Derrida's reasoning : a critical assessment
In a series of early essays, Derrida examines theories of language in the philosophical tradition. He finds a persistent privileging of speech at the expense of writing, which he attributes to the conception of meaning as presence, as an ideal object present to inner perception, and of the sign as a transparent unity of signifier and signified. I trace the notion of ~presence~ to Heidegger's 'destruction of the history of ontology'. Heidegger criticizes the tradition for privileging perception as the only means of access to being. I accept Heidegger's criticisms of the tradition, but offer an argument to show that he is wrong to deny the priority of scientific ontology. Derrida denies three theses in traditional theories of language: (i) Language has a relation to the world (the reference relation). (ii) The intermediaries in this relation are meanings, which are ideal objects present to inner perception. (iii) Complex sentences derive their relation to the world from simple names. By a close analysis of Derrida's arguments, I show that Derrida is correct to reject (ii), but that once that is done, (i) and (iii) can be retained.
Amos, David
Philosophy
Derrida's reasoning : a critical assessment. In a series of early essays, Derrida examines theories of language in the philosophical tradition. He finds a persistent privileging of speech at the expense of writing, which he attributes to the conception of meaning as presence, as an ideal object present to inner perception, and of the sign as a transparent unity of signifier and signified. I trace the notion of ~presence~ to Heidegger's 'destruction of the history of ontology'. Heidegger criticizes the tradition for privileging perception as the only means of access to being. I accept Heidegger's criticisms of the tradition, but offer an argument to show that he is wrong to deny the priority of scientific ontology. Derrida denies three theses in traditional theories of language: (i) Language has a relation to the world (the reference relation). (ii) The intermediaries in this relation are meanings, which are ideal objects present to inner perception. (iii) Complex sentences derive their relation to the world from simple names. By a close analysis of Derrida's arguments, I show that Derrida is correct to reject (ii), but that once that is done, (i) and (iii) can be retained.
derrida reasoning critical_assessment series early essay derrida examine theory language philosophical_tradition find persistent privilege speech expense writing attribute conception mean presence ideal object present inner perception sign transparent unity signifier signify trace notion presence heidegger destruction history ontology heidegger criticize tradition privilege perception mean access accept heidegger criticisms tradition offer argument show wrong deny priority scientific ontology derrida deny thesis traditional theory language language relation world reference relation relation meaning ideal object present inner perception iii complex sentence derive relation world simple name close_analysis derrida argument show derrida correct reject iii retain