Naming without necessity
In this thesis I argue that we should break with the dominant Kripkean tradition concerning natural kind terms and theoretical identity. I claim that there is just no interesting connection between the metaphysics and semantics of natural kind terms, and demonstrate this by constructing a version of descriptivism that is combined with the same metaphysics â that is, a nontrivial version of essentialism â found in Kripke, but which effectively avoids all of the standard criticisms. With my version of descriptivism in place, I present what I take to be the most reasonable version of metaphysical essentialism, positing only what I call 'thin' essences. I claim that thin essences are perfectly adequate to underpin scientific realism, and moreover that they are sufficient to support the version of descriptivism developed here. In effect, what I offer here is an error theory of the Kripkean tradition: Kripke is right to think that there are interesting things to say about meaning and essence, but just wrong about what those things are. Thus whilst Kripke thinks that it is possible to make discoveries about the meanings of natural kind terms, I think, rather, that we make empirical discoveries that lead to revisions
Sabbarton-Leary, Nigel
BD Speculative Philosophy
Naming without necessity. In this thesis I argue that we should break with the dominant Kripkean tradition concerning natural kind terms and theoretical identity. I claim that there is just no interesting connection between the metaphysics and semantics of natural kind terms, and demonstrate this by constructing a version of descriptivism that is combined with the same metaphysics â that is, a nontrivial version of essentialism â found in Kripke, but which effectively avoids all of the standard criticisms. With my version of descriptivism in place, I present what I take to be the most reasonable version of metaphysical essentialism, positing only what I call 'thin' essences. I claim that thin essences are perfectly adequate to underpin scientific realism, and moreover that they are sufficient to support the version of descriptivism developed here. In effect, what I offer here is an error theory of the Kripkean tradition: Kripke is right to think that there are interesting things to say about meaning and essence, but just wrong about what those things are. Thus whilst Kripke thinks that it is possible to make discoveries about the meanings of natural kind terms, I think, rather, that we make empirical discoveries that lead to revisions
naming without necessity argue break dominant tradition concern natural_kind term theoretical identity claim interest connection metaphysics semantics natural_kind term construct version combine metaphysics version essentialism find kripke effectively avoid standard criticism version place present take reasonable version metaphysical essentialism posit call thin essence claim thin essence perfectly adequate underpin scientific_realism moreover sufficient support version develop here effect offer error theory tradition kripke right think interesting thing say mean essence wrong thing thus whilst kripke think possible make discovery mean natural_kind term think rather make empirical discovery lead revision