From representations to practice : a critique of naturalized reason
This thesis investigates an understanding of the relationship between mind and world which avoids defining the former as a naturalizable entity and the latter as identifiable with the world described by the natural sciences. I recommend paying closer attention to the notion of person and to our practical encounter with the world. I reject the idea of the world's having a given structure which is independent of our knowledge of it and, consequently, any conception of knowledge as a search for free-standing essences. I start by criticizing the project of naturalizing intentionality in general, and the content of mental states in particular. I focus on Fodor's language of thought and his explication of semantic relations as relations between individual mental representations and isolated features of the world. I argue that this sort of account leads to scepticism or to postulating pre-established harmony. An alternative, Davidsonian framework which highlights the interdependence of meaning and knowledge is explored. Following the Kantian line opened by McDowell, I propose pursuing Davidson's philosophy to its ultimate consequences and defend a non-foundationalist role for experience, oppose Davidson's inconsistent
Pinedo Garcia, Manuel de
Knowledge; Fodor; Meaning; Mind; Communication
From representations to practice : a critique of naturalized reason. This thesis investigates an understanding of the relationship between mind and world which avoids defining the former as a naturalizable entity and the latter as identifiable with the world described by the natural sciences. I recommend paying closer attention to the notion of person and to our practical encounter with the world. I reject the idea of the world's having a given structure which is independent of our knowledge of it and, consequently, any conception of knowledge as a search for free-standing essences. I start by criticizing the project of naturalizing intentionality in general, and the content of mental states in particular. I focus on Fodor's language of thought and his explication of semantic relations as relations between individual mental representations and isolated features of the world. I argue that this sort of account leads to scepticism or to postulating pre-established harmony. An alternative, Davidsonian framework which highlights the interdependence of meaning and knowledge is explored. Following the Kantian line opened by McDowell, I propose pursuing Davidson's philosophy to its ultimate consequences and defend a non-foundationalist role for experience, oppose Davidson's inconsistent
representation practice critique reason investigates_relationship mind world avoid define former entity latter identifiable world describe natural_science recommend pay_close attention notion person practical encounter world reject_idea world give structure independent knowledge consequently conception knowledge search free_standing essence start criticize project intentionality general content mental_state particular focus language_think explication semantic relation relation individual mental_representation isolate feature world argue sort account lead scepticism postulate pre established harmony alternative davidsonian framework highlight interdependence meaning knowledge explore following kantian line open mcdowell propose pursue davidson philosophy ultimate consequence defend non role experience oppose davidson inconsistent