Naturalising intentionality : a teleological approach
This thesis develops a teleological theory of mental representation to naturalise intentionality. Teleosemantics explains mental representation in terms of biological functions. The thesis addresses a number of foundational problems that threats the viability of teleosemantics. The first chapter, âThe metaphysics of mental representationâ, develops a basic conception of mental representation that is designed to satisfy certain intuitive requirements (misrepresentation and original intentionality) and methodological requirements (explanatory power and ontological parsimony). The second chapter, âNaturalising intentionalityâ, defends the thesis that mental representation is naturalistically reducible and in particular that it should be explained teleosemantically. After that, it addresses some of Tyler Burgeâs objections to reductionist naturalism in general and teleosemantics in particular. The third chapter, âThe minimal conditions for intentionality: the problem of demarcationâ, considers the problem of demarcating the limits of intentionality and the objection that teleosemantics and other naturalist theories are too liberal. It adopts the method of reflective equilibrium to develop minimal
Farias De Souza Filho, Sergio
Naturalising intentionality : a teleological approach. This thesis develops a teleological theory of mental representation to naturalise intentionality. Teleosemantics explains mental representation in terms of biological functions. The thesis addresses a number of foundational problems that threats the viability of teleosemantics. The first chapter, âThe metaphysics of mental representationâ, develops a basic conception of mental representation that is designed to satisfy certain intuitive requirements (misrepresentation and original intentionality) and methodological requirements (explanatory power and ontological parsimony). The second chapter, âNaturalising intentionalityâ, defends the thesis that mental representation is naturalistically reducible and in particular that it should be explained teleosemantically. After that, it addresses some of Tyler Burgeâs objections to reductionist naturalism in general and teleosemantics in particular. The third chapter, âThe minimal conditions for intentionality: the problem of demarcationâ, considers the problem of demarcating the limits of intentionality and the objection that teleosemantics and other naturalist theories are too liberal. It adopts the method of reflective equilibrium to develop minimal
naturalising intentionality teleological approach develops teleological theory_mental representation naturalise intentionality explain mental_representation term biological function address number foundational problem threat viability first metaphysics mental_representation develop basic conception mental_representation design satisfy certain intuitive requirement misrepresentation original intentionality methodological requirement explanatory_power ontological parsimony second naturalising intentionality defend mental_representation reducible particular explain address objection reductionist naturalism general particular third minimal condition intentionality problem demarcation considers problem demarcate limit intentionality objection naturalist theory liberal adopts method reflective equilibrium develop minimal