Agent-regret in our lives
This dissertation is a defence of agent-regret and an exploration of its role in our lives. I argue that agent-regret shows that an agent takes seriously her status as an agent who impacts the world, but who only has fallible control over it. To accept responsibility for any outcomes, she must accept responsibility for unintended outcomes, too: agent-regret is part of being a human agent. In doing this, I try to defend and develop Williams's own conception of agent-regret. In the first part, I explore the nature of agent-regret. Agent-regret is distinct from guilt because we can feel agent-regret without being at fault. I argue that several challenges that seek to reduce agent-regret to a form of guilt fail. I further argue that agent-regret takes as its object not only something one has done, but the fact that one did it; I discuss this in terms of what Bernard Williams called taking an ~external~ view on one's own action. I suggest that we can best understand the object of agent-regret as one's responsibility for an outcome. I argue that this form of ~responsibility~ is conceptually separate from liability or answerability; it concerns whether the outcome can be ascribed to an agent. This is a restricted
Wojtowicz, Jake
Agent-regret in our lives. This dissertation is a defence of agent-regret and an exploration of its role in our lives. I argue that agent-regret shows that an agent takes seriously her status as an agent who impacts the world, but who only has fallible control over it. To accept responsibility for any outcomes, she must accept responsibility for unintended outcomes, too: agent-regret is part of being a human agent. In doing this, I try to defend and develop Williams's own conception of agent-regret. In the first part, I explore the nature of agent-regret. Agent-regret is distinct from guilt because we can feel agent-regret without being at fault. I argue that several challenges that seek to reduce agent-regret to a form of guilt fail. I further argue that agent-regret takes as its object not only something one has done, but the fact that one did it; I discuss this in terms of what Bernard Williams called taking an ~external~ view on one's own action. I suggest that we can best understand the object of agent-regret as one's responsibility for an outcome. I argue that this form of ~responsibility~ is conceptually separate from liability or answerability; it concerns whether the outcome can be ascribed to an agent. This is a restricted
agent life defence agent exploration_role life argue agent show agent take_seriously status agent impact world fallible control accept responsibility outcome must accept responsibility unintended outcome agent part human agent try defend develop williams conception agent first_part explore_nature agent agent distinct guilt feel agent without fault argue several challenge seek reduce agent form guilt fail argue agent take object something fact discus term bernard_williams call take external view action suggest best object agent responsibility outcome argue form responsibility conceptually separate liability concern whether outcome ascribe agent restrict