Naive realism, imaginative disjunctivism, and the problem of misleading experience
This thesis defends naĂŻve realism about the essential nature of perceptual experience, that is, the experiences that subjects enjoy when they hear, see, smell, taste, and touch things. It claims that the essential natures of such experiences are intrinsically constituted and relationally determined by the perceptible properties of those worldly objects with which perceiving subjects are immediately and irreducibly acquainted. In particular, this thesis defends naĂŻve realism against the Problem of Misleading Experience which exploits the existence of misleading experiences (viz., dreams, hallucinations, and illusions) in order to show that no perceptual experience can be naĂŻve realist in nature. Chapter 1 presents naĂŻve realismâs metaphysical commitments and the Problem of Misleading Experience. In Chapter 2, I sketch three desirable constraints on any successful naĂŻve realist solution: I argue that it is desirable for the NaĂŻve Realist to (i) adopt some form of Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism (i.e. the claim that perceptual and misleading experiences have different phenomenal natures), (ii) positively explain the phenomenal nature of misleading experience, and, (iii) tell the same fundamental story
Moody, Louise J.
Naive realism, imaginative disjunctivism, and the problem of misleading experience. This thesis defends naĂŻve realism about the essential nature of perceptual experience, that is, the experiences that subjects enjoy when they hear, see, smell, taste, and touch things. It claims that the essential natures of such experiences are intrinsically constituted and relationally determined by the perceptible properties of those worldly objects with which perceiving subjects are immediately and irreducibly acquainted. In particular, this thesis defends naĂŻve realism against the Problem of Misleading Experience which exploits the existence of misleading experiences (viz., dreams, hallucinations, and illusions) in order to show that no perceptual experience can be naĂŻve realist in nature. Chapter 1 presents naĂŻve realismâs metaphysical commitments and the Problem of Misleading Experience. In Chapter 2, I sketch three desirable constraints on any successful naĂŻve realist solution: I argue that it is desirable for the NaĂŻve Realist to (i) adopt some form of Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism (i.e. the claim that perceptual and misleading experiences have different phenomenal natures), (ii) positively explain the phenomenal nature of misleading experience, and, (iii) tell the same fundamental story
naive realism imaginative disjunctivism problem misleading experience defends realism essential_nature perceptual_experience experience_subject enjoy hear see smell taste touch thing claim essential_nature experience intrinsically constitute determine perceptible property worldly object perceive subject immediately irreducibly acquaint particular defend realism problem misleading experience exploit existence misleading experience viz dream hallucination illusion order_show perceptual_experience realist nature present realism metaphysical commitment problem misleading experience sketch desirable constraint successful realist solution argue desirable realist adopt form basic phenomenal disjunctivism claim perceptual misleading experience different phenomenal nature positively explain phenomenal nature mislead experience iii tell fundamental story