The structure of well-being : incommensurability, needs, and sufficiency
As it is discussed in philosophy, economics, and some other social sciences, well-being is very commonly conceived of and treated in quantificational terms. However, it is difficult, if not impossible to make room in the quantificational conception of well-being for any notion of sufficiencyââof having enough in a sense that it is especially ethically significant that people attain. This difficulty with sufficiency is encapsulated by the Threshold Problem: that of non-arbitrarily specifying a sufficiency level on a scale of well-being. This thesis takes this difficulty and this problem as an opportunity to investigate deeper problems with the quantifying approach. One line of inquiry pursued is whether a theory of needs could solve the Threshold Problem. To this end existing theories of needs are surveyed, but found wanting. The central element of the thesis, however, is a critique of the quantifying account of well-being emerging from a discussion of value incommensurabilityââwhich in turn provides resources for the development of an account of the structure of well-being. This account presents a new theory of needs, and analyses well-being in terms of needs. It avoids the Threshold Problem, because
Fardell, B. P.
The structure of well-being : incommensurability, needs, and sufficiency. As it is discussed in philosophy, economics, and some other social sciences, well-being is very commonly conceived of and treated in quantificational terms. However, it is difficult, if not impossible to make room in the quantificational conception of well-being for any notion of sufficiencyââof having enough in a sense that it is especially ethically significant that people attain. This difficulty with sufficiency is encapsulated by the Threshold Problem: that of non-arbitrarily specifying a sufficiency level on a scale of well-being. This thesis takes this difficulty and this problem as an opportunity to investigate deeper problems with the quantifying approach. One line of inquiry pursued is whether a theory of needs could solve the Threshold Problem. To this end existing theories of needs are surveyed, but found wanting. The central element of the thesis, however, is a critique of the quantifying account of well-being emerging from a discussion of value incommensurabilityââwhich in turn provides resources for the development of an account of the structure of well-being. This account presents a new theory of needs, and analyses well-being in terms of needs. It avoids the Threshold Problem, because
structure well_being incommensurability need sufficiency discuss philosophy economics social_sciences well_being commonly conceive treated term however difficult impossible make room conception well_being notion sufficiency enough sense especially ethically significant people attain difficulty sufficiency encapsulate threshold problem non specify sufficiency level scale well_being take difficulty problem opportunity_investigate deep problem quantify approach line inquiry pursue whether theory need could solve threshold problem end exist theory need survey find wanting central_element however critique quantify account well_being emerge discussion value incommensurability turn provide resource development account structure well_being account present_new theory need analyse well_being term need avoids threshold problem