Conceivability, apriority and modality
I aim to understand whether apriority entails necessity, aposteriority entails contingency and conceivability entails possibility; that is, the relationship between, and the nature of, rationality and modality. The thesis is split into two parts: one on apriority and modality (chs. 2-4), and another on conceivability, apriority/aposteriority and modality (chs. 5 to 7). In Chapter 1, I discuss âtwo-dimensional modal semanticsâ, arguing that it is ill-equipped to provide a substantive account of rationality and modality, before setting out the basis of such an understanding. I begin the first part of the thesis (in Chapter 2) by outlining a preliminary account of the a priori: it is, strictly, not defeasible by empirical evidence; it involves a kind of necessity (ârational necessityâ); and it is (at least in its prima facie variant) fallible. In Chapter 3 I discuss the contingent a priori, arguing that genuine apriority entails necessity, before placing apriority qua ârational necessityâ (and ârational modalityâ more widely) with respect to other kinds of modality (in Chapter 4). I conclude Part I of the thesis, by arguing that the a priori is not coextensive with, but is grounded in, metaphysical
Winstanley, Paul
Conceivability, apriority and modality. I aim to understand whether apriority entails necessity, aposteriority entails contingency and conceivability entails possibility; that is, the relationship between, and the nature of, rationality and modality. The thesis is split into two parts: one on apriority and modality (chs. 2-4), and another on conceivability, apriority/aposteriority and modality (chs. 5 to 7). In Chapter 1, I discuss âtwo-dimensional modal semanticsâ, arguing that it is ill-equipped to provide a substantive account of rationality and modality, before setting out the basis of such an understanding. I begin the first part of the thesis (in Chapter 2) by outlining a preliminary account of the a priori: it is, strictly, not defeasible by empirical evidence; it involves a kind of necessity (ârational necessityâ); and it is (at least in its prima facie variant) fallible. In Chapter 3 I discuss the contingent a priori, arguing that genuine apriority entails necessity, before placing apriority qua ârational necessityâ (and ârational modalityâ more widely) with respect to other kinds of modality (in Chapter 4). I conclude Part I of the thesis, by arguing that the a priori is not coextensive with, but is grounded in, metaphysical
modality aim whether entail necessity entail contingency entail possibility relationship nature_rationality modality split_two part_one modality chs another modality chs discuss two_dimensional modal semantics argue ill equipped provide substantive account rationality modality set basis understanding begin first_part outline preliminary account priori strictly empirical_evidence involve kind necessity rational necessity least prima_facie variant fallible discuss contingent priori argue genuine entail necessity place qua rational necessity rational modality widely respect kinds modality conclude part argue priori coextensive ground metaphysical