Semantic externalism and self knowledge : privileged access to the world
The thesis is concerned to defend the compatibility of two plausible claims about the mind; semantic externalism and privileged access. It is further concerned to demonstrate one important implication of the conjunction of semantic externalism and privileged access, an implication which forces the rejection of the dichotomy between knowledge of oneâs mind and knowledge of oneâs world. Chapter one is a presentation of semantic externalism. Chapter two is a presentation of the claim of privileged access. The claim of privileged access is formulated in response to the following question. How can a subject have privileged access to the contents of her thoughts given that her thoughts depend essentially on contingent facts about her world of which she could have empirical knowledge only? Chapter three is concerned with the following implication, the consequent of which is prima facie absurd. If the contents of the mind depend essentially upon contingent facts about the world, knowledge of the semantic contents âwithinâ can yield knowledge of the world âwithoutâ. Chapter four is a defence of the consequent. It is argued that the apparent absurdity of non-empirical knowledge of the world arises from a
Sawyer, Sarah Ann
Philosophy
Semantic externalism and self knowledge : privileged access to the world. The thesis is concerned to defend the compatibility of two plausible claims about the mind; semantic externalism and privileged access. It is further concerned to demonstrate one important implication of the conjunction of semantic externalism and privileged access, an implication which forces the rejection of the dichotomy between knowledge of oneâs mind and knowledge of oneâs world. Chapter one is a presentation of semantic externalism. Chapter two is a presentation of the claim of privileged access. The claim of privileged access is formulated in response to the following question. How can a subject have privileged access to the contents of her thoughts given that her thoughts depend essentially on contingent facts about her world of which she could have empirical knowledge only? Chapter three is concerned with the following implication, the consequent of which is prima facie absurd. If the contents of the mind depend essentially upon contingent facts about the world, knowledge of the semantic contents âwithinâ can yield knowledge of the world âwithoutâ. Chapter four is a defence of the consequent. It is argued that the apparent absurdity of non-empirical knowledge of the world arises from a
semantic externalism self_knowledge privileged access world concerned defend compatibility plausible claim mind semantic externalism privilege access concerned one_important implication conjunction semantic externalism privilege access implication force rejection dichotomy knowledge mind knowledge world presentation semantic externalism presentation claim privilege access claim privilege access formulate response follow_question subject privilege access content thought give thought depend essentially contingent fact world could empirical_knowledge three_concerned follow implication consequent prima_facie absurd content mind depend essentially upon contingent fact world knowledge semantic_content within yield knowledge world without defence consequent argue apparent non empirical_knowledge world arises