An audience for moral philosophy?
The essay is divided into three parts. Part One is a criticism of a tradition of accounts of morality in which moral practices are explained or justified as the means to social stability and cooperation and, hence, to the satisfaction of individuals' needs, interests and desires. It is argued that Glaucon's 'popular account' of justice in Book II of Plato's Republic, Hobbes' Leviathan, and John Rawis' recent A Theory of Justice are instances of this kind of account. These are said to issue in the 'politicalization of morality', the reduction of morality to matters of political necessity. It is argued that this is indeed a reduction, and that where 'the good' is thus identified with 'the necessary', proper moral values cannot be articulated. The politicalization of morality, it is argued, is the elimination of morality. Part Two addresses questions raised by Part One, questions about the nature of philosophical criticism. Criticism of a purported account or theory of morality as a misrepresentation of moral practices or as the elimination of morality, appears to presume that a common understanding of morality is shared by both critic and theorist, that is to say, that both, as it were, recognize a common object
Edelman, J. T.
An audience for moral philosophy?. The essay is divided into three parts. Part One is a criticism of a tradition of accounts of morality in which moral practices are explained or justified as the means to social stability and cooperation and, hence, to the satisfaction of individuals' needs, interests and desires. It is argued that Glaucon's 'popular account' of justice in Book II of Plato's Republic, Hobbes' Leviathan, and John Rawis' recent A Theory of Justice are instances of this kind of account. These are said to issue in the 'politicalization of morality', the reduction of morality to matters of political necessity. It is argued that this is indeed a reduction, and that where 'the good' is thus identified with 'the necessary', proper moral values cannot be articulated. The politicalization of morality, it is argued, is the elimination of morality. Part Two addresses questions raised by Part One, questions about the nature of philosophical criticism. Criticism of a purported account or theory of morality as a misrepresentation of moral practices or as the elimination of morality, appears to presume that a common understanding of morality is shared by both critic and theorist, that is to say, that both, as it were, recognize a common object
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