Materialism and perceptual experience
The present work is a defence of scientific materialism. It begins by arguing in the face of received criticism, that it does appear possible to define the theory such that it merits serious attention. The main obstacle foe the theory is then identified as the fact that our perceptual experience suggests that there are constituents in the world that it cannot allow - in particular, the unanalysable, indefinable qualia that characterise our experience of Secondary Qualities and sensations, and, also^ sensations located where there is no corresponding physical phenomenon. Two main approaches to the problems these items pose are identified. The first is the Analytical Approach, which claims that existing concepts relating to perceptual experience may be analysed so ns to avoid conflicts with materialism. Such analyses fail, however - notably because they cannot deal satisfactorily with the distinction between ordinary conscious perceptual experiences and unusual, and arguably unconscious, perceptual episodes, so favouring the second approach, that of Eliminative Materialism. An attempt is made, first, to present a coherent formulation of this defence in the light of recent discussion, and attention then focusses
Ramsay, William Donald
B Philosophy (General)
Materialism and perceptual experience. The present work is a defence of scientific materialism. It begins by arguing in the face of received criticism, that it does appear possible to define the theory such that it merits serious attention. The main obstacle foe the theory is then identified as the fact that our perceptual experience suggests that there are constituents in the world that it cannot allow - in particular, the unanalysable, indefinable qualia that characterise our experience of Secondary Qualities and sensations, and, also^ sensations located where there is no corresponding physical phenomenon. Two main approaches to the problems these items pose are identified. The first is the Analytical Approach, which claims that existing concepts relating to perceptual experience may be analysed so ns to avoid conflicts with materialism. Such analyses fail, however - notably because they cannot deal satisfactorily with the distinction between ordinary conscious perceptual experiences and unusual, and arguably unconscious, perceptual episodes, so favouring the second approach, that of Eliminative Materialism. An attempt is made, first, to present a coherent formulation of this defence in the light of recent discussion, and attention then focusses
materialism perceptual_experience present_work defence scientific materialism begin argue face receive criticism appear possible define theory merit serious attention main obstacle theory identify fact perceptual_experience suggest constituent world allow particular characterise experience secondary sensation also sensation locate correspond physical phenomenon two_main approach_problem item pose identify first analytical claim exist concept relate perceptual_experience may analyse avoid conflict materialism analysis fail however notably deal satisfactorily distinction ordinary conscious perceptual_experience unusual arguably unconscious perceptual episode favour second materialism attempt_make first_present coherent formulation defence light_recent discussion attention_focus