Nuclear belief systems and individual policy-makers : Duncan Sandys, unmanned weaponry, and the impossibility of defence
This thesis attempts to explore the influence that Duncan Sandys' experiences of the Second World War had on his policy preferences, and policy-making, in relation to British defence policy during his years in government. This is a significant period in British nuclear policy which began with thermonuclear weaponry being placed ostentatiously at the centre of British defence planning in the 1957 Defence White Paper, and ended with the British acquiring the latest American nuclear weapon technology as a consequence of the Polaris Sales Agreement. It also saw intense discussion of the nature and type of nuclear weaponry the British government sought to wield in the Cold War, with attempts to build indigenous land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and where British nuclear policy was discussed in extreme depth in government. The thesis explores this area by focusing on Duncan Sandys and examining his interaction with prominent aspects of the defence policy-making process. It argues that Sandys sought to navigate his way through this period of uncertainty by drawing heavily upon his experiences of the Second World War, and that this method of policy-making should be seen as a nuclear belief system unique
Betts, Lewis
Nuclear belief systems and individual policy-makers : Duncan Sandys, unmanned weaponry, and the impossibility of defence. This thesis attempts to explore the influence that Duncan Sandys' experiences of the Second World War had on his policy preferences, and policy-making, in relation to British defence policy during his years in government. This is a significant period in British nuclear policy which began with thermonuclear weaponry being placed ostentatiously at the centre of British defence planning in the 1957 Defence White Paper, and ended with the British acquiring the latest American nuclear weapon technology as a consequence of the Polaris Sales Agreement. It also saw intense discussion of the nature and type of nuclear weaponry the British government sought to wield in the Cold War, with attempts to build indigenous land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and where British nuclear policy was discussed in extreme depth in government. The thesis explores this area by focusing on Duncan Sandys and examining his interaction with prominent aspects of the defence policy-making process. It argues that Sandys sought to navigate his way through this period of uncertainty by drawing heavily upon his experiences of the Second World War, and that this method of policy-making should be seen as a nuclear belief system unique
nuclear belief_system individual policy_makers weaponry impossibility defence attempt_explore influence experience second_world_war policy preference policy_making relation british defence policy year government significant period british nuclear policy begin weaponry place centre british defence planning defence white paper end british acquire late american nuclear weapon technology consequence agreement also saw intense discussion nature type nuclear weaponry british_government seek wield cold_war attempt_build indigenous land_based british nuclear policy discuss extreme depth government explores area focus examine interaction prominent aspect defence policy_making process argues seek navigate way period uncertainty draw_heavily upon experience second_world_war method policy_making see nuclear belief_system unique