Phenomenology, philosophy of mind and the subject
I propose to develop a phenomenologically-informed ontological model of the subject of experiences. This model will attempt to explain how it is possible for a subject to have experiences with a subjective character, which are like something for their subject. It will also address how the subject can have experiences whose subjective character plays an intentional role, making the subject aware of objects. The subjective character of experiences and their intentionality have both been widely discussed in the philosophy of mind. However, these discussions have focused on whether or not these features can be explained in naturalistic or physicalistic terms. As a result, there has been relatively little detailed description of the subjective character of experiences. In particular, complex experiential states such as those involving a combination of different kinds of experience have been neglected in the recent literature. There has also been little discussion of how we can be aware, not just of individual objects, but of situations, and indeed how our everyday awareness of objects involves an awareness of the world as the background to all our activities. In order to provide detailed descriptions of the subjective
O'Conaill, Donnchadh
Phenomenology, philosophy of mind and the subject. I propose to develop a phenomenologically-informed ontological model of the subject of experiences. This model will attempt to explain how it is possible for a subject to have experiences with a subjective character, which are like something for their subject. It will also address how the subject can have experiences whose subjective character plays an intentional role, making the subject aware of objects. The subjective character of experiences and their intentionality have both been widely discussed in the philosophy of mind. However, these discussions have focused on whether or not these features can be explained in naturalistic or physicalistic terms. As a result, there has been relatively little detailed description of the subjective character of experiences. In particular, complex experiential states such as those involving a combination of different kinds of experience have been neglected in the recent literature. There has also been little discussion of how we can be aware, not just of individual objects, but of situations, and indeed how our everyday awareness of objects involves an awareness of the world as the background to all our activities. In order to provide detailed descriptions of the subjective
phenomenology philosophy_mind subject propose develop phenomenologically informed ontological model subject_experience model attempt_explain possible subject_experience subjective character like something subject also_address subject_experience whose subjective character play intentional role make subject aware object subjective character experience intentionality widely_discuss philosophy_mind however discussion focus whether feature explain naturalistic term relatively_little detailed_description subjective character experience particular complex experiential state involve combination different_kind experience neglect recent_literature also little discussion aware individual object situation indeed everyday awareness object involve awareness world background activity order_provide detail_description subjective