The naturalisation of transcendental idealism
In the early section of the thesis I argue for a position which endorses what is usually considered to be an unacceptable paradox: the paradox of the Naturalisation Idealism (hereafter, âthe paradoxâ). The paradox occurs most vividly in the work of Arthur Schopenhauer, a philosopher who claimed notoriously that the brain is responsible for the ideality of the whole world even though the brain is itself an object within the world. I argue that there are four key philosophical intuitions whose indubitability leads to the paradox, but I suggest that the paradox may be considered in a more positive light by construing the intuitions in terms of a key analogy. I call the resulting position âcontraspectivismâ. Contraspectivism enables us to countenance what I call a âfour-fitâ between the key philosophical intuitions, with a âfulcralâ role for the brain in connecting them. I claim that this position comprises a âCopernican turnaroundâ: a position which upholds Kantâs Copernicanism but which nonetheless explicates it according to the original reality of the world within which the brain is environed. I allege that three philosophers, in particular, are committed â explicitly or implicitly â
Irvine, B. T.
The naturalisation of transcendental idealism. In the early section of the thesis I argue for a position which endorses what is usually considered to be an unacceptable paradox: the paradox of the Naturalisation Idealism (hereafter, âthe paradoxâ). The paradox occurs most vividly in the work of Arthur Schopenhauer, a philosopher who claimed notoriously that the brain is responsible for the ideality of the whole world even though the brain is itself an object within the world. I argue that there are four key philosophical intuitions whose indubitability leads to the paradox, but I suggest that the paradox may be considered in a more positive light by construing the intuitions in terms of a key analogy. I call the resulting position âcontraspectivismâ. Contraspectivism enables us to countenance what I call a âfour-fitâ between the key philosophical intuitions, with a âfulcralâ role for the brain in connecting them. I claim that this position comprises a âCopernican turnaroundâ: a position which upholds Kantâs Copernicanism but which nonetheless explicates it according to the original reality of the world within which the brain is environed. I allege that three philosophers, in particular, are committed â explicitly or implicitly â
naturalisation transcendental_idealism early section argue position endorse usually consider unacceptable paradox paradox naturalisation idealism hereafter paradox paradox occur vividly work schopenhauer philosopher claim notoriously brain responsible whole world even_though brain object within world argue four_key philosophical intuition whose lead paradox suggest paradox may_consider positive light construe intuition term key analogy call result position enable countenance call fit key philosophical intuition role brain connect them claim position comprises position upholds kant nonetheless explicate accord original reality world within brain allege philosopher particular commit explicitly_implicitly