Affective perception
This thesis aims to present and defend an account of affective perception. The central argument seeks to establish three claims. 1) Certain emotional bodily feelings (and not just psychic feelings) are world-directed intentional states. 2) Their intentionality is to be understood in perceptual terms: such feelings are affective perceptions of emotional properties of a certain kind. 3) These âemotion-proper propertiesâ are response-dependent in a way that entails that appropriate affective responses to their token instances qualify, ipso facto, as perceptions of those instances. The arguments for (1) and (2) appeal directly to the phenomenology of emotional experience and draw heavily from recent research by Peter Goldie and Matthew Ratcliffe. By applying Goldieâs insights into the intentional structure of psychic feelings to the case of emotional bodily feelings, it is shown that certain of the latterâparticularly those pertaining to the so-called âstandardâ emotionsâexemplify world-directed intentionality analogous to the perceptual intentionality of tactile feelings. Adapting Ratcliffeâs account of the analogy between tactile feelings and what he terms âexistential feelingsâ, it is argued
Taylor, Richard James
Philosophy of mind ; Emotion ; Philosophy ; emotions ; affect ; perception ; philosophy
Affective perception. This thesis aims to present and defend an account of affective perception. The central argument seeks to establish three claims. 1) Certain emotional bodily feelings (and not just psychic feelings) are world-directed intentional states. 2) Their intentionality is to be understood in perceptual terms: such feelings are affective perceptions of emotional properties of a certain kind. 3) These âemotion-proper propertiesâ are response-dependent in a way that entails that appropriate affective responses to their token instances qualify, ipso facto, as perceptions of those instances. The arguments for (1) and (2) appeal directly to the phenomenology of emotional experience and draw heavily from recent research by Peter Goldie and Matthew Ratcliffe. By applying Goldieâs insights into the intentional structure of psychic feelings to the case of emotional bodily feelings, it is shown that certain of the latterâparticularly those pertaining to the so-called âstandardâ emotionsâexemplify world-directed intentionality analogous to the perceptual intentionality of tactile feelings. Adapting Ratcliffeâs account of the analogy between tactile feelings and what he terms âexistential feelingsâ, it is argued
affective perception aim_present defend_account affective perception central_argument seek_establish claim certain emotional bodily feeling feeling world directed intentional_state intentionality understood perceptual term feeling affective perception emotional property certain_kind emotion proper property response_dependent way entail appropriate affective response token instance qualify facto perception instance argument appeal directly phenomenology emotional_experience draw_heavily recent peter matthew apply insight intentional structure feeling case emotional bodily feeling show certain latter particularly pertain so_called standard emotion exemplify world directed intentionality analogous perceptual intentionality feeling account analogy feeling term existential feeling argue