Thought in motion : on the possibility of practical reason
All intentional action involves practical thought, for the agent of intentional action represents the kind of action they do in a distinctively practical way: as a model or guide for their actual action. In the first instance, this thesis is about how we should conceive of the relationship between such practical thought and the particular intentional actions for which it is necessary. In this thesis I defend what I call the Identity Account. The account claims that there is a fundamental way of thinking that some kind of action is to-be-done, or is good-to-do, wherein one is and knows oneself to be doing that action-kind. In such cases, practical thoughts are intentional actions: a species of self-conscious change. I argue that other forms of practical thought are less fundamental than intentional action, and must be understood only relative to it. Standing in the way of the Identity Account is a certain conception of what a particular change is, which I call the block view. This entails a separation between practical thought and intentional action, and it puts out of the reach the possibility of the kind of self-conscious changes which the Identity Account says intentional actions are. I marshal a number
Hinshelwood, A. J.
Thought in motion : on the possibility of practical reason. All intentional action involves practical thought, for the agent of intentional action represents the kind of action they do in a distinctively practical way: as a model or guide for their actual action. In the first instance, this thesis is about how we should conceive of the relationship between such practical thought and the particular intentional actions for which it is necessary. In this thesis I defend what I call the Identity Account. The account claims that there is a fundamental way of thinking that some kind of action is to-be-done, or is good-to-do, wherein one is and knows oneself to be doing that action-kind. In such cases, practical thoughts are intentional actions: a species of self-conscious change. I argue that other forms of practical thought are less fundamental than intentional action, and must be understood only relative to it. Standing in the way of the Identity Account is a certain conception of what a particular change is, which I call the block view. This entails a separation between practical thought and intentional action, and it puts out of the reach the possibility of the kind of self-conscious changes which the Identity Account says intentional actions are. I marshal a number
thought motion possibility practical_reason intentional_action involve practical_thought agent intentional_action represent kind action distinctively practical way model guide actual action first_instance conceive relationship practical think particular intentional_action necessary defend call identity account account claim fundamental way_think kind action good wherein know oneself action kind case practical_thought intentional_action specie self_conscious change argue form practical think less fundamental intentional_action must_understand relative standing way identity account certain conception particular change call block view entail separation practical think intentional_action put reach possibility kind self_conscious change identity account say intentional_action marshal number