Two sources of moral reasons
One of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two distinct metaethical theories â realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other â whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct sources of moral reasons. The resulting âhybridâ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism, whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals â but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons. Chapter
Macdonald, Iain Ezra
BJ1031.M3 ; Ethics ; Moral realism ; Constructivism (Philosophy)
Two sources of moral reasons. One of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two distinct metaethical theories â realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other â whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct sources of moral reasons. The resulting âhybridâ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism, whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals â but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons. Chapter
source moral_reason core question contemporary concern_nature status moral claim however question presupposes morality unify single metaethical account suffice aim challenge presupposition particular argue substantial theoretical combine_two distinct metaethical theory realism one_hand constructivism whilst limit_scope each realist case discourse aim_describe particular feature reality constructivist case discourse aim solve coordination problem_face people social being therefore two_distinct source moral_reason result hybrid theory appeal metaethical level also yield attractive picture apply level specifically retain core intuition underlie utilitarianism whilst incorporate broadly account morality account reason harm person least reason harm animal additional reason harm person