Logical presupposition : a re-appraisal of the concept and revision of the theory
This dissertation is a defence of a logical approach to presupposition. In it (1) I enumerate, by way of apologia, some fundamental assumptions underlying both antagonistic and protagonistic treatments of such an approach, and argue that they are conceptually unnecessary, methodologically untoward, and/or logically contradictory. Most saliently, (a) I demonstrate the conceptual and logical contradiction in the view that presuppositional logic might be compatible with (or even imply) an ambiguity of natural language negation, (b) I provide a critique of the now traditional disassociation of the problems of presupposition-definition and presupposition- projection, (c) I provide a critique of the view that presuppositional logic -might be compatible with (or imply) logical trivalence. (2) In the light of a discussion of the conceptual distinction, I propose logical criteria for the distinction between a three-valued logic and a two-valued logic with truth-value gaps. (3) I demonstrate that, by these criteria, the standard (Strawsonian) Definition of Presupposition (SLDP) induces a trivalent logic. (4) I present a distinct (but comparable) revised logical definition of presupposition (RLDP)showing that it induces
Burton-Roberts, Noel
Linguistic semantics theory
Logical presupposition : a re-appraisal of the concept and revision of the theory. This dissertation is a defence of a logical approach to presupposition. In it (1) I enumerate, by way of apologia, some fundamental assumptions underlying both antagonistic and protagonistic treatments of such an approach, and argue that they are conceptually unnecessary, methodologically untoward, and/or logically contradictory. Most saliently, (a) I demonstrate the conceptual and logical contradiction in the view that presuppositional logic might be compatible with (or even imply) an ambiguity of natural language negation, (b) I provide a critique of the now traditional disassociation of the problems of presupposition-definition and presupposition- projection, (c) I provide a critique of the view that presuppositional logic -might be compatible with (or imply) logical trivalence. (2) In the light of a discussion of the conceptual distinction, I propose logical criteria for the distinction between a three-valued logic and a two-valued logic with truth-value gaps. (3) I demonstrate that, by these criteria, the standard (Strawsonian) Definition of Presupposition (SLDP) induces a trivalent logic. (4) I present a distinct (but comparable) revised logical definition of presupposition (RLDP)showing that it induces
logical presupposition re_appraisal concept revision theory defence logical presupposition enumerate way apologia fundamental_assumption underlie antagonistic treatment argue conceptually unnecessary methodologically and logically contradictory conceptual logical contradiction view logic might compatible even imply ambiguity natural_language negation provide critique_traditional problem presupposition definition presupposition projection provide critique view logic might compatible imply logical light discussion conceptual distinction propose logical criterion distinction valued logic valued logic truth value gap criterion standard definition presupposition induce logic present distinct comparable revise logical definition presupposition showing