Testimony, belief and unbelief in the problem of faith and reason
This thesis evaluates two current theories of propositional faith, and explores the prospects of each theory for responding to the perennial problem of faith and reason (PFR). According to the first theory ĂąÂÂ the non-doxastic theory of faith (NDT) ĂąÂÂ faith that p does not require belief that p. NDT can be used to respond to the PFR when we accept that beliefs held on faith do not meet the required standards for epistemic justification, but deny that all instances of faith require belief. Where someoneĂąÂÂs faith does not involve belief, her faith may be adequately responsive to the epistemic reasons in her possession. According to the second theory ĂąÂÂ the divine testimony theory (DTT) ĂąÂÂ faith requires trusting the testimony of a divine being where this involves believing the testimony. One can look to defend DTT by drawing from the significant resources that have recently been developed in the philosophy of testimony to assess the standards of justification in contexts of divine testimony. DTT takes the PFR head on, but addresses it from a fresh perspective. In this thesis I defend three claims. First, NDT is untenable as a theory of faith and hence fails as a response to the PFR. Second,
Malcolm, Finlay
Testimony, belief and unbelief in the problem of faith and reason. This thesis evaluates two current theories of propositional faith, and explores the prospects of each theory for responding to the perennial problem of faith and reason (PFR). According to the first theory ĂąÂÂ the non-doxastic theory of faith (NDT) ĂąÂÂ faith that p does not require belief that p. NDT can be used to respond to the PFR when we accept that beliefs held on faith do not meet the required standards for epistemic justification, but deny that all instances of faith require belief. Where someoneĂąÂÂs faith does not involve belief, her faith may be adequately responsive to the epistemic reasons in her possession. According to the second theory ĂąÂÂ the divine testimony theory (DTT) ĂąÂÂ faith requires trusting the testimony of a divine being where this involves believing the testimony. One can look to defend DTT by drawing from the significant resources that have recently been developed in the philosophy of testimony to assess the standards of justification in contexts of divine testimony. DTT takes the PFR head on, but addresses it from a fresh perspective. In this thesis I defend three claims. First, NDT is untenable as a theory of faith and hence fails as a response to the PFR. Second,
testimony belief problem faith_reason evaluates current_theory propositional faith explore prospect theory respond perennial problem faith_reason according first theory non doxastic theory faith faith require belief use respond accept belief hold faith meet required standard epistemic_justification deny instance faith require belief faith involve belief faith may adequately responsive epistemic reason possession according second theory divine testimony theory faith require trust testimony divine involve believe testimony look defend draw significant resource recently develop philosophy testimony ass standard justification contexts divine testimony take head address fresh perspective defend claim first untenable theory faith hence fail response second