Likeness and likelihood in Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Plato's Timaeus
This thesis scrutinizes the use of the term <i>eikos/eoikos </i>(usually translated either as âlikeâ or âlikelyâ) in the philosophy of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Platoâs <i>Timaeus</i>. I argue that each philosopher employs the word in a manner significantly different from that of his predecessors. Moreover, as I demonstrate in each case, the difference in sense is informed by a desire to reflect on and correct previous accounts. I conclude that recognizing this continuity in the development of the philosophical sense of <i>eikos</i> will greatly improve our general understanding of the epistemology and, perhaps, metaphysics of Xenophanes, Parmenides and the <i>Timaeus.</i> The first chapter argues that we should read fragment B35 of Xenophanes as deliberately contrasting with the Homeric formula of telling lies like<i> (homoios) </i>truth. An analysis of the Homeric use of the terms <i>eoikos</i> and <i>homoios </i>demonstrates that Xenophanes uses <i>eoikos</i> in B35 to signify a particular kind of similarity between his account and truth: apparent but potentially specious similarity. The second chapter treats the promise of Parmenidesâ goddess to offer a <i>diakosmos eoikos pas</i> (B8.60).
Bryan, J. J.
Likeness and likelihood in Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Plato's Timaeus. This thesis scrutinizes the use of the term <i>eikos/eoikos </i>(usually translated either as âlikeâ or âlikelyâ) in the philosophy of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Platoâs <i>Timaeus</i>. I argue that each philosopher employs the word in a manner significantly different from that of his predecessors. Moreover, as I demonstrate in each case, the difference in sense is informed by a desire to reflect on and correct previous accounts. I conclude that recognizing this continuity in the development of the philosophical sense of <i>eikos</i> will greatly improve our general understanding of the epistemology and, perhaps, metaphysics of Xenophanes, Parmenides and the <i>Timaeus.</i> The first chapter argues that we should read fragment B35 of Xenophanes as deliberately contrasting with the Homeric formula of telling lies like<i> (homoios) </i>truth. An analysis of the Homeric use of the terms <i>eoikos</i> and <i>homoios </i>demonstrates that Xenophanes uses <i>eoikos</i> in B35 to signify a particular kind of similarity between his account and truth: apparent but potentially specious similarity. The second chapter treats the promise of Parmenidesâ goddess to offer a <i>diakosmos eoikos pas</i> (B8.60).
likeness likelihood plato scrutinize use term usually translate either like likely philosophy plato argue philosopher employ word manner significantly_different predecessor moreover case difference sense inform desire reflect correct previous account conclude recognize continuity development philosophical sense greatly improve general epistemology perhaps metaphysics first argue read fragment deliberately contrast homeric formula tell lie like truth analysis homeric use term demonstrate signify particular_kind similarity account truth apparent potentially similarity second treat promise goddess offer pas