Subjectivist theories of normative language
On the assumption that there are no objective normative facts, what is the best theory of normative language? I try to answer this question. Chapter 1 argues for a presumption against noncognitivism and explains why error-theories are of limited interest: they concern adverbs and adjectives like âmoralâ, but not words like âoughtâ, âgoodâ and âreasonâ. This narrows down the options: the best subjectivist theory of normative language is a truth conditional, non-error-theoretic account. Chapter 2 argues for contextualism about normative statements. Contextualists hold that their truth conditions (can) vary with the context of utterance. Chapter 3 starts the assessment of contextualist theories. It looks into Humean accounts. Problems are revealed with both Harmanâs and Schroederâs versions. Chapter 4 develops a form of indexical relativism according to which the truth of normative statements depends on contextually salient rules. I present imperative-based analyses of âoughtâ and âreasonâ and show how they can explain why âA ought to Xâ entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X-es. Chapter 5 further develops the theory of chapter 4 and applies it to the words âgoodâ
Evers, Hendrik Willem Adriaan
Philosophy ; Ethics (Moral philosophy) ; normative antirealism ; normative language ; normative semantics ; contextualism ; moral antirealism ; moral relativism ; Stephen Finlay
Subjectivist theories of normative language. On the assumption that there are no objective normative facts, what is the best theory of normative language? I try to answer this question. Chapter 1 argues for a presumption against noncognitivism and explains why error-theories are of limited interest: they concern adverbs and adjectives like âmoralâ, but not words like âoughtâ, âgoodâ and âreasonâ. This narrows down the options: the best subjectivist theory of normative language is a truth conditional, non-error-theoretic account. Chapter 2 argues for contextualism about normative statements. Contextualists hold that their truth conditions (can) vary with the context of utterance. Chapter 3 starts the assessment of contextualist theories. It looks into Humean accounts. Problems are revealed with both Harmanâs and Schroederâs versions. Chapter 4 develops a form of indexical relativism according to which the truth of normative statements depends on contextually salient rules. I present imperative-based analyses of âoughtâ and âreasonâ and show how they can explain why âA ought to Xâ entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X-es. Chapter 5 further develops the theory of chapter 4 and applies it to the words âgoodâ
subjectivist theory normative language assumption objective normative fact best theory normative language try answer_question argues presumption explain error theories limited interest concern adverbs adjective like moral word like ought good_reason narrow option best subjectivist theory normative language truth_conditional non error theoretic account argues contextualism normative statement contextualists hold truth_condition vary context utterance start assessment contextualist theory look humean account problems reveal version develops form indexical relativism accord truth normative statement depend contextually salient rule present imperative based_analysis ought reason show explain ought entails balance reason favour develop_theory applies word good