Can Sen's and Nussbaum's capabilities approach be justified as an approach to social justice?
My thesis offers an internal critique of Senâs and Nussbaumâs versions of the capabilities approach (CA hereafter) as an approach to social justice. First, I examine the justifications that Sen and Nussbaum provide for their approaches to justice. I argue that neither Sen nor Nussbaum succeeds in providing a successful justification. Their approaches fail to make a good case for certain departures from or kinship with Rawlsâ theory. Their justificatory strategies rely on some deficient conception of public reason (or lack thereof). Second, I try to defend a conception of public reason that can provide reasoned justification, which does not assume unjustified boundaries. I examine two dominant models of public reason (i.e., the political liberal model and deliberative model) in contemporary political philosophy and argue that neither can provide reasoned justification for CA. They either assume a very restricted conception of <i>public</i> or fail to give any account of <i>reason-giving</i>. Instead, I argue that a version of Kantâs conception of public reason â which requires that principles that <i>cannot</i> be universalised <i>must </i>be rejected â has the potential to reach the public in the
Chen, X.
Can Sen's and Nussbaum's capabilities approach be justified as an approach to social justice?. My thesis offers an internal critique of Senâs and Nussbaumâs versions of the capabilities approach (CA hereafter) as an approach to social justice. First, I examine the justifications that Sen and Nussbaum provide for their approaches to justice. I argue that neither Sen nor Nussbaum succeeds in providing a successful justification. Their approaches fail to make a good case for certain departures from or kinship with Rawlsâ theory. Their justificatory strategies rely on some deficient conception of public reason (or lack thereof). Second, I try to defend a conception of public reason that can provide reasoned justification, which does not assume unjustified boundaries. I examine two dominant models of public reason (i.e., the political liberal model and deliberative model) in contemporary political philosophy and argue that neither can provide reasoned justification for CA. They either assume a very restricted conception of <i>public</i> or fail to give any account of <i>reason-giving</i>. Instead, I argue that a version of Kantâs conception of public reason â which requires that principles that <i>cannot</i> be universalised <i>must </i>be rejected â has the potential to reach the public in the
capability justify social_justice offer internal critique version capability hereafter social_justice first_examine justification provide approach justice argue_neither succeed provide successful justification approach fail_make good case certain departure kinship rawls_theory justificatory strategy rely deficient conception public reason lack thereof second try defend conception public reason provide reason justification assume unjustified boundary examine dominant model public reason political liberal model deliberative model contemporary political_philosophy argue_neither provide reason justification either assume restricted conception public fail give_account reason giving instead_argue version kant conception public reason require principle must reject potential reach public