Real normativity
Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) marked the beginning in earnest of the continuing debate about the connection of rule-following and meaning to normativity. This thesis continues my previous project (Cross 2013) on this topic. That first instalment assessed a dilemma identified by John McDowell (1984) between two arguably unappealing alternatives: embracing something like Crispin Wright's (1980) global anti-realism, and facing up to the notorious 'sceptical paradox' Kripke found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953). Where previously I focused on Wright, I will now focus on Kripke. I begin with an outline of Kripke's problem and locate it within the context of my previous work, in turn locating the normativity of meaning within the challenge. I then critically assess the relative merits of several accounts of meaning-normativity that present as straight solutions to Kripke's paradox, before responding to arguments that the paradox can and should be resolved by rejecting the critical premiss that meaning is essentially normative. I ultimately conclude that while meaning-normativists can plausibly resist this and similar assaults, the whole topic is
Cross, J. A.
Real normativity. Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) marked the beginning in earnest of the continuing debate about the connection of rule-following and meaning to normativity. This thesis continues my previous project (Cross 2013) on this topic. That first instalment assessed a dilemma identified by John McDowell (1984) between two arguably unappealing alternatives: embracing something like Crispin Wright's (1980) global anti-realism, and facing up to the notorious 'sceptical paradox' Kripke found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953). Where previously I focused on Wright, I will now focus on Kripke. I begin with an outline of Kripke's problem and locate it within the context of my previous work, in turn locating the normativity of meaning within the challenge. I then critically assess the relative merits of several accounts of meaning-normativity that present as straight solutions to Kripke's paradox, before responding to arguments that the paradox can and should be resolved by rejecting the critical premiss that meaning is essentially normative. I ultimately conclude that while meaning-normativists can plausibly resist this and similar assaults, the whole topic is
real normativity kripke wittgenstein private language mark_begin continue debate connection rule_following meaning normativity continue previous project cross topic first assess dilemma identify john_mcdowell arguably alternative embrace something_like crispin_wright global anti_realism face notorious sceptical paradox kripke find wittgenstein philosophical_investigations wittgenstein previously focus wright focus kripke begin_outline kripke problem locate_within context previous_work turn locate normativity meaning within challenge critically_assess relative_merit several account meaning normativity present solution kripke paradox respond argument paradox resolve reject critical premiss meaning essentially normative ultimately conclude meaning plausibly resist similar assault whole topic