Co-operation between the British Army and the Royal Air Force in South-East Asia, 1941-1945
This study suggests that, from a situation where co-operation between the British Army and the RAF in south-east Asia hardly existed it grew to have a profound effect on the course of the war in Burma, particularly in air supply. The evidence shows that air supply became critical to the successful prosecution of the campaign. The study also challenges the view that air interdiction is always of major importance in land campaigns. The Malayan defence strategy was flawed as a result of pre-war misconceptions and prejudices, exacerbated by institutional bureaucracy and fiscal restrictions. Burma, a 'Cinderella' defence area, was a case of too little, too late. In the first year of the war; given the problems of finance, labour for defence works and reinforcements, even extensive co-operation between the army and the air force might not have produced a different result, but it might have made defeat less ignominious. Underlying the Burma campaign, there were two fundamental factors outside climate and terrain affecting co-operation. Distances and the multiplicity of the Allied aims. Distance detrimentally affected surface transport and US support of China and establishing airfields to bomb Japan, caused the air
Williamson, Arthur Charles
Co-operation between the British Army and the Royal Air Force in South-East Asia, 1941-1945. This study suggests that, from a situation where co-operation between the British Army and the RAF in south-east Asia hardly existed it grew to have a profound effect on the course of the war in Burma, particularly in air supply. The evidence shows that air supply became critical to the successful prosecution of the campaign. The study also challenges the view that air interdiction is always of major importance in land campaigns. The Malayan defence strategy was flawed as a result of pre-war misconceptions and prejudices, exacerbated by institutional bureaucracy and fiscal restrictions. Burma, a 'Cinderella' defence area, was a case of too little, too late. In the first year of the war; given the problems of finance, labour for defence works and reinforcements, even extensive co-operation between the army and the air force might not have produced a different result, but it might have made defeat less ignominious. Underlying the Burma campaign, there were two fundamental factors outside climate and terrain affecting co-operation. Distances and the multiplicity of the Allied aims. Distance detrimentally affected surface transport and US support of China and establishing airfields to bomb Japan, caused the air
co_operation british army royal_air_force south_east asia study suggest situation co_operation british army raf south asia hardly exist grow profound effect course war particularly air supply evidence show air supply become critical successful prosecution campaign study also challenge_view air always major importance land campaign defence strategy flaw pre_war misconception prejudice exacerbate institutional bureaucracy fiscal restriction defence area case little late first year war give problem finance labour defence work reinforcement even extensive co_operation army air_force might produce different might make defeat less underlying campaign two_fundamental factor outside climate terrain affect co_operation multiplicity allied aim distance affect surface transport support china establish bomb japan cause air