Reconciling internalism and externalism through use
This thesis stems from two related problems within the Internalism-Externalism debate. First is the problem of intentionality: how is it that we are able to reach out to the world through language. The answer I believe is through use. The second problem relates to the possibility of scientific enquiry: whether or not it is possible to scientifically study the object of externalist inquiry, the use of language for instance. The kind of theory I try to point towards, both incorporates how we are able to reach out to the world through language; i.e. explains use, and also aims to do so scientifically. I arrive at this through various steps, the first of which is an interpretation of Wittgensteinâs use of âgrammarâ as both constitutive of a proposition and involving an element of use. Further through an analysis of Horwich, I attempt to see whether it is possible to systematize a use theory of meaning. I move on to externalist referential semantics, specifically to minimal semantics, as it appears to incorporate both internalist as well as externalist elements. For a theory that was able to scientifically explain content ascription, I then turn to Davidson. Davidsonâs decision theoretic account of what
Worah, Pallavi
Reconciling internalism and externalism through use. This thesis stems from two related problems within the Internalism-Externalism debate. First is the problem of intentionality: how is it that we are able to reach out to the world through language. The answer I believe is through use. The second problem relates to the possibility of scientific enquiry: whether or not it is possible to scientifically study the object of externalist inquiry, the use of language for instance. The kind of theory I try to point towards, both incorporates how we are able to reach out to the world through language; i.e. explains use, and also aims to do so scientifically. I arrive at this through various steps, the first of which is an interpretation of Wittgensteinâs use of âgrammarâ as both constitutive of a proposition and involving an element of use. Further through an analysis of Horwich, I attempt to see whether it is possible to systematize a use theory of meaning. I move on to externalist referential semantics, specifically to minimal semantics, as it appears to incorporate both internalist as well as externalist elements. For a theory that was able to scientifically explain content ascription, I then turn to Davidson. Davidsonâs decision theoretic account of what
reconciling internalism externalism use stem two_related problem within internalism externalism debate first problem intentionality able reach world language answer believe use second problem_relate possibility scientific enquiry whether_possible scientifically study object externalist inquiry use language instance kind theory try point_towards incorporates able reach world language explains use also_aim scientifically arrive various step first interpretation wittgenstein use grammar constitutive proposition involve element use analysis attempt see_whether possible systematize use theory_meaning move externalist referential semantics specifically minimal semantics appear incorporate internalist well externalist element theory able scientifically explain content ascription turn davidson davidson decision theoretic account