A Theory of Value
In this thesis, I articulate and defend a theory of value. The theory has three main parts: The Bi-Conditional Judgment Claim: To j~dge that X is valuable is to judge that X has properties that provide reason for certain responses toward X. The Bi-Conditional Propertv Claim: For X to be valuable is for X to have properties that provide reason for certain responses toward X. The Buck-Passing Claim: Value does not provide any reason for any of the responses mentioned in the Bi-Conditional Property Claim. Call these 'the three main claims.' In Chapter 1, I lay the groundwork for the thesis by briefly giving an account of valuing. Then I clarify the three main claims and their relation to my account of valuing. In Chapter 2, I revisit G.E. Moore's famous Open-Question Argument and contend that it supports the three main claims at least as well as it supports Moore's own account of value against various fOnTIS of reductive naturalism. In Chapter 3. I expand on T.M. Scanlon's argument in favor of the Buck-Passing Claim against Moore's account. In Chapter 4. I consider and reject the main criticisms of th~ two Bi- Page 8 \,.- OJ,' vĂâĂÂ· _.. .. Conditional Claims. Finally, in Chapter 5, I -consider a way in'
Leonard, Kahn
A Theory of Value. In this thesis, I articulate and defend a theory of value. The theory has three main parts: The Bi-Conditional Judgment Claim: To j~dge that X is valuable is to judge that X has properties that provide reason for certain responses toward X. The Bi-Conditional Propertv Claim: For X to be valuable is for X to have properties that provide reason for certain responses toward X. The Buck-Passing Claim: Value does not provide any reason for any of the responses mentioned in the Bi-Conditional Property Claim. Call these 'the three main claims.' In Chapter 1, I lay the groundwork for the thesis by briefly giving an account of valuing. Then I clarify the three main claims and their relation to my account of valuing. In Chapter 2, I revisit G.E. Moore's famous Open-Question Argument and contend that it supports the three main claims at least as well as it supports Moore's own account of value against various fOnTIS of reductive naturalism. In Chapter 3. I expand on T.M. Scanlon's argument in favor of the Buck-Passing Claim against Moore's account. In Chapter 4. I consider and reject the main criticisms of th~ two Bi- Page 8 \,.- OJ,' vĂâĂÂ· _.. .. Conditional Claims. Finally, in Chapter 5, I -consider a way in'
theory value articulate defend theory value theory three_main part conditional judgment claim valuable judge property provide reason certain response toward conditional claim valuable property provide reason certain response toward passing claim value provide reason response mention conditional property claim call the three_main claims lay groundwork briefly give_account valuing clarify three_main claim relation account valuing revisit moore famous open_question argument contend support three_main claim least well support moore account value various reductive naturalism expand argument favor passing claim moore account consider reject main criticism page conditional claims finally_consider way