The experiential world
There are four positions one might take in respect of the ontological status of the physical world: physicalism, which says that the physical world is ontologically fundamental, and nothing else is; substance dualism, which says that the physical world is ontologically fundamental, but so is the human mental realm, and that these are in some strong metaphysical sense separate; idealism, which says that the physical world is constitutively sustained, at least in part, by facts about the human mental realm; and a rough collection of views I term 'compatibilism', which holds that both the physical and the mental are fundamental, but that they are not separate as in substance dualism. Of these positions, I argue mainly against the first and last. I begin by demonstrating that all forms of compatibilism are committed to a radically revisionary definition of 'mental' and 'physical', since in ordinary usage, and for good reason, the terms are taken as mutually exclusive. I formulate a definition of 'mental' according to which it means 'subjective, non-spatial, and non-quantifiable', and demonstrate that these properties are necessarily coextensive. Against physicalism, I consider a range of arguments which purport
Davnall, Richard
B Philosophy (General)
The experiential world. There are four positions one might take in respect of the ontological status of the physical world: physicalism, which says that the physical world is ontologically fundamental, and nothing else is; substance dualism, which says that the physical world is ontologically fundamental, but so is the human mental realm, and that these are in some strong metaphysical sense separate; idealism, which says that the physical world is constitutively sustained, at least in part, by facts about the human mental realm; and a rough collection of views I term 'compatibilism', which holds that both the physical and the mental are fundamental, but that they are not separate as in substance dualism. Of these positions, I argue mainly against the first and last. I begin by demonstrating that all forms of compatibilism are committed to a radically revisionary definition of 'mental' and 'physical', since in ordinary usage, and for good reason, the terms are taken as mutually exclusive. I formulate a definition of 'mental' according to which it means 'subjective, non-spatial, and non-quantifiable', and demonstrate that these properties are necessarily coextensive. Against physicalism, I consider a range of arguments which purport
experiential world position one_might take respect ontological status physical_world physicalism say physical_world ontologically fundamental nothing else substance dualism say physical_world ontologically fundamental_human mental realm strong metaphysical sense separate idealism say physical_world sustain least part facts human mental realm rough collection view term hold physical_mental fundamental separate substance dualism position argue mainly first_last begin demonstrate form commit radically revisionary definition mental_physical since ordinary usage good_reason term take mutually_exclusive formulate definition mental accord mean subjective non spatial non quantifiable property necessarily coextensive physicalism consider range argument purport