Being apart from reasons : a study on the role of reasons in public and private moral decision-making
This thesis is an attempt to restore the employment of reasons to its rightful place as a morally valuable decision-making method. In order to do so, arguments are provided that aim at proving that there are other decision-making methods which are allowed and, sometimes, required by morals, which are not reasoning. That would only be true if there are substantive moral reasons which apply to the decision-making process through which an action was brought about, so that to action that only differ in that they were brought about in different ways might be considered to be different sorts of action when viewed from a moral point of view. Those arguments explain how it is possible to conceive a richer morality of decision-making processes that has a place for, but is not reduced to, the use of reasons. In order to restore the employment of reasons to its rightful place, arguments are also provided to prove that <i>public</i> agents are always required to reason comprehensively (instead of, e.g. following their inclinations or reasoning from an incomplete set of reasons). Many contemporary philosophers attempted to justify constrains to the employment of reasons by public agents, so that public agents should not
Michelon, Claudio F.
Being apart from reasons : a study on the role of reasons in public and private moral decision-making. This thesis is an attempt to restore the employment of reasons to its rightful place as a morally valuable decision-making method. In order to do so, arguments are provided that aim at proving that there are other decision-making methods which are allowed and, sometimes, required by morals, which are not reasoning. That would only be true if there are substantive moral reasons which apply to the decision-making process through which an action was brought about, so that to action that only differ in that they were brought about in different ways might be considered to be different sorts of action when viewed from a moral point of view. Those arguments explain how it is possible to conceive a richer morality of decision-making processes that has a place for, but is not reduced to, the use of reasons. In order to restore the employment of reasons to its rightful place, arguments are also provided to prove that <i>public</i> agents are always required to reason comprehensively (instead of, e.g. following their inclinations or reasoning from an incomplete set of reasons). Many contemporary philosophers attempted to justify constrains to the employment of reasons by public agents, so that public agents should not
apart reason study role reason public private moral decision_making attempt restore employment reason rightful place morally valuable decision_making method order argument provide aim prove decision_making method_allow sometimes required moral_reason would true substantive moral_reason apply decision_making_process action bring action differ bring different_way might consider different sort action view_moral point_view argument explain possible conceive rich morality decision_making_process place reduce use reason order restore employment reason rightful place argument also_provide prove public agent always require reason comprehensively instead follow inclination reason incomplete set reason many_contemporary philosopher attempt justify constrains employment reason public agent public agent