Ethical practice and objective reasons : Kantian and Wittgensteinian themes in the objectivity of ethical reasons
This thesis develops a 'response-dependent' account of the objectivity of ethical judgment. It uses the Kantian device of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as the critical reflective test for convergence in judgment that is genuinely objectivity-sustaining. After a discussion of the challenges to ethical objectivism, it is argued that Wittgenstein's consideration of rule-following provides a compelling case for rejecting attempts to ground objectivity in a manner that is external to normative practices. This removes one potent source of hostility to ethical objectivity, but it does not establish the truth of this position. Within the constraints of a broadly Wittgensteinian conception of objectivity, plausible accounts of ethical objectivity will be 'response-dependent'. The key issue facing such theories is whether they can provide a model of practical rationality that delivers suitably demanding, objectivity-sustaining standards of rational criticism. I examine two approaches to this issue. The first (suggested by John McDowell) takes Wittgenstein's rulefollowing considerations as implying a virtue-centred approach to ethical deliberation. On this view, virtuous agents' uncodifiable responses determine correct
Cornwell, James
Judgment (Ethics) ; Objectivity
Ethical practice and objective reasons : Kantian and Wittgensteinian themes in the objectivity of ethical reasons. This thesis develops a 'response-dependent' account of the objectivity of ethical judgment. It uses the Kantian device of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as the critical reflective test for convergence in judgment that is genuinely objectivity-sustaining. After a discussion of the challenges to ethical objectivism, it is argued that Wittgenstein's consideration of rule-following provides a compelling case for rejecting attempts to ground objectivity in a manner that is external to normative practices. This removes one potent source of hostility to ethical objectivity, but it does not establish the truth of this position. Within the constraints of a broadly Wittgensteinian conception of objectivity, plausible accounts of ethical objectivity will be 'response-dependent'. The key issue facing such theories is whether they can provide a model of practical rationality that delivers suitably demanding, objectivity-sustaining standards of rational criticism. I examine two approaches to this issue. The first (suggested by John McDowell) takes Wittgenstein's rulefollowing considerations as implying a virtue-centred approach to ethical deliberation. On this view, virtuous agents' uncodifiable responses determine correct
ethical practice objective reason kantian wittgensteinian theme objectivity ethical reason develop response_dependent account objectivity ethical judgment kantian device categorical imperative critical reflective test convergence judgment genuinely objectivity sustaining discussion challenge ethical argue_wittgenstein consideration rule_following provide compelling case reject attempt ground objectivity manner external normative practice remove potent source hostility ethical objectivity establish truth position within_constraint broadly wittgensteinian conception objectivity plausible account ethical objectivity response_dependent key_issue face theory whether provide_model practical_rationality delivers suitably demand objectivity sustaining standard rational criticism examine two_approach issue first suggest john_mcdowell take wittgenstein consideration imply virtue centred ethical deliberation view virtuous agent response determine correct