Consciousness and the heterogeneity of attention
This thesis will primarily consider issues related to attention and its relationship to phenomenal consciousness. The main argument of this thesis is that we cannot hope to make progress in this domain unless we greater appreciate the role that the concept âattentionâ plays within these debates. I argue that by focussing on this, we can reach new and surprising conclusions about both the nature of attention, and its relationship to other philosophically interesting faculties of the mind. I begin by offering a summary of the arguments of the thesis, and a brief history of the debates I will be addressing. Then I turn to a detailed examination of the debates over whether attention is necessary for consciousness or sufficient for consciousness, with a particular emphasis on the latter of these. I examine much of Robert Kentridgeâs work in this regard. I will argue that this debate has reached an impasse, and that the point of apparent disagreement is conceptual, not empirical. I then go on to investigate the concept which is the point of friction, which is âattentionâ. I investigate various ways of resolving the difficulties in this debate, and argue that none of them work. I then examine some particular
Taylor, John Henry
Consciousness and the heterogeneity of attention. This thesis will primarily consider issues related to attention and its relationship to phenomenal consciousness. The main argument of this thesis is that we cannot hope to make progress in this domain unless we greater appreciate the role that the concept âattentionâ plays within these debates. I argue that by focussing on this, we can reach new and surprising conclusions about both the nature of attention, and its relationship to other philosophically interesting faculties of the mind. I begin by offering a summary of the arguments of the thesis, and a brief history of the debates I will be addressing. Then I turn to a detailed examination of the debates over whether attention is necessary for consciousness or sufficient for consciousness, with a particular emphasis on the latter of these. I examine much of Robert Kentridgeâs work in this regard. I will argue that this debate has reached an impasse, and that the point of apparent disagreement is conceptual, not empirical. I then go on to investigate the concept which is the point of friction, which is âattentionâ. I investigate various ways of resolving the difficulties in this debate, and argue that none of them work. I then examine some particular
consciousness heterogeneity attention primarily consider issue_relate attention relationship phenomenal_consciousness main_argument hope make_progress domain unless great appreciate role concept attention play within debate argue focussing reach new surprising conclusion nature attention relationship philosophically_interesting faculty mind begin offer summary argument brief_history debate address turn detailed_examination debate whether attention necessary consciousness sufficient consciousness particular_emphasis latter these examine much work regard argue debate reach impasse point apparent disagreement conceptual empirical investigate concept point friction attention investigate various_way resolve difficulty debate argue none work examine particular