One world and the many sciences : a defence of physicalism
The subject of this thesis is physicalism, understood not as some particular doctrine pertaining narrowly to the philosophy of mind, but rather as a quite general metaphysical claim to the effect that everything is, or is fundamentally, physical. Thus physicalism explicates the thought that in some sense physics is the basic science. The aim of the thesis is to defend a particular brand of physicalism, which I call eliminative type physicalism. It claims, roughly, that every property is a physical property â a property mentioned in the laws of physics, and hence that any putative property not identifiable with a physical property must be eliminated from our ontology. Eliminative type physicalism is apt to face three objections, and so my thesis, like Caesar's Gaul, falls into three parts. In the first, I argue against the idea that there are tenable positions, both physicalist and non-physicalist, alternative to eliminative type physicalism. I argue that each of these positions â token physicalism (Fodor, middle Putnam), supervenience physicalism (Lewis, Horgan) and and a non-physicalist view I call pluralism (Goodman, late Putnam) â is defective. In the second part, responding to the objection that
Melnyk, Andrew
Logical positivism
One world and the many sciences : a defence of physicalism. The subject of this thesis is physicalism, understood not as some particular doctrine pertaining narrowly to the philosophy of mind, but rather as a quite general metaphysical claim to the effect that everything is, or is fundamentally, physical. Thus physicalism explicates the thought that in some sense physics is the basic science. The aim of the thesis is to defend a particular brand of physicalism, which I call eliminative type physicalism. It claims, roughly, that every property is a physical property â a property mentioned in the laws of physics, and hence that any putative property not identifiable with a physical property must be eliminated from our ontology. Eliminative type physicalism is apt to face three objections, and so my thesis, like Caesar's Gaul, falls into three parts. In the first, I argue against the idea that there are tenable positions, both physicalist and non-physicalist, alternative to eliminative type physicalism. I argue that each of these positions â token physicalism (Fodor, middle Putnam), supervenience physicalism (Lewis, Horgan) and and a non-physicalist view I call pluralism (Goodman, late Putnam) â is defective. In the second part, responding to the objection that
world many science defence physicalism subject physicalism understood particular doctrine pertain narrowly philosophy_mind rather quite general metaphysical claim effect everything fundamentally physical thus physicalism think sense physic basic science aim_defend particular brand physicalism call type physicalism claim roughly every property physical_property property mention law physic hence putative property identifiable physical_property must eliminate ontology type physicalism apt face objection like caesar gaul fall_three part first argue idea tenable position physicalist non physicalist alternative type physicalism argue position token physicalism middle putnam supervenience physicalism lewis non physicalist view call pluralism late putnam defective second_part respond objection