Sui generis-ness, parsimony and innocence : the (meta)ÂČphysics of parthood
A metaphysical naturalist could find the following combination of claims attractive. First, part-whole and composition in physics are sui generis and lack some of the âcoreâ features we ascribe to these concepts and their worldly satisfiers in first-order metaphysics. Second, having agreed that some physical objects of interest satisfy sui generis concepts and/or relate by sui generis relations, none among these objects satisfies a classical concept or relate by a classical part-whole relation (e.g. the concept or relation of mereological part). The first claim I read as one of âappropriationâ: the structural relations between physical objects of interest are sui generis and yet they pertain to the mereological kind. The second I read as one of âeliminationâ: metaphysically abstracted part-whole (or composition) has no instances in well- regarded physical domains. The dissertation argues for appropriation and against elimination. For appropriation, because current physics sanctions relata of part-whole relations (or at least satisfiers of part-whole concepts) that clash with intuitive, seemingly analytic principles for part-whole, e.g. the Antisymmetry postulate (x and y are mutual parts only if
Ceravolo, Fabio
Sui generis-ness, parsimony and innocence : the (meta)ÂČphysics of parthood. A metaphysical naturalist could find the following combination of claims attractive. First, part-whole and composition in physics are sui generis and lack some of the âcoreâ features we ascribe to these concepts and their worldly satisfiers in first-order metaphysics. Second, having agreed that some physical objects of interest satisfy sui generis concepts and/or relate by sui generis relations, none among these objects satisfies a classical concept or relate by a classical part-whole relation (e.g. the concept or relation of mereological part). The first claim I read as one of âappropriationâ: the structural relations between physical objects of interest are sui generis and yet they pertain to the mereological kind. The second I read as one of âeliminationâ: metaphysically abstracted part-whole (or composition) has no instances in well- regarded physical domains. The dissertation argues for appropriation and against elimination. For appropriation, because current physics sanctions relata of part-whole relations (or at least satisfiers of part-whole concepts) that clash with intuitive, seemingly analytic principles for part-whole, e.g. the Antisymmetry postulate (x and y are mutual parts only if
sui_generis ness parsimony innocence meta metaphysical naturalist could follow combination claim attractive first_part whole composition physic sui_generis lack core feature ascribe concept worldly first order metaphysics second agree physical_object interest satisfy sui_generis concept and relate sui_generis relation none among object satisfies classical concept relate classical part_whole relation concept relation mereological part first claim read appropriation structural relation physical_object interest sui_generis yet pertain mereological kind second read elimination metaphysically abstract part_whole composition instance well regarded physical domain argues appropriation elimination appropriation current physic sanction part_whole relation least part_whole concept clash intuitive seemingly analytic principle part_whole postulate mutual part