure of relations cannot be identified with the strictly homogeneous structure of apodeictic science. In response,
demonstrative structure aristotelian science qua contend aristotelian science qua fall rubric demonstrative science define posterior argument set_forth response well interpretation regard science special variant dialectical inquiry proper science central interpretative crux underlie debate scientific status ontology problem homonymy according doctrine posterior principles property investigate single science must fall ambit single genus entity appeared majority commentator condition homogeneity meet science aristotle heterogeneous multiplicity category category generic unity connect virtue share dependency primary category viz insist structure relation identify strictly homogeneous structure science response