Experience and knowledge
Experience is the source of empirical knowledge. Does this require that experience itself be knowledge? My answer to the question is affirmative. Experience, in so far as it is the source of empirical knowledge, has to be itself knowledge. Following the traditional understanding of knowledge, this means that experience as the source of knowledge is a kind of justified true belief. This I call the gnostic conception of experience, or gnosticism for short. The aim of the thesis is to argue for gnosticism. The thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 proposes gnosticism and examines some historical traditions from the gnosticist point of view. Chapter 2 defends a version of traditional understanding of knowledge on which gnosticismis based. Chapter 3 rejects nongnosticism by arguing against nonconceptualism. It is argued that nonconceptual experience cannot play a justificatory role for thought, since there is no systematic relation between nonconceptual experience and thought. Chapter 4 rejects quasi-gnosticism by arguing against conceptualism. Based on the doxastic criterion of justification, the chapter challenges the justificatory role of nondoxatic conceptual experience. Chapter 5 explores the relationship
Tang, R.
Experience and knowledge. Experience is the source of empirical knowledge. Does this require that experience itself be knowledge? My answer to the question is affirmative. Experience, in so far as it is the source of empirical knowledge, has to be itself knowledge. Following the traditional understanding of knowledge, this means that experience as the source of knowledge is a kind of justified true belief. This I call the gnostic conception of experience, or gnosticism for short. The aim of the thesis is to argue for gnosticism. The thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 proposes gnosticism and examines some historical traditions from the gnosticist point of view. Chapter 2 defends a version of traditional understanding of knowledge on which gnosticismis based. Chapter 3 rejects nongnosticism by arguing against nonconceptualism. It is argued that nonconceptual experience cannot play a justificatory role for thought, since there is no systematic relation between nonconceptual experience and thought. Chapter 4 rejects quasi-gnosticism by arguing against conceptualism. Based on the doxastic criterion of justification, the chapter challenges the justificatory role of nondoxatic conceptual experience. Chapter 5 explores the relationship
experience knowledge experience source empirical_knowledge require experience knowledge answer_question affirmative experience far source empirical_knowledge knowledge following traditional knowledge mean experience source knowledge kind justify true belief call gnostic conception experience gnosticism short aim argue gnosticism consists chapter proposes gnosticism examine historical tradition point_view defends version traditional knowledge base reject argue argue experience play justificatory role thought since systematic relation experience thought reject quasi gnosticism argue based doxastic criterion justification challenge justificatory role conceptual experience explores_relationship