Embodiment and grammatical structure : an approach to the relation of experience, assertion and truth
In this thesis I address a concern in both existential phenomenology and embodied cognition, namely, the question of how âhigherâ cognitive abilities such as language and judgements of truth relate to embodied experience. I suggest that although our words are grounded in experience, what makes this grounding and our higher abilities possible is grammatical structure. The opening chapter contrasts the âsituatedâ approach of embodied cognition and existential phenomenology with Cartesian methodological solipsism. The latter produces a series of dualisms, including that of language and meaning, whereas the former dissolves such dualisms. The second chapter adapts Merleau-Pontyâs arguments against the perceptual constancy hypothesis in order to undermine the dualism of grammar and meaning. This raises the question of what grammar is, which is addressed in the third chapter. I acknowledge the force of Chomskyâs observation that language is structure dependent and briefly introduce a minimal grammatical operation which might be the âspark which lit the intellectual forest fireâ (Clark: 2001, 151). Grammatical relations are argued to make possible the grounding of our symbols in chapters 4 and 5,
Malt, Alexander James
Embodiment and grammatical structure : an approach to the relation of experience, assertion and truth. In this thesis I address a concern in both existential phenomenology and embodied cognition, namely, the question of how âhigherâ cognitive abilities such as language and judgements of truth relate to embodied experience. I suggest that although our words are grounded in experience, what makes this grounding and our higher abilities possible is grammatical structure. The opening chapter contrasts the âsituatedâ approach of embodied cognition and existential phenomenology with Cartesian methodological solipsism. The latter produces a series of dualisms, including that of language and meaning, whereas the former dissolves such dualisms. The second chapter adapts Merleau-Pontyâs arguments against the perceptual constancy hypothesis in order to undermine the dualism of grammar and meaning. This raises the question of what grammar is, which is addressed in the third chapter. I acknowledge the force of Chomskyâs observation that language is structure dependent and briefly introduce a minimal grammatical operation which might be the âspark which lit the intellectual forest fireâ (Clark: 2001, 151). Grammatical relations are argued to make possible the grounding of our symbols in chapters 4 and 5,
embodiment grammatical_structure relation experience assertion truth address_concern existential phenomenology embody cognition namely question higher cognitive_ability language judgement truth relate embodied experience suggest although word ground experience make ground high ability possible grammatical_structure open contrast situate embodied cognition existential phenomenology cartesian methodological latter produce series dualism include language meaning whereas former dissolve dualism second adapts merleau_ponty argument perceptual constancy hypothesis order undermine dualism grammar meaning raise_question grammar address third chapter acknowledge force chomsky observation language structure dependent briefly introduce minimal grammatical operation might spark intellectual forest fire clark grammatical_relation argue make_possible grounding symbol