Concept, Norm, and Nature Three Strategies for Breaking with the Dilemma of Underdetermination and Dualism
The aim of this thesis is to break with the dilemma of underdetermination and dualism I claim haunts attempts to give an account of the relation between concept, norm, and nature. I investigate what it takes to get out of the dilemma's grip, dissolve it, or otherwise display it as a false alternative. In particular, I consider what I have found to be the three most promising strategies for doing so. There are two points of entry into thinking about the dilemma. One is a conflict between two general intuitions that seem to guide most contemporary approaches in this field, what I have labelled the orthodoxĂâĂÂ· naturalist and the normativist intuitions. I outline this conflict in the Introduction. The second point of entry is the role the dilemma plays as the premise responsible for what seems to be a permanent inability to give an account of conceptual normativity. In Chapter One, I introduce two models for thinking about conceptual normativity, the 'intentionality' model, and the 'correct use' model. On each model, I claim, a set of equally unpalatable and reciprocally parasitic alternatives seem to exhaust our analytical options. The dilemma, I assume towards the end of Chapter One, is the premise responsible
Lindgaard, Jakob
Concept, Norm, and Nature Three Strategies for Breaking with the Dilemma of Underdetermination and Dualism. The aim of this thesis is to break with the dilemma of underdetermination and dualism I claim haunts attempts to give an account of the relation between concept, norm, and nature. I investigate what it takes to get out of the dilemma's grip, dissolve it, or otherwise display it as a false alternative. In particular, I consider what I have found to be the three most promising strategies for doing so. There are two points of entry into thinking about the dilemma. One is a conflict between two general intuitions that seem to guide most contemporary approaches in this field, what I have labelled the orthodoxĂâĂÂ· naturalist and the normativist intuitions. I outline this conflict in the Introduction. The second point of entry is the role the dilemma plays as the premise responsible for what seems to be a permanent inability to give an account of conceptual normativity. In Chapter One, I introduce two models for thinking about conceptual normativity, the 'intentionality' model, and the 'correct use' model. On each model, I claim, a set of equally unpalatable and reciprocally parasitic alternatives seem to exhaust our analytical options. The dilemma, I assume towards the end of Chapter One, is the premise responsible
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