Self and agency : a defence of PraĆastapÄda's differential naturalism
This thesis discusses the VaiĆeáčŁika philosopher PraĆastapÄda's conception of self in his text, the PadÄrthadharmasaáčgraha, and its key commentaries. It examines the arguments these texts propose for the existence of a self that is non-physical and yet non-Cartesian, based in a paradigm I term âdifferential naturalism'. I examine PraĆastapÄda's four arguments for the existence of a self from: the structures of agency and action in human cognition; in intentional mental and bodily acts; in the homeostatic regulation of the human body; and in the biological life of the human organism. The core thesis, I argue, is that the rational structures of agency and action we find in these activities require a conscious owner. This must be a self. The dualist argument for the self's non-physical nature emerges from a dichotomous ontology of mental and physical properties and causal powers, which entails that only a non-physical substance can be a bearer of the normative and intentional structures that agency and mental causation demand. The minded self is, however, necessarily embodied. PraĆastapÄda, I suggest, postulates a naturalistic conception of self. Such a self enables the integration of the mental,
Sinha, Shalini
B0132.V2 Vaise?ika
Self and agency : a defence of PraĆastapÄda's differential naturalism. This thesis discusses the VaiĆeáčŁika philosopher PraĆastapÄda's conception of self in his text, the PadÄrthadharmasaáčgraha, and its key commentaries. It examines the arguments these texts propose for the existence of a self that is non-physical and yet non-Cartesian, based in a paradigm I term âdifferential naturalism'. I examine PraĆastapÄda's four arguments for the existence of a self from: the structures of agency and action in human cognition; in intentional mental and bodily acts; in the homeostatic regulation of the human body; and in the biological life of the human organism. The core thesis, I argue, is that the rational structures of agency and action we find in these activities require a conscious owner. This must be a self. The dualist argument for the self's non-physical nature emerges from a dichotomous ontology of mental and physical properties and causal powers, which entails that only a non-physical substance can be a bearer of the normative and intentional structures that agency and mental causation demand. The minded self is, however, necessarily embodied. PraĆastapÄda, I suggest, postulates a naturalistic conception of self. Such a self enables the integration of the mental,
self agency defence differential naturalism discus philosopher conception_self text key commentary examines argument texts propose existence self non physical yet non cartesian base paradigm term differential naturalism examine argument_existence self structure_agency action human_cognition intentional mental bodily act regulation human_body biological life human organism core argue rational structure_agency action activity require conscious owner must self dualist argument self non physical nature emerge dichotomous ontology mental_physical property causal_power entail non physical substance bearer normative intentional structure_agency mental causation demand mind self however necessarily embody suggest postulate naturalistic conception_self self enable integration mental