Reason, freedom and morality : an interpretation and defence of Kant's Groundwork III
Kant worries that if we are not free, morality will be nothing more than a phantasm for us. In the final section of the Groundwork, he attempts secure our freedom, and with it, morality. Here is a simplified version of his argument: 1. A rational will is a free will 2. A free will stands under the moral law 3. Therefore, a rational will stands under the moral law In this thesis, I offer an interpretation and defence of this. I begin by defending the first two premises. I follow Kant to argue that reason involves freedom, and offer an account of the relationship between freedom and morality. I then turn to two prominent objections. Commentators often complain that Kant has not managed to establish that we are rational beings with wills in the first place, and that he equivocates in his use of âfreeâ between premise 1 and 2. I argue that both of these objections can be overcome, and thus seek to defend Kantâs approach in Groundwork III. In doing so, I depart from Kant (and Kantians) at several points. Most significantly, I argue against a non-metaphysical account of freedom, an anti-realist meta-ethics, and transcendental idealism itself. I stay with the spirit of Kantâs project, but often depart from
Saunders, Joe
Reason, freedom and morality : an interpretation and defence of Kant's Groundwork III. Kant worries that if we are not free, morality will be nothing more than a phantasm for us. In the final section of the Groundwork, he attempts secure our freedom, and with it, morality. Here is a simplified version of his argument: 1. A rational will is a free will 2. A free will stands under the moral law 3. Therefore, a rational will stands under the moral law In this thesis, I offer an interpretation and defence of this. I begin by defending the first two premises. I follow Kant to argue that reason involves freedom, and offer an account of the relationship between freedom and morality. I then turn to two prominent objections. Commentators often complain that Kant has not managed to establish that we are rational beings with wills in the first place, and that he equivocates in his use of âfreeâ between premise 1 and 2. I argue that both of these objections can be overcome, and thus seek to defend Kantâs approach in Groundwork III. In doing so, I depart from Kant (and Kantians) at several points. Most significantly, I argue against a non-metaphysical account of freedom, an anti-realist meta-ethics, and transcendental idealism itself. I stay with the spirit of Kantâs project, but often depart from
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