Absolute-theory
This thesis is concerned with the project which J.N. Findlay has called absolute-theory (see his book <i>Ascent to the Absolute</i> London: George Allen and Unwin 1970, and his article 'Bradley's contribution to Absolute-theory' in <i>The Philosophy of F.H.Bradley</i> edited by Guy Stock and Anthony Manser, Oxford: Clarendon 1984). In absolute-theory one is concerned with (1) determining the abstract or formal characteristics, the form as it were, of the fundamental existent or existents on which all things depend, and (ii) evaluating the candidates that might be said to fit the abstract form. If there are a plurality of fundamental existents then the form is a universal with many instances. If there is only one fundamental existent, one primordial object, then the form itself is particular in the sense that it is not instantiable by more than one thing. The background issue is monism versus pluralism. In chapter 1 first some of the characteristics that go to make up the form are delineated. Then some candidates are briefly evaluated and rejected. Finally the kind of candidate absolute idealists offer in general is elucidated to some degree giving the authors preferred formulation. The self-differentiated
Naik, A. D.
Philosophy of logic
Absolute-theory. This thesis is concerned with the project which J.N. Findlay has called absolute-theory (see his book <i>Ascent to the Absolute</i> London: George Allen and Unwin 1970, and his article 'Bradley's contribution to Absolute-theory' in <i>The Philosophy of F.H.Bradley</i> edited by Guy Stock and Anthony Manser, Oxford: Clarendon 1984). In absolute-theory one is concerned with (1) determining the abstract or formal characteristics, the form as it were, of the fundamental existent or existents on which all things depend, and (ii) evaluating the candidates that might be said to fit the abstract form. If there are a plurality of fundamental existents then the form is a universal with many instances. If there is only one fundamental existent, one primordial object, then the form itself is particular in the sense that it is not instantiable by more than one thing. The background issue is monism versus pluralism. In chapter 1 first some of the characteristics that go to make up the form are delineated. Then some candidates are briefly evaluated and rejected. Finally the kind of candidate absolute idealists offer in general is elucidated to some degree giving the authors preferred formulation. The self-differentiated
absolute theory concerned project call absolute theory see book absolute london george allen article absolute philosophy edit stock oxford absolute theory concern determine abstract formal characteristic form fundamental existent thing depend evaluate candidate might say fit abstract form plurality fundamental form universal many instance one_fundamental existent primordial object form particular sense one_thing background issue monism versus pluralism first characteristic make form delineate candidate briefly evaluate reject finally kind candidate absolute idealist offer general elucidate degree give author preferred formulation self differentiated