Belief, truth, and biological function
In this thesis I argue that there is a link between belief and truth, which is indicated by three features of belief relating to how they are formed. I suggest that these features require an explanation from the belief theorist. The first feature is that when we think about what to believe, we find that we immediately and inescapably attend to what is the case (Transparency). The second feature is that beliefs are not the kinds of thing which are able to be willed, that is, we cannot just believe something, like we can just raise our arms (the Uncontrollability Thesis). The third feature is that beliefs can be correct (when they are true) and incorrect (when they are false), and are also appropriate targets for claims that they are rational, irrational, justified, unjustified, and so on (Epistemic Normativity). These features, which indicate a link between belief and truth, have been thought to be necessary features of belief, that is, features of all beliefs, of all believers, across all possible worlds. This is a claim which I deny. I argue that accounts which have understood the features in this way cannot explain them, and so ought to be rejected. I offer an alternative account of these features by appeal
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema
Belief, truth, and biological function. In this thesis I argue that there is a link between belief and truth, which is indicated by three features of belief relating to how they are formed. I suggest that these features require an explanation from the belief theorist. The first feature is that when we think about what to believe, we find that we immediately and inescapably attend to what is the case (Transparency). The second feature is that beliefs are not the kinds of thing which are able to be willed, that is, we cannot just believe something, like we can just raise our arms (the Uncontrollability Thesis). The third feature is that beliefs can be correct (when they are true) and incorrect (when they are false), and are also appropriate targets for claims that they are rational, irrational, justified, unjustified, and so on (Epistemic Normativity). These features, which indicate a link between belief and truth, have been thought to be necessary features of belief, that is, features of all beliefs, of all believers, across all possible worlds. This is a claim which I deny. I argue that accounts which have understood the features in this way cannot explain them, and so ought to be rejected. I offer an alternative account of these features by appeal
belief truth biological function argue link belief truth indicate feature belief relate form suggest feature require explanation belief theorist first feature think believe immediately attend case transparency second feature belief kinds thing able will believe something_like raise arm third feature belief correct true incorrect false also appropriate target claim rational irrational justified unjustified epistemic normativity feature indicate link belief truth think necessary feature belief feature belief believer across possible_world claim deny argue account understood feature way explain ought reject offer_alternative account feature appeal