The token-token identity-theory and recent theories of reference
This thesis investigates a specific kind of criticism of the token-token identity-theory. This criticism is based on recent theories of reference. In the Introduction I argue that more than Davidson's three premisses is needed to establish that mental events are identical to physical events. One needs to invoke principles about what constitutes event-identity. In Part 1 I discuss event-identities. I lay down the constraints an adequate theory of event-identity must satisfy, and criticise the major theories in the literature. I suggest an alternative view, which I defend against some recent proposals. I end Part 1 by exploring a view which takes seriously the possibility of constitution-relations between events. In Parts 2 and 3 I discuss whether the identity-theory can be defended. Part 2 discusses sensations, and I concentrate on S. Kripke's arguments against the identity-view. I distinguish two versions of Kripke's argument, one epistemic, and one metaphysical. The epistemic version of the argument presupposes Kripke's views on content, but fails by its own standards. The metaphysical version is shown to be weak and implausible. Part 3 discusses cognitive events, and concentrates on de re beliefs. I produce
Gjelsvik, Olav
Identity (Philosophical concept) ; Reference (Philosophy)
The token-token identity-theory and recent theories of reference. This thesis investigates a specific kind of criticism of the token-token identity-theory. This criticism is based on recent theories of reference. In the Introduction I argue that more than Davidson's three premisses is needed to establish that mental events are identical to physical events. One needs to invoke principles about what constitutes event-identity. In Part 1 I discuss event-identities. I lay down the constraints an adequate theory of event-identity must satisfy, and criticise the major theories in the literature. I suggest an alternative view, which I defend against some recent proposals. I end Part 1 by exploring a view which takes seriously the possibility of constitution-relations between events. In Parts 2 and 3 I discuss whether the identity-theory can be defended. Part 2 discusses sensations, and I concentrate on S. Kripke's arguments against the identity-view. I distinguish two versions of Kripke's argument, one epistemic, and one metaphysical. The epistemic version of the argument presupposes Kripke's views on content, but fails by its own standards. The metaphysical version is shown to be weak and implausible. Part 3 discusses cognitive events, and concentrates on de re beliefs. I produce
token token identity theory recent_theory reference investigates specific kind criticism token token identity theory criticism base recent_theory reference introduction argue davidson premiss need_establish mental event identical physical event need invoke principle constitute event identity part discus event identities lay constraint adequate theory event identity must satisfy criticise major theory literature suggest_alternative view defend recent proposal end part_explore view take_seriously possibility constitution relations event parts discuss whether identity theory defend part discus sensation concentrate kripke argument identity view distinguish_two version kripke argument epistemic metaphysical epistemic version argument presuppose kripke view content fails standard metaphysical version show weak implausible part discus cognitive event concentrate belief produce