My personality, whose responsibility? : equal opportunity for integrity : what the metaphysics of the person can teach luck-egalitarians about responsibility
Contemporary egalitarianism has been defined by its attempt to render the distribution of resources 'responsibility-sensitive'. The core intuition is that if someone is responsible for the fact that he is worse off than others then the inequality ought not to raise the concerns of justice. Perhaps the central challenge facing this approach is to establish the 'cut' between what people can rightly be held responsible for, and what not. The basic principle adopted has been that ascriptions of responsibility ought to track the distinction between chance and choice. People ought not to be held responsible if they are worse off than others on account of bad luck, but should bear responsibility for their situation if it results from their choices. What is surprising, though, is how little work has been done to establish where luck ends, and responsibility begins - whether the preferences that someone has instilled in him through upbringing, for example, are his responsibility, or simply a matter of luck. Philosophers have posited that the cut should be based on metaphysics - on whether a preference has been 'genuinely', freely, chosen; or that because as a matter of course in our everyday ethical lives we hold people
Gill, Rupert
My personality, whose responsibility? : equal opportunity for integrity : what the metaphysics of the person can teach luck-egalitarians about responsibility. Contemporary egalitarianism has been defined by its attempt to render the distribution of resources 'responsibility-sensitive'. The core intuition is that if someone is responsible for the fact that he is worse off than others then the inequality ought not to raise the concerns of justice. Perhaps the central challenge facing this approach is to establish the 'cut' between what people can rightly be held responsible for, and what not. The basic principle adopted has been that ascriptions of responsibility ought to track the distinction between chance and choice. People ought not to be held responsible if they are worse off than others on account of bad luck, but should bear responsibility for their situation if it results from their choices. What is surprising, though, is how little work has been done to establish where luck ends, and responsibility begins - whether the preferences that someone has instilled in him through upbringing, for example, are his responsibility, or simply a matter of luck. Philosophers have posited that the cut should be based on metaphysics - on whether a preference has been 'genuinely', freely, chosen; or that because as a matter of course in our everyday ethical lives we hold people
personality whose responsibility equal opportunity integrity metaphysics person teach luck responsibility contemporary egalitarianism define attempt render distribution resource responsibility sensitive core intuition someone responsible fact bad others inequality ought raise concern justice perhaps central challenge_face establish cut people rightly hold_responsible not basic_principle adopt ascription responsibility ought track distinction chance choice people ought hold_responsible bad others account bad luck bear responsibility situation choice surprising though little_work establish luck end responsibility begin whether preference someone upbringing example responsibility simply matter luck philosophers posit cut base metaphysics whether preference genuinely freely choose matter course everyday ethical_life hold people