The rationality of anger
Anger has a bad reputation. The Stoics have famously advocated against anger (Nussbaum 2015; Bommarito 2017), while philosophers interested in oppression, particularly feminist philosophers, have on the other hand, highlighted the crucial motivational, political and epistemic value of anger in fighting against the oppressive status quo (Lorde 1981; Frye 1983; hooks 1995; Yancy 2008). I argue that the points of disagreement that emerge from the debate on anger hinge on its nature and (ir)rationality. Disagreement hinges on whether anger is instrumentally beneficial to the angry agent, in terms of its psychological effects and behavioural consequences, on whether anger is of epistemic value, and on how to construe the nature of anger itself. A foundational approach to the debate, one that makes the emotion of anger central, will reveal that anger is a rational phenomenon that can play the positive roles feminist philosophers have afforded it. I provide such a foundational account of anger. The project has four complimentary desiderata; to provide an account of anger's nature, an account of anger as instrumentally rational for oppressed agents, an account of anger as reason-responsive, and finally an account
Luz Sousa Oliveira E Silva, Laura
The rationality of anger. Anger has a bad reputation. The Stoics have famously advocated against anger (Nussbaum 2015; Bommarito 2017), while philosophers interested in oppression, particularly feminist philosophers, have on the other hand, highlighted the crucial motivational, political and epistemic value of anger in fighting against the oppressive status quo (Lorde 1981; Frye 1983; hooks 1995; Yancy 2008). I argue that the points of disagreement that emerge from the debate on anger hinge on its nature and (ir)rationality. Disagreement hinges on whether anger is instrumentally beneficial to the angry agent, in terms of its psychological effects and behavioural consequences, on whether anger is of epistemic value, and on how to construe the nature of anger itself. A foundational approach to the debate, one that makes the emotion of anger central, will reveal that anger is a rational phenomenon that can play the positive roles feminist philosophers have afforded it. I provide such a foundational account of anger. The project has four complimentary desiderata; to provide an account of anger's nature, an account of anger as instrumentally rational for oppressed agents, an account of anger as reason-responsive, and finally an account
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