Intuition, perception, and emotion : a critical study of the prospects for contemporary ethical intuitionism
This thesis is a critical study of the prospects for contemporary accounts of ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism is an epistemological theory about the nature of our justified ethical beliefs, whose central claim is that we have at least some non-inferentially justified beliefs. Having been out of favour for much of the latter-part of the twentieth century, ethical intuitionism is enjoying something of a renaissance. Contemporary proponents of the view have shown that ethical intuitionism need not fall foul of the main objections previously brought against it. Furthermore, developments in epistemology have helped to make the notion of non-inferential justification (and the associated view, epistemological foundationalism) more philosophically respectable. As I will suggest, non-inferentially justified belief paradigmatically involves a belief that is justified by a non-doxastic state. In this thesis I will consider four accounts of ethical intuitionism which each claim that a particular kind of non-doxastic state can ground justified ethical beliefs: understandings, intellectual seemings, perceptual experiences and emotional experiences. Note that contemporary ethical intuitionists do not commit themselves
Cowan, Robert
B Philosophy (General) ; BJ Ethics
Intuition, perception, and emotion : a critical study of the prospects for contemporary ethical intuitionism. This thesis is a critical study of the prospects for contemporary accounts of ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism is an epistemological theory about the nature of our justified ethical beliefs, whose central claim is that we have at least some non-inferentially justified beliefs. Having been out of favour for much of the latter-part of the twentieth century, ethical intuitionism is enjoying something of a renaissance. Contemporary proponents of the view have shown that ethical intuitionism need not fall foul of the main objections previously brought against it. Furthermore, developments in epistemology have helped to make the notion of non-inferential justification (and the associated view, epistemological foundationalism) more philosophically respectable. As I will suggest, non-inferentially justified belief paradigmatically involves a belief that is justified by a non-doxastic state. In this thesis I will consider four accounts of ethical intuitionism which each claim that a particular kind of non-doxastic state can ground justified ethical beliefs: understandings, intellectual seemings, perceptual experiences and emotional experiences. Note that contemporary ethical intuitionists do not commit themselves
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