Semantics and the stratification of explanation in cognitive science
This work is concerned with a pervasive problem in Cognitive Science which I have called the ~stratificational~ approach. I argue that the division into ~levels of explanation~ that runs as a constant theme through much work in Cognitive Science and in particular natural language semantics, is in direct conflict with neuroscientific evidence. I claim it is also in conflict with a right understanding of the philosophical notion of ~evidence~. The neuroscientific work is linked with the philosophical problem to provide a critique of concrete cases of research within the natural language semantics community. More recent neuroscientifically aware research is examined and it is demonstrated that it suffers similar problems due to the same deep running assumptions as those which effect traditional formalist theory. The contribution of this thesis is thought to be that of a demonstration of the essential nature and indeed the <i>ubiquity</i> of the basic assumptions in the field. Also, a new link is forged between the concerns of the formalists and certain seemingly more abstract philosophical work. This link enables us to see how much philosophical problems infect research into cognition and language. It is argued
Kime, Philip L.
Semantics and the stratification of explanation in cognitive science. This work is concerned with a pervasive problem in Cognitive Science which I have called the ~stratificational~ approach. I argue that the division into ~levels of explanation~ that runs as a constant theme through much work in Cognitive Science and in particular natural language semantics, is in direct conflict with neuroscientific evidence. I claim it is also in conflict with a right understanding of the philosophical notion of ~evidence~. The neuroscientific work is linked with the philosophical problem to provide a critique of concrete cases of research within the natural language semantics community. More recent neuroscientifically aware research is examined and it is demonstrated that it suffers similar problems due to the same deep running assumptions as those which effect traditional formalist theory. The contribution of this thesis is thought to be that of a demonstration of the essential nature and indeed the <i>ubiquity</i> of the basic assumptions in the field. Also, a new link is forged between the concerns of the formalists and certain seemingly more abstract philosophical work. This link enables us to see how much philosophical problems infect research into cognition and language. It is argued
semantics stratification explanation cognitive_science work concern pervasive problem cognitive_science call approach argue division levels explanation run constant theme much work cognitive_science particular natural_language semantics direct conflict evidence claim also conflict right philosophical notion evidence work link philosophical_problem provide critique concrete case within natural_language semantics community recent aware examine demonstrated suffers similar problem due deep run assumption effect traditional theory think demonstration essential_nature indeed ubiquity basic_assumption field also new link forge concern certain seemingly abstract philosophical_work link enable see much philosophical_problem cognition language argue