Aristotle's ethical theory of action
This dissertation consists of an interpretation of Aristotleâs treatment of wanting, choice and moral responsibility that focuses on action as expressive of emotion and character. It culminates in Aristotelian definitions of: what it is to act virtuously, what it is to act at all, what a virtue is, and what it is for a human being to flourish. Chapter II consists of a detailed reading of Aristotleâs <i>EN </i>III.2-3 analysis of <i>prohairesis</i> (choice, principle) and an interpretation of the âpractical syllogismâ (<i>MA </i>7, <i>EN </i>VII.3). It first argues that and explains how <i>prohairesis </i>is thoughtful wanting (<i>bouleÌsis</i>) in <i>EN</i> III.4 according to which what is thoughtfully wanted is what appears fine and pleasant. It then relates this definition to a distinction between what is pleasant merely because of oneâs personality and what is âtrulyâ pleasant to be found in <i>EN </i>X.5<i>. </i>It thereby argues that thoughtful wanting is constituted by emotions, understood as conative states through which ways of acting thought right (wrong) appear pleasant (unpleasant) in imagination. Chapter IV argues that <i>EN</i> III.5 is centred on an analysis of ethical imputation
Chew, C. A. A. M.
Aristotle's ethical theory of action. This dissertation consists of an interpretation of Aristotleâs treatment of wanting, choice and moral responsibility that focuses on action as expressive of emotion and character. It culminates in Aristotelian definitions of: what it is to act virtuously, what it is to act at all, what a virtue is, and what it is for a human being to flourish. Chapter II consists of a detailed reading of Aristotleâs <i>EN </i>III.2-3 analysis of <i>prohairesis</i> (choice, principle) and an interpretation of the âpractical syllogismâ (<i>MA </i>7, <i>EN </i>VII.3). It first argues that and explains how <i>prohairesis </i>is thoughtful wanting (<i>bouleÌsis</i>) in <i>EN</i> III.4 according to which what is thoughtfully wanted is what appears fine and pleasant. It then relates this definition to a distinction between what is pleasant merely because of oneâs personality and what is âtrulyâ pleasant to be found in <i>EN </i>X.5<i>. </i>It thereby argues that thoughtful wanting is constituted by emotions, understood as conative states through which ways of acting thought right (wrong) appear pleasant (unpleasant) in imagination. Chapter IV argues that <i>EN</i> III.5 is centred on an analysis of ethical imputation
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