In praise of wider functionalism or for more matter in mind
The premiss of this thesis is naturalism: viz., that psychological facts, whilst not reducible to, are determined by, physical facts. Pace Davidson's anomalism of the mental, the Author argues that token-token psycho-physical identity presupposes that the inferential inter-relations between psychological states are <i>projectably mirrored</i> by physical dispositional relations between those states. The Author aims to regiment our folk-psychological explanations because, he argues, we have warrant to apply the conceptual contents of our self-applied indices to the states so indexed, rather than treating those conceptual contents merely as indices of internal states. That warrant arises from the determinate conceptual content of our home language - pace the well-known arguments of Quine, Putnam and Davidson. The Author also aims to show that only a functional system wide enough to include the objects which we perceive and manipulate can generate those conceptual contents, not a narrow functional system which terminates at or before the bodily envelope. Field's subjective semantics for classical logic are used to show that narrow functionalism cannot account for the sense of 'exists', nor, adapting work of Hintikka
Edwards, James Stephen
In praise of wider functionalism or for more matter in mind. The premiss of this thesis is naturalism: viz., that psychological facts, whilst not reducible to, are determined by, physical facts. Pace Davidson's anomalism of the mental, the Author argues that token-token psycho-physical identity presupposes that the inferential inter-relations between psychological states are <i>projectably mirrored</i> by physical dispositional relations between those states. The Author aims to regiment our folk-psychological explanations because, he argues, we have warrant to apply the conceptual contents of our self-applied indices to the states so indexed, rather than treating those conceptual contents merely as indices of internal states. That warrant arises from the determinate conceptual content of our home language - pace the well-known arguments of Quine, Putnam and Davidson. The Author also aims to show that only a functional system wide enough to include the objects which we perceive and manipulate can generate those conceptual contents, not a narrow functional system which terminates at or before the bodily envelope. Field's subjective semantics for classical logic are used to show that narrow functionalism cannot account for the sense of 'exists', nor, adapting work of Hintikka
praise wider functionalism matter mind premiss naturalism viz psychological fact whilst reducible determine physical fact pace davidson mental author argue token token psycho physical identity presuppose inferential inter relations psychological_state mirror physical dispositional relation state author aim regiment folk_psychological explanation argues warrant apply conceptual content self applied index state index rather treat conceptual content merely internal state warrant arise determinate conceptual content home language pace well_known argument quine putnam davidson author also aim_show functional system wide enough include object perceive manipulate generate conceptual content narrow functional system bodily field subjective semantics classical logic use show narrow functionalism account sense exists adapt work