Representationalism and anti-representationalism about perceptual experience
Many philosophers have held that perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of perceivers being in particular representational states. Such states are said to have representational content, i.e. accuracy or veridicality conditions, capturing the way that things, according to that experience, appear to be. In this thesis I argue that the case against representationalism â the view that perceptual experience is fundamentally and irreducibly representational â that is set out in Charles Travisâs âThe Silence of the Sensesâ (2004) constitutes a powerful, but much misunderstood and neglected argument against this prevailing philosophical orthodoxy. In chapter 2, I present an interpretation of Travisâs arguments that poses a dilemma for the representationalist concerning the indeterminacy and availability of perceptual content. Chapters 3 and 4 evaluate a variety of arguments in favour of such content based upon the nature of appearances, or âlooksâ, including those by Byrne (2009), Siegel (2010) and Schellenberg (2011b), each of which I find to be problematic. Finally, chapters 5 and 6 examine the relationship between representational content and phenomenal character, i.e. what perceptual experience
Wilson, Keith A.
B Philosophy (General)
Representationalism and anti-representationalism about perceptual experience. Many philosophers have held that perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of perceivers being in particular representational states. Such states are said to have representational content, i.e. accuracy or veridicality conditions, capturing the way that things, according to that experience, appear to be. In this thesis I argue that the case against representationalism â the view that perceptual experience is fundamentally and irreducibly representational â that is set out in Charles Travisâs âThe Silence of the Sensesâ (2004) constitutes a powerful, but much misunderstood and neglected argument against this prevailing philosophical orthodoxy. In chapter 2, I present an interpretation of Travisâs arguments that poses a dilemma for the representationalist concerning the indeterminacy and availability of perceptual content. Chapters 3 and 4 evaluate a variety of arguments in favour of such content based upon the nature of appearances, or âlooksâ, including those by Byrne (2009), Siegel (2010) and Schellenberg (2011b), each of which I find to be problematic. Finally, chapters 5 and 6 examine the relationship between representational content and phenomenal character, i.e. what perceptual experience
representationalism anti perceptual_experience many_philosopher hold perceptual_experience fundamentally matter particular representational state state say representational content accuracy condition capture way thing accord experience appear argue case representationalism view perceptual_experience fundamentally irreducibly representational set charles silence constitute powerful much misunderstood neglect argument prevail philosophical orthodoxy present interpretation arguments pose dilemma concern indeterminacy availability perceptual content evaluate variety argument_favour content base_upon nature appearance look include problematic finally_examine relationship representational content phenomenal_character perceptual_experience