Understanding testimony
I present and defend an account of how it is that we acquire knowledge from what others tell us and an account of what it is for us to understand the utterances of others that can sustain this epistemology. In Chapters 1 & 2 I present my account of how it is that we can acquire knowledge from others. I say that a speaker makes available irreducibly testimonial knowledge to their audience by voicing knowledge. Testimonial knowledge is a distinctive kind of knowledge that one can get by way of transmission from a knowledgable source. One voices knowledge that p when knowledge that p (one's own, or another's) contributes in the required way in a causal explanation of why one produced one's utterance. I defend the claim that, so long as a speaker in fact voices knowledge that p, then their audience can come to know that p by believing the speaker, regardless of what reasons they initially had to think that the speaker uttered truth or falsity. In Chapter 3 I show that the causal explanation of a speaker's linguistic behaviour will also appeal to expectations that the speaker has of their audience; expectations that they will have understood what speaker has done in so speaking. Understanding utterances is conceived
Nettel, E. P.
Understanding testimony. I present and defend an account of how it is that we acquire knowledge from what others tell us and an account of what it is for us to understand the utterances of others that can sustain this epistemology. In Chapters 1 & 2 I present my account of how it is that we can acquire knowledge from others. I say that a speaker makes available irreducibly testimonial knowledge to their audience by voicing knowledge. Testimonial knowledge is a distinctive kind of knowledge that one can get by way of transmission from a knowledgable source. One voices knowledge that p when knowledge that p (one's own, or another's) contributes in the required way in a causal explanation of why one produced one's utterance. I defend the claim that, so long as a speaker in fact voices knowledge that p, then their audience can come to know that p by believing the speaker, regardless of what reasons they initially had to think that the speaker uttered truth or falsity. In Chapter 3 I show that the causal explanation of a speaker's linguistic behaviour will also appeal to expectations that the speaker has of their audience; expectations that they will have understood what speaker has done in so speaking. Understanding utterances is conceived
testimony present defend_account acquire_knowledge others tell account utterances others sustain epistemology present_account acquire_knowledge others say speaker make_available irreducibly testimonial knowledge audience voice knowledge testimonial knowledge distinctive kind_knowledge get way transmission source voice knowledge knowledge one_another contributes require way causal_explanation produce utterance defend_claim long speaker fact voice knowledge audience come_know believe speaker regardless reason initially think speaker utter truth falsity show causal_explanation speaker_linguistic behaviour also appeal expectation speaker audience expectation understand speaker speaking utterance conceive