Universalizability, needs, and moral judgements
Can there be an answer to the question 'which moral judgements ought anyone to make?' that does not depend upon contestable value assumptions? My essay brings together two hitherto unconnected ways of responding to this problem to be found in recent meta-ethics; the claim that our particular moral judgements must be universalizable and the claim that our commonsense moral beliefs are grounded in human needs. I will try to show how these two features, uni versalizability and needs, get us to the heart of our ordinary moral beliefs and practices. I will try to show also that an interpretation of the universalizability thesis, based upon human needs, provides us with a theory-neutral rule with which a rational autonomous judger can answer the 'which moral judgements?' question. There are three parts to the essay. In Part One, I will show some of the formal conditions that particular moral judgments must meet if they are to satisfy my interpretation of the universalizability thesis. First of all, there is the generally conceded requirement that when a person makes such a judgement he must be consistent, in the sense that he must be willing and able to accept the same judgement for all similar cases in propria
Dowling, Keith William
Universalizability, needs, and moral judgements. Can there be an answer to the question 'which moral judgements ought anyone to make?' that does not depend upon contestable value assumptions? My essay brings together two hitherto unconnected ways of responding to this problem to be found in recent meta-ethics; the claim that our particular moral judgements must be universalizable and the claim that our commonsense moral beliefs are grounded in human needs. I will try to show how these two features, uni versalizability and needs, get us to the heart of our ordinary moral beliefs and practices. I will try to show also that an interpretation of the universalizability thesis, based upon human needs, provides us with a theory-neutral rule with which a rational autonomous judger can answer the 'which moral judgements?' question. There are three parts to the essay. In Part One, I will show some of the formal conditions that particular moral judgments must meet if they are to satisfy my interpretation of the universalizability thesis. First of all, there is the generally conceded requirement that when a person makes such a judgement he must be consistent, in the sense that he must be willing and able to accept the same judgement for all similar cases in propria
need moral_judgement answer_question which moral_judgement ought anyone make depend_upon contestable value assumption essay bring_together hitherto unconnected way_respond problem find recent meta_ethics claim particular moral_judgement must claim commonsense moral_belief ground human need try_show feature need get heart ordinary moral_belief practice try_show also interpretation base_upon human need provide theory neutral rule rational autonomous answer which moral_judgement question three_part essay part_one show formal condition particular moral_judgment must meet satisfy interpretation thesis first generally concede requirement person make judgement must consistent sense must willing able accept judgement similar case