Towards a scientific conception of free will
Can we reach a satisfactory conception of free will that is consistent with the current scientific world view? This important problem is the subject of this thesis. It is argued that certain areas of science raise profound problems for libertarian conceptions of free will and moral responsibility. Specifically, it is unclear how libertarian free will can arise from the neuronal processes of the brain; it is unclear how, or why, it has evolved; and it is inconsistent with the physicist's conception of time as it is understood through Einstein's Theory of Relativity. These are problems which do not arise for compatibilist conceptions of free will. Furthermore, there are a number of more philosophical objections which can be raised against libertarianismâincluding Harry Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternate possibilities and Galen Strawson's recent objection to ultimate responsibilityâwhich strongly indicate that we do not have free will or moral responsibility in any libertarian sense. As a consequence of this various compatibilist conceptions of free will are considered in order to see if a satisfactory compatibilist account of free will can be reached. It is concluded that an epistemic
Iredale, Mathew Walter Martin
Philosophy
Towards a scientific conception of free will. Can we reach a satisfactory conception of free will that is consistent with the current scientific world view? This important problem is the subject of this thesis. It is argued that certain areas of science raise profound problems for libertarian conceptions of free will and moral responsibility. Specifically, it is unclear how libertarian free will can arise from the neuronal processes of the brain; it is unclear how, or why, it has evolved; and it is inconsistent with the physicist's conception of time as it is understood through Einstein's Theory of Relativity. These are problems which do not arise for compatibilist conceptions of free will. Furthermore, there are a number of more philosophical objections which can be raised against libertarianismâincluding Harry Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternate possibilities and Galen Strawson's recent objection to ultimate responsibilityâwhich strongly indicate that we do not have free will or moral responsibility in any libertarian sense. As a consequence of this various compatibilist conceptions of free will are considered in order to see if a satisfactory compatibilist account of free will can be reached. It is concluded that an epistemic
towards scientific conception free will reach satisfactory conception free consistent current scientific world_view important problem subject thesis argue certain_area science raise profound problem libertarian conception free moral_responsibility specifically unclear libertarian free arise process brain unclear evolve inconsistent physicist conception time understood theory relativity problem_arise conception free will furthermore number philosophical objection raise include frankfurt argument principle alternate possibility galen recent objection ultimate responsibility strongly indicate free moral_responsibility libertarian sense consequence various conception free consider order see satisfactory account free reach conclude epistemic