Problems in historical construction : an idealist approach
An idealist approach to history construes what historians do in terms of coherence, unity and individuality. An outline of the historical thought of Dilthey and Croce in chapter one signposts the major concerns of Collingwood and Oakeshott. Both approach history from an idealist perspective yet, their conclusions differ radically for Collingwood the historian re-thinks the thoughts of past individuals, inferred from evidence, in answer to a question. The object of historical thought is not dead actions but living thoughts. The limits of historical thought reflect the boundaries of our mental faculties, and the identity of subject and object in historical re- enactment becomes the model for all genuine knowledge. Oakeshott rejects this identity. History is a particular understanding of objects left-over from the past, governed by organising postulates, and logically distinct from other ~modes~ of understanding. It has no privileged subject-matter, neither a real past of events, nor an every-increasing archive of authenticated evidence. The past is constructed within historical thought. Chapters four and five are spent tracing the implications of an idealist understanding of history. I argue that analytical
Rogerson, Paul
Problems in historical construction : an idealist approach. An idealist approach to history construes what historians do in terms of coherence, unity and individuality. An outline of the historical thought of Dilthey and Croce in chapter one signposts the major concerns of Collingwood and Oakeshott. Both approach history from an idealist perspective yet, their conclusions differ radically for Collingwood the historian re-thinks the thoughts of past individuals, inferred from evidence, in answer to a question. The object of historical thought is not dead actions but living thoughts. The limits of historical thought reflect the boundaries of our mental faculties, and the identity of subject and object in historical re- enactment becomes the model for all genuine knowledge. Oakeshott rejects this identity. History is a particular understanding of objects left-over from the past, governed by organising postulates, and logically distinct from other ~modes~ of understanding. It has no privileged subject-matter, neither a real past of events, nor an every-increasing archive of authenticated evidence. The past is constructed within historical thought. Chapters four and five are spent tracing the implications of an idealist understanding of history. I argue that analytical
problems historical construction idealist approach idealist history historian term coherence unity individuality outline historical thought major_concern collingwood history idealist perspective yet conclusion differ radically collingwood historian thought past individual infer evidence answer_question object historical think dead action live thought limit historical think reflect boundary mental faculty identity subject_object historical enactment become model genuine knowledge reject identity history particular object left over past govern organise postulate logically distinct modes understanding privilege subject_matter neither real past event every increasing archive evidence past construct within historical thought four_five spent trace implication idealist history argue analytical