Logic and reality in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill
This study of the leading principles of Mill's empiricist metaphysics and philosophy of logic aims to provide accurate (and often revisionary) exegesis and criticism of his theories, and to show their pertinence to current philosophical debates. Mill's views on the attainment of knowledge by inference, the problems of suasive syllogisms, and the possibility of inductive inference are first discussed, and it is argued that his philosophy of logic is informed by a realist theory of error. Subsequently, attention is paid to his uncompromising rejection of a priori avenues to knowledge about objective reality, and his allegiance to a radical empiricist principle that all knowledge is of phenomena alone. A scrutiny of Mill's theories of the experienced world and of the experiencing self: brings the discussion; to the point at which it emerges clearly that there is a deep tension within his thought between a form of empiricism which approximates to a variety of scientific realism, and another which leans towards sensationalistic reductionism.
Scarre, Geoffrey Francis
Philosophy
Logic and reality in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. This study of the leading principles of Mill's empiricist metaphysics and philosophy of logic aims to provide accurate (and often revisionary) exegesis and criticism of his theories, and to show their pertinence to current philosophical debates. Mill's views on the attainment of knowledge by inference, the problems of suasive syllogisms, and the possibility of inductive inference are first discussed, and it is argued that his philosophy of logic is informed by a realist theory of error. Subsequently, attention is paid to his uncompromising rejection of a priori avenues to knowledge about objective reality, and his allegiance to a radical empiricist principle that all knowledge is of phenomena alone. A scrutiny of Mill's theories of the experienced world and of the experiencing self: brings the discussion; to the point at which it emerges clearly that there is a deep tension within his thought between a form of empiricism which approximates to a variety of scientific realism, and another which leans towards sensationalistic reductionism.
logic reality philosophy john_stuart_mill study lead principle mill empiricist metaphysics_philosophy logic aim_provide accurate often revisionary exegesis criticism theory show current philosophical debate mill view attainment knowledge inference problem syllogism possibility inductive inference first_discuss argue philosophy_logic inform realist theory error subsequently attention_pay uncompromising rejection priori avenue knowledge objective reality allegiance radical empiricist principle knowledge phenomena alone scrutiny mill theory experience world experience self brings discussion point emerge clearly deep tension_within thought form empiricism approximate variety scientific_realism another lean towards reductionism