Policy without paternalism : a capability approach to legitimate state action
There has long been a conflict at the heart of theories of distributive justice between a concern to allow individuals autonomy and avoid paternalism, on the one hand, and a concern to promote individual well-being, on the other. The capability approach attempts to tread this line, by providing individuals with certain central capabilities or opportunities: these preserve a space for individual freedom and choice, yet ensure that all individuals have access to those things that are considered central for a flourishing life. Further, âall individualsâ is meant expansively, aiming to accommodate the experiences and needs of many groups that are often ignored. However, the perfectionist roots of the capability approach have led to concerns being raised that it cannot successfully protect autonomy and promote inclusivity, and that it will, instead, justify paternalism. I contend that, in particular, Martha Nussbaum's influential account of capabilities falls prey to just this objection. In my thesis I defend a version of the capability approach that is strictly anti-paternalist, and accommodates a variety of non-standard human experiences. I argue that this focus on autonomy need not be bought at the expense
Begon, Jessica
Policy without paternalism : a capability approach to legitimate state action. There has long been a conflict at the heart of theories of distributive justice between a concern to allow individuals autonomy and avoid paternalism, on the one hand, and a concern to promote individual well-being, on the other. The capability approach attempts to tread this line, by providing individuals with certain central capabilities or opportunities: these preserve a space for individual freedom and choice, yet ensure that all individuals have access to those things that are considered central for a flourishing life. Further, âall individualsâ is meant expansively, aiming to accommodate the experiences and needs of many groups that are often ignored. However, the perfectionist roots of the capability approach have led to concerns being raised that it cannot successfully protect autonomy and promote inclusivity, and that it will, instead, justify paternalism. I contend that, in particular, Martha Nussbaum's influential account of capabilities falls prey to just this objection. In my thesis I defend a version of the capability approach that is strictly anti-paternalist, and accommodates a variety of non-standard human experiences. I argue that this focus on autonomy need not be bought at the expense
policy without paternalism capability legitimate state action long conflict heart theory distributive_justice concern allow individual_autonomy avoid paternalism one_hand concern promote individual well_being other capability attempt line provide individual certain central capability opportunity preserve space individual freedom choice yet ensure individual access thing consider central flourish life individual mean aim accommodate experience need many group often ignore however root capability lead concern raise successfully protect autonomy promote instead justify paternalism contend particular martha_nussbaum influential account capability fall prey objection defend version capability strictly anti accommodate variety non_standard human_experience argue focus autonomy need buy expense