Normativity and contrastive explanation
My thesis concentrates on the distinction between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgments, and their relation to normative justification. Negatively, it seeks to show that a prevailing kind of account of this relation should be rejected, namely that family of views which takes it that every reason has an associated weight, and the truth with respect to any issue is established by which set of reasons is weightiest. Through an examination of Rossâ doctrine of prima facie duties, this discussion also leads to a formulation of the central problem which any account of this relation must seek to solve. Positively, this thesis develops a new account of the relation between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgements, based on the fundamental insight that a justification of normative propositions is identical to an explanation of their truth, were they to be true. I defend this identity claim, and seek to generate an account of justification from an account of explanation. Drawing on a deservedly popular âcontrastiveâ conception of explanation in the philosophy of science, I show how we can fruitfully think of justification as itself contrastive. Part of this is showing how the notion
Olbrich, David
Normativity and contrastive explanation. My thesis concentrates on the distinction between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgments, and their relation to normative justification. Negatively, it seeks to show that a prevailing kind of account of this relation should be rejected, namely that family of views which takes it that every reason has an associated weight, and the truth with respect to any issue is established by which set of reasons is weightiest. Through an examination of Rossâ doctrine of prima facie duties, this discussion also leads to a formulation of the central problem which any account of this relation must seek to solve. Positively, this thesis develops a new account of the relation between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgements, based on the fundamental insight that a justification of normative propositions is identical to an explanation of their truth, were they to be true. I defend this identity claim, and seek to generate an account of justification from an account of explanation. Drawing on a deservedly popular âcontrastiveâ conception of explanation in the philosophy of science, I show how we can fruitfully think of justification as itself contrastive. Part of this is showing how the notion
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