The chances of higher-level causation : an investigation into causal exclusion arguments
It is well-known that non-reductive physicalism suffers from internal tensions between physicalist and antireductionist commitments. This thesis reconstructs Jaegwon Kim's classic causal exclusion arguments that aim to demonstrate the tension between the putative causal autonomy of multiply realized higher-level properties and basic commitments of physicalism and investigates some solutions that aim to dissolve the paradox highlighted by exclusion worries. The main goal of this thesis is to appraise a solution, developed by Menzies and List, according to which, while the causation of an effect via a higher-level realized property is possible, it is incompatible with the causation of the same effect by a distinct realizing property. On this incompatibilist view causal exclusion is a contingent matter and can be directed both downwards and upwards, but it presupposes a difference-making account of causation. On the one hand, the thesis provides justification for preferring a difference-making account of causation over productive accounts presupposed by Kim's exclusion argument, on the other hand, it develops internal criticism against the approach suggested by Menzies and List. Two strands of original arguments
Kertesz, Gergely
The chances of higher-level causation : an investigation into causal exclusion arguments. It is well-known that non-reductive physicalism suffers from internal tensions between physicalist and antireductionist commitments. This thesis reconstructs Jaegwon Kim's classic causal exclusion arguments that aim to demonstrate the tension between the putative causal autonomy of multiply realized higher-level properties and basic commitments of physicalism and investigates some solutions that aim to dissolve the paradox highlighted by exclusion worries. The main goal of this thesis is to appraise a solution, developed by Menzies and List, according to which, while the causation of an effect via a higher-level realized property is possible, it is incompatible with the causation of the same effect by a distinct realizing property. On this incompatibilist view causal exclusion is a contingent matter and can be directed both downwards and upwards, but it presupposes a difference-making account of causation. On the one hand, the thesis provides justification for preferring a difference-making account of causation over productive accounts presupposed by Kim's exclusion argument, on the other hand, it develops internal criticism against the approach suggested by Menzies and List. Two strands of original arguments
chance higher level causation investigation causal exclusion argument well_known non_reductive physicalism suffers internal tension physicalist commitment reconstructs classic causal exclusion argument aim tension putative causal autonomy multiply realize higher level property basic commitment physicalism investigate solution aim dissolve paradox highlight exclusion worry main_goal appraise solution develop list accord causation effect via higher level realize property possible incompatible causation effect distinct realize property incompatibilist view causal exclusion contingent matter direct downwards upwards presuppose difference making account causation one_hand provide justification prefer difference making account causation productive account presuppose exclusion argument hand develop internal criticism suggest list two_strand original argument