Moral disagreement : a psychological account and the political implications
Moral disagreement is not only a philosophically interesting matter in its own right, but is also a highly important social and political issue. Historically, moral disagreement has often led to instability, conflict and persecution. Itâs easy enough to see how a society of individuals with a consensus on important moral issues can forge a common life together, but it is more difficult to determine how cooperation is to be attained whilst disagreement on key matters persists. If we are to understand how best to face up to moral disagreement, it is vital that we get to grips with what exactly we are dealing with, and what options are feasible. In this thesis, I articulate a particular conception of what moral disagreement involves, its extent, and what its root psychological causes are. I further demonstrate that this conception has important implications for a contemporary debate within liberal political theory. In so doing, I advocate a descriptive form of value pluralism, whereby individuals are typically committed to a range of distinct values which they implicitly take to have independent normative force. I suggest that individuals both across and within cultural groups weight such values differently,
Caven, Peter
Moral disagreement : a psychological account and the political implications. Moral disagreement is not only a philosophically interesting matter in its own right, but is also a highly important social and political issue. Historically, moral disagreement has often led to instability, conflict and persecution. Itâs easy enough to see how a society of individuals with a consensus on important moral issues can forge a common life together, but it is more difficult to determine how cooperation is to be attained whilst disagreement on key matters persists. If we are to understand how best to face up to moral disagreement, it is vital that we get to grips with what exactly we are dealing with, and what options are feasible. In this thesis, I articulate a particular conception of what moral disagreement involves, its extent, and what its root psychological causes are. I further demonstrate that this conception has important implications for a contemporary debate within liberal political theory. In so doing, I advocate a descriptive form of value pluralism, whereby individuals are typically committed to a range of distinct values which they implicitly take to have independent normative force. I suggest that individuals both across and within cultural groups weight such values differently,
moral disagreement psychological account political_implication moral disagreement philosophically_interesting matter right also_highly important social_political issue historically moral disagreement often lead instability conflict persecution easy enough see society individual consensus important moral issue forge common life together difficult determine cooperation attain whilst disagreement key matter persists best face moral disagreement vital get grip exactly deal option feasible articulate particular conception moral disagreement involve extent root psychological cause conception important_implication contemporary_debate within liberal political_theory advocate descriptive form value pluralism whereby individual typically commit range distinct value implicitly take independent normative force suggest individual across within cultural group weight value differently