Aristotle's Metaphysics Z from the standpoint of a theory of definition
This thesis is about the problems and the arguments presented in book Z of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In Z, Aristotle sets out an enquiry into the first genus of entities: substance. The solution is meant to contribute to the foundation of metaphysics. I suggest that metaphysics is conceived to be a demonstrative science and Z is the enquiry to establish its principle by answering what substance is. Accordingly, the most promising way to engage with Z is to establish a correspondence between substance and definition. Substance is the entity that grounds the existence of the other entities just as a definition is the statement that grounds the demonstrations conducted in a science. Chapter One and Chapter Two outline a theory of definition for my discussion of Z. In the light of the logical works, I argue that Z's enquiry is concerned with two issues about substance: primacy and unity. Chapter Three and Four are concerned with the primacy of substance. My contention is that Z.4-11 develops a formalist essentialism that is designed to ensure the primacy of substance. If substance is defined as essence and identified with form, then substance turns out to be primary. Chapter Five and Six are concerned with the
Argenti, A.
Aristotle's Metaphysics Z from the standpoint of a theory of definition. This thesis is about the problems and the arguments presented in book Z of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In Z, Aristotle sets out an enquiry into the first genus of entities: substance. The solution is meant to contribute to the foundation of metaphysics. I suggest that metaphysics is conceived to be a demonstrative science and Z is the enquiry to establish its principle by answering what substance is. Accordingly, the most promising way to engage with Z is to establish a correspondence between substance and definition. Substance is the entity that grounds the existence of the other entities just as a definition is the statement that grounds the demonstrations conducted in a science. Chapter One and Chapter Two outline a theory of definition for my discussion of Z. In the light of the logical works, I argue that Z's enquiry is concerned with two issues about substance: primacy and unity. Chapter Three and Four are concerned with the primacy of substance. My contention is that Z.4-11 develops a formalist essentialism that is designed to ensure the primacy of substance. If substance is defined as essence and identified with form, then substance turns out to be primary. Chapter Five and Six are concerned with the
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