Knowledge from ignorance : a study in the acquisition of inferential knowledge
The view that knowledge-yielding single-premise deductive inference must proceed from a known premise is very plausible at first blush. In this thesis I explore in detail the possibility that this view is false. I construct a series of challenging cases against the principle of Counter-Closure, which expresses this view. These cases force theorists endorsing a variety of contemporary views to either (i) abandon Counter-Closure; (ii) admit into their epistemology novel and theory-specific kinds of Gettier cases; or (iii) make significant revisions to their theories. I offer considerations that help would-be deniers of Counter-Closure explain away its prima facie plausibility and suggest a suitable theoretical replacement phrased in terms of justification rather than knowledge. Finally, I connect this discussion with debates in the epistemologies of testimony and memory, where analogue principles to Counter- Closure have been recently subjected to critical scrutiny.
Luzzi, Federico Walter
Knowledge and learning ; Inference
Knowledge from ignorance : a study in the acquisition of inferential knowledge. The view that knowledge-yielding single-premise deductive inference must proceed from a known premise is very plausible at first blush. In this thesis I explore in detail the possibility that this view is false. I construct a series of challenging cases against the principle of Counter-Closure, which expresses this view. These cases force theorists endorsing a variety of contemporary views to either (i) abandon Counter-Closure; (ii) admit into their epistemology novel and theory-specific kinds of Gettier cases; or (iii) make significant revisions to their theories. I offer considerations that help would-be deniers of Counter-Closure explain away its prima facie plausibility and suggest a suitable theoretical replacement phrased in terms of justification rather than knowledge. Finally, I connect this discussion with debates in the epistemologies of testimony and memory, where analogue principles to Counter- Closure have been recently subjected to critical scrutiny.
knowledge ignorance study acquisition inferential knowledge view knowledge single premise deductive inference must proceed know premise plausible first explore detail possibility view false construct series challenge case principle counter closure express view case force theorist endorse variety contemporary view either abandon counter closure admit epistemology novel theory specific kind case iii make_significant revision theory offer consideration help would counter closure explain away prima_facie plausibility suggest suitable theoretical replacement phrase term justification rather knowledge finally connect discussion debate epistemology testimony memory analogue principle counter closure recently subject critical scrutiny