Make no exceptions for yourself : a Kantian response to the particularist challenge
The primary aim of this thesis is to examine whether and how Kantian ethicists can accommodate the intuitions that motivate moral particularism: the intuition that the moral domain is very complex, that our moral obligations vary with circumstances in ways that are hard to codify, and that there are exceptions to most, if not all, moral principles that we can think of or formulate (Part One). The secondary aim of this thesis is to draw on the insights gained in the course of this investigation in order to contribute to the solution of two other problems that occupy contemporary Kantian ethicists (Part Two). To begin with, I discuss and reject a number of existing attempts to account for the circumstance-dependence of our moral obligations within a Kantian framework. What all these attempts have in common is the assumption that, for Kant, a principle of duty is universally valid only if it is valid in all cases or situations. I call this the âCase-Scope Readingâ of Kantâs conception of universal validity. When combined with the requirements that emerge from the challenge mounted by their particularist opponents, this reading throws Kantians on the horns of a trilemma. In response, I suggest that we should
Schumski, Irina
BJ Ethics
Make no exceptions for yourself : a Kantian response to the particularist challenge. The primary aim of this thesis is to examine whether and how Kantian ethicists can accommodate the intuitions that motivate moral particularism: the intuition that the moral domain is very complex, that our moral obligations vary with circumstances in ways that are hard to codify, and that there are exceptions to most, if not all, moral principles that we can think of or formulate (Part One). The secondary aim of this thesis is to draw on the insights gained in the course of this investigation in order to contribute to the solution of two other problems that occupy contemporary Kantian ethicists (Part Two). To begin with, I discuss and reject a number of existing attempts to account for the circumstance-dependence of our moral obligations within a Kantian framework. What all these attempts have in common is the assumption that, for Kant, a principle of duty is universally valid only if it is valid in all cases or situations. I call this the âCase-Scope Readingâ of Kantâs conception of universal validity. When combined with the requirements that emerge from the challenge mounted by their particularist opponents, this reading throws Kantians on the horns of a trilemma. In response, I suggest that we should
make exception kantian response challenge primary_aim examine_whether kantian accommodate intuition motivate moral intuition moral domain complex moral_obligation vary circumstance way hard codify exception moral_principle think formulate part_one secondary_aim draw_insight gain course investigation order contribute solution problem occupy contemporary kantian part_two begin discus reject number exist attempt account circumstance dependence moral_obligation within kantian framework attempt common_assumption kant principle duty universally valid valid case situation call case scope reading kant conception universal validity combined requirement emerge challenge mount opponent read throw horn response suggest