Wittgenstein and aspects : the problems of free will, causation and religious belief
In this dissertation I pursue the three following objectives: First, to articulate and examine Wittgenstein's remarks on voluntary action and, in particular, his remarks on the nature of free action and free will. Wittgenstein argues that voluntary actions are distinguished not by volitions preceding the actions but by the surroundings (mental and behavioural) in which they occur, and he contends that to express a belief in the freedom of the will is to express a personal attitude towards human beings and their actions. Second, to explain Wittgenstein's work on causation and natural law: he argues for the consistency of the regularity theory of natural laws (that natural laws express merely universal regularities) and freedom of action, and also that we use two different concepts of causation, namely, regular succession and causal connection. Third, to investigate Wittgenstein's use of the concept 'aspect' and the related concept of'attitude', which plays a fundamental part in some of the preceding arguments. I consider Wittgenstein's work on 'seeing aspects' and his - hitherto unexplored -- application of this concept in the philosophy of mathematics, where he argues that mathematical intuition is a form
Scott, Michael Andrew
Philosophy
Wittgenstein and aspects : the problems of free will, causation and religious belief. In this dissertation I pursue the three following objectives: First, to articulate and examine Wittgenstein's remarks on voluntary action and, in particular, his remarks on the nature of free action and free will. Wittgenstein argues that voluntary actions are distinguished not by volitions preceding the actions but by the surroundings (mental and behavioural) in which they occur, and he contends that to express a belief in the freedom of the will is to express a personal attitude towards human beings and their actions. Second, to explain Wittgenstein's work on causation and natural law: he argues for the consistency of the regularity theory of natural laws (that natural laws express merely universal regularities) and freedom of action, and also that we use two different concepts of causation, namely, regular succession and causal connection. Third, to investigate Wittgenstein's use of the concept 'aspect' and the related concept of'attitude', which plays a fundamental part in some of the preceding arguments. I consider Wittgenstein's work on 'seeing aspects' and his - hitherto unexplored -- application of this concept in the philosophy of mathematics, where he argues that mathematical intuition is a form
wittgenstein aspect problem free causation religious_belief pursue follow objective first articulate examine wittgenstein remark voluntary action particular remark nature free action free_will wittgenstein argue voluntary action distinguish volition precede action surroundings mental behavioural occur contend express belief freedom express personal attitude_towards human_being action second explain wittgenstein work causation natural_law argues consistency regularity theory natural_law natural_law express merely universal regularity freedom action also use two_different concept causation namely regular succession causal connection third investigate wittgenstein use concept aspect related_concept attitude play fundamental part precede argument consider wittgenstein work seeing aspect hitherto unexplored application concept philosophy_mathematics argue mathematical intuition form