Higher-order expressivism : the dyadic nature of moral judgement
Moral judgements have a dyadic nature. Normally we experience some pressure to act in line with our moral judgements, even if it's regularly overcome by fear, selfishness, laziness, or other forces. This is evidence that moral judgements are desire-like, as expressivists contend. On the other hand, moral judgements also have the features of beliefs. They can be true or false, as cognitivists maintain, and justified and reasoned about in the way other beliefs are. Rather than deny one of these two aspects, this thesis is ultimately a defence of higher-order expressivism according to which moral judgements are hybrid mental states composed of beliefs and desires. However, only two of the chapters (2 and 3) contain arguments in favour of this specific kind of expressivism. The first chapter - What is Expressivism? - argues for a general characterisation that will be useful for friends and foes alike, and the final two chapters address problems that are common to all expressivists. After we find out what expressivism is, I turn to the problems with pure versions according to which moral judgements are only desire-like states. I argue in chapter 2, The Problem with Purity, that pure expressivists are unlikely to
Bex-Priestley, Graham
Higher-order expressivism : the dyadic nature of moral judgement. Moral judgements have a dyadic nature. Normally we experience some pressure to act in line with our moral judgements, even if it's regularly overcome by fear, selfishness, laziness, or other forces. This is evidence that moral judgements are desire-like, as expressivists contend. On the other hand, moral judgements also have the features of beliefs. They can be true or false, as cognitivists maintain, and justified and reasoned about in the way other beliefs are. Rather than deny one of these two aspects, this thesis is ultimately a defence of higher-order expressivism according to which moral judgements are hybrid mental states composed of beliefs and desires. However, only two of the chapters (2 and 3) contain arguments in favour of this specific kind of expressivism. The first chapter - What is Expressivism? - argues for a general characterisation that will be useful for friends and foes alike, and the final two chapters address problems that are common to all expressivists. After we find out what expressivism is, I turn to the problems with pure versions according to which moral judgements are only desire-like states. I argue in chapter 2, The Problem with Purity, that pure expressivists are unlikely to
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