Understanding, normativity, and scientific practice
Understanding, Normativity, and Scientific Practice Harry Lewendon-Evans PhD Thesis Department of Philosophy Durham University 2018 Recent work in epistemology and philosophy of science has argued that understanding is an important cognitive achievement that philosophers should seek to address for its own sake. This thesis outlines and defends a new account of scientific understanding that analyses the concept of understanding in terms of the concept of normativity. The central claim is that to understand means to grasp something in the light of norms. The thesis is divided into two parts: Part I (chapters one to three) addresses the question of the agency of understanding and Part II (chapters four to five) focuses on the vehicles of scientific understanding. Chapter One begins with an account of understanding drawn from the work of Martin Heidegger, which presents understanding as a practical, normative capacity for making sense of entities. Chapter Two builds on Robert Brandomâs normative inferentialism to argue that conceptual understanding is grounded in inferential rules embedded within norm-governed, social practices. Chapter Three argues that normativity should be located in the intersubjective nature
Lewendon-Evans, Harry Edward
Understanding, normativity, and scientific practice. Understanding, Normativity, and Scientific Practice Harry Lewendon-Evans PhD Thesis Department of Philosophy Durham University 2018 Recent work in epistemology and philosophy of science has argued that understanding is an important cognitive achievement that philosophers should seek to address for its own sake. This thesis outlines and defends a new account of scientific understanding that analyses the concept of understanding in terms of the concept of normativity. The central claim is that to understand means to grasp something in the light of norms. The thesis is divided into two parts: Part I (chapters one to three) addresses the question of the agency of understanding and Part II (chapters four to five) focuses on the vehicles of scientific understanding. Chapter One begins with an account of understanding drawn from the work of Martin Heidegger, which presents understanding as a practical, normative capacity for making sense of entities. Chapter Two builds on Robert Brandomâs normative inferentialism to argue that conceptual understanding is grounded in inferential rules embedded within norm-governed, social practices. Chapter Three argues that normativity should be located in the intersubjective nature
normativity scientific practice normativity scientific practice evans phd department philosophy durham_university recent_work epistemology philosophy_science argue important cognitive achievement philosopher seek_address sake outline defend new account scientific analyse concept term concept normativity central_claim mean grasp something light norm divide_two_part part_one address_question agency part focus vehicle scientific understanding begin account drawn work_martin_heidegger present practical normative capacity make_sense entity build normative argue_conceptual ground inferential rule embed_within norm governed social_practice argue normativity locate intersubjective nature