Representation rectified
This abstract is a little involved and technical. Those looking for a more leisurely, thematic overview of the thesis can turn to the Introduction, which follows shortly. In the first chapter of the thesis, I examine Andy Clarkâs argument for the extended mind thesis (EM henceforth). As Clark acknowledges, his argument for EM relies on a brand of functionalism developed by Frank Jackson and David Braddon-Mitchell. Mark Sprevak claims to have developed a reductio not only of Clarkâs argument of EM, but of the functionalist position that Clarkâs argument presupposes. I show that this reductio can be blocked, because it rests on an optional presupposition (a presupposition that is anyway implausible). But by rejecting this presupposition, we end up blocking Clarkâs argument for EM as well as Sprevakâs reductio of that argument. This result is bad news for Clark, but rather better news for the functionalists on whose work Clarkâs argument relies. In chapters 2 and 3, I develop and apply a model-based theory of mental representation. The basic idea is there is a type of mental representation (what I call âs-representationâ) which is best understood by analogy with scientific models. In chapter 2,
Wadham, Jack
Representation rectified. This abstract is a little involved and technical. Those looking for a more leisurely, thematic overview of the thesis can turn to the Introduction, which follows shortly. In the first chapter of the thesis, I examine Andy Clarkâs argument for the extended mind thesis (EM henceforth). As Clark acknowledges, his argument for EM relies on a brand of functionalism developed by Frank Jackson and David Braddon-Mitchell. Mark Sprevak claims to have developed a reductio not only of Clarkâs argument of EM, but of the functionalist position that Clarkâs argument presupposes. I show that this reductio can be blocked, because it rests on an optional presupposition (a presupposition that is anyway implausible). But by rejecting this presupposition, we end up blocking Clarkâs argument for EM as well as Sprevakâs reductio of that argument. This result is bad news for Clark, but rather better news for the functionalists on whose work Clarkâs argument relies. In chapters 2 and 3, I develop and apply a model-based theory of mental representation. The basic idea is there is a type of mental representation (what I call âs-representationâ) which is best understood by analogy with scientific models. In chapter 2,
representation rectify abstract little involved technical look thematic overview turn introduction follow shortly first_examine clark argument extend mind henceforth clark acknowledge argument relies brand functionalism develop mark claim develop clark argument functionalist position clark argument presupposes show block rest optional presupposition presupposition implausible reject presupposition end block clark argument well argument bad news clark rather well news functionalist whose_work clark argument relies develop_apply model based theory_mental representation basic idea type mental_representation call representation best_understood analogy scientific model