Laws of nature : reductive metaphysics, anti-reductive semantics
Serious scientific effort continues to be expended in the search for a so-called âTheory of Everythingâ, a fundamental theory or law of nature upon which all others depend. Specialist philosophers of physics have begun to tackle specific foundational questions associated with particular candidate Theories of Everything. Yet generalist philosophers of science have said very little about the wider philosophical implications of Theories of Everything. This is regrettable, for the existence or otherwise of a Theory of Everything impacts upon issues of general interest, such as reductionism, explanation and the status of laws of nature. This thesis examines some of these issues. In particular, it motivates and articulates a philosophical analysis of laws of nature which, unlike other analyses, is compatible with the existence of a Theory of Everything. I analyse Theories of Everything as laws of nature which meet certain special conditions. I then demonstrate that such laws are logically possible. In doing so, I turn a number of traditional objections to the possibility of a Theory of Everything. Chief amongst these is the claim that a Theory of Everything would entail unpalatably strong reductionism. I develop
Heard, D.
Laws of nature : reductive metaphysics, anti-reductive semantics. Serious scientific effort continues to be expended in the search for a so-called âTheory of Everythingâ, a fundamental theory or law of nature upon which all others depend. Specialist philosophers of physics have begun to tackle specific foundational questions associated with particular candidate Theories of Everything. Yet generalist philosophers of science have said very little about the wider philosophical implications of Theories of Everything. This is regrettable, for the existence or otherwise of a Theory of Everything impacts upon issues of general interest, such as reductionism, explanation and the status of laws of nature. This thesis examines some of these issues. In particular, it motivates and articulates a philosophical analysis of laws of nature which, unlike other analyses, is compatible with the existence of a Theory of Everything. I analyse Theories of Everything as laws of nature which meet certain special conditions. I then demonstrate that such laws are logically possible. In doing so, I turn a number of traditional objections to the possibility of a Theory of Everything. Chief amongst these is the claim that a Theory of Everything would entail unpalatably strong reductionism. I develop
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