The Tractatus paradox
In the penultimate remark of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein declares that anyone who understands him judges the book to be nonsense. The immediate reaction to this paradoxical statement is to reject the insights of the book that this assessment is based on; that is, to reject the bookâs theories of logic and language. Commentators have tried to save the bookâs fundamental philosophical ideas by blocking this immediate response. In this thesis I characterise and explore different attempts to do so. I discuss attempts of Russell, Carnap, Max Black, Malcolm, Hackerâs Ineffability interpretation and Conantâs (and Diamondâs) Therapeutic interpretation. I argue that the Therapeutic reading is the most promising attempt in its main ideas. Nonetheless, current versions of the Therapeutic readings do not seem successful. I borrow ideas from Griceâs pragmatic theory of conversation and Davidsonâs account of metaphor to explain how the book is to be read therapeutically. I argue that the book is a long conversation between Wittgenstein and his audience which eventually turns out to be a pointless series of remarks. The book, however, works metaphorically in such a way that it affects its
Mosmer, Reza
B Philosophy (General)
The Tractatus paradox. In the penultimate remark of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein declares that anyone who understands him judges the book to be nonsense. The immediate reaction to this paradoxical statement is to reject the insights of the book that this assessment is based on; that is, to reject the bookâs theories of logic and language. Commentators have tried to save the bookâs fundamental philosophical ideas by blocking this immediate response. In this thesis I characterise and explore different attempts to do so. I discuss attempts of Russell, Carnap, Max Black, Malcolm, Hackerâs Ineffability interpretation and Conantâs (and Diamondâs) Therapeutic interpretation. I argue that the Therapeutic reading is the most promising attempt in its main ideas. Nonetheless, current versions of the Therapeutic readings do not seem successful. I borrow ideas from Griceâs pragmatic theory of conversation and Davidsonâs account of metaphor to explain how the book is to be read therapeutically. I argue that the book is a long conversation between Wittgenstein and his audience which eventually turns out to be a pointless series of remarks. The book, however, works metaphorically in such a way that it affects its
tractatus paradox penultimate remark tractatus wittgenstein declare anyone understands judge book nonsense immediate reaction paradoxical statement reject insight book assessment base reject book theory logic language try save book fundamental philosophical idea block immediate response characterise explore different attempt discus attempt russell carnap black ineffability interpretation diamond therapeutic interpretation argue therapeutic reading promise attempt main idea nonetheless current version therapeutic reading seem successful borrow idea grice pragmatic_theory conversation davidson account metaphor explain book read argue book long conversation wittgenstein audience eventually turn series remark book however work metaphorically way affect