The role of emotion-arousal in Aristotleâs Rhetoric
The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotleâs view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoricâs role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as âproper grounds for convictionâ, applying this to all three of Aristotleâs kinds of âtechnical proofsâ (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speakerâs conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotleâs view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise).
Dow, Jamie P. G.
Aristotle ; Rhetoric ; Emotion ; Phantasia ; Persuasion ; Argument ; De anima ; Proof ; PA3893.R4D7 ; Aristotle. Rhetoric ; Rhetoric and psychology ; Emotions in literature
The role of emotion-arousal in Aristotleâs Rhetoric. The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotleâs view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoricâs role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as âproper grounds for convictionâ, applying this to all three of Aristotleâs kinds of âtechnical proofsâ (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speakerâs conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotleâs view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise).
role_emotion aristotle rhetoric principal claim defend aristotle arouse emotion others amount give proper ground conviction hence skill properly part expertise rhetoric set aristotle_view rhetoric exercise solely provision proper ground conviction show defend controversial view appeal widely share plausible view rhetoric role proper function state explore detail normative standard must meet something qualify proper ground conviction apply aristotle kinds technical proof case emotion meeting standard matter arouse emotion constitute reasonable acceptance premise_argument count favour speaker conclusion seek_show aristotle_view emotion compatible role involves oppose_view rhetoric aristotle reject role_emotion rhetoric view famously generate contradiction rest treatise