Enacting virtue
This thesis is about how we develop as moral agents and come to realise the virtuous activity on which flourishing depends. Aristotleâs account of how this is effected is familiar: we become virtuous through practice of the actions in which virtue finds its expression. But how should we understand the difference between the doings of the learner and the activity of the virtuous agent, and what is it that happens when a learner does these things that results in her realisation of virtuous activity? Whilst both agents perform virtuous actions, the two are engaged in different activities: one is in the process of acquiring a disposition, the other is engaged in its exercise. But we can also see each as related to the actions they perform in different ways. The learner is not yet the author of her actions in the strict sense that the virtuous agent is, who chooses these actions as an expression of a settled way of seeing and valuing things; indeed, the learnerâs actions stand in the relation of copy to those of the virtuous agent, or so I argue. How, then, does the learnerâs practice of these alienable actions result in her becoming an author of virtuous actions in the strict sense? I argue that by seeing
Hampson, Margaret RoÌisiÌn
Enacting virtue. This thesis is about how we develop as moral agents and come to realise the virtuous activity on which flourishing depends. Aristotleâs account of how this is effected is familiar: we become virtuous through practice of the actions in which virtue finds its expression. But how should we understand the difference between the doings of the learner and the activity of the virtuous agent, and what is it that happens when a learner does these things that results in her realisation of virtuous activity? Whilst both agents perform virtuous actions, the two are engaged in different activities: one is in the process of acquiring a disposition, the other is engaged in its exercise. But we can also see each as related to the actions they perform in different ways. The learner is not yet the author of her actions in the strict sense that the virtuous agent is, who chooses these actions as an expression of a settled way of seeing and valuing things; indeed, the learnerâs actions stand in the relation of copy to those of the virtuous agent, or so I argue. How, then, does the learnerâs practice of these alienable actions result in her becoming an author of virtuous actions in the strict sense? I argue that by seeing
enacting virtue develop moral_agent come realise virtuous activity flourish aristotle_account effect familiar become virtuous practice action virtue find expression difference doings learner activity virtuous agent happen learner thing realisation virtuous activity whilst agent perform virtuous action engage different activity process acquire disposition engage exercise also_see related action perform different_way learner yet author action strict sense virtuous agent choose action expression settle way see valuing thing indeed learner action stand relation copy virtuous agent argue learner practice action become author virtuous action strict sense argue see