A study of necessity
The concern of this thesis is the widely-held belief in the necessity, in the strongest sense, of certain statements and inferences, in particular those whose truth, or truth-preservation, is a matter of simple arithmetic or logic applied to experience. Concerning this belief, I ask; i) can it be justified? and ii) can it be explained? The answers will be i) No; ii) Yes. Chapter 1 attempts to clarify just what is involved in regarding a statement or rule of inference as necessary. It discusses and rejects a number of suggestions, including one of Quine's. It settles on an answer of Ian McFetridge's (1.4-5) considers arguments of Wright and Hale that the practice of refuting theories on the basis of observation imposes a methodological imperative to treat some statements or inferences as necessary. The chapter attempts to rebut these arguments and to defend a Quinean methodology that imposes no such need for necessity. It is conceded, though, that the arguments drive the Quinean into Dummettian anti-realism about doxastic modification. It is concluded that the answer to question i) is ~No~. Chapter 2 discusses the connection commonly held to obtain between these two distinctions: necessary/contingent and imaginable/unimaginable.
Ahmed, A.
A study of necessity. The concern of this thesis is the widely-held belief in the necessity, in the strongest sense, of certain statements and inferences, in particular those whose truth, or truth-preservation, is a matter of simple arithmetic or logic applied to experience. Concerning this belief, I ask; i) can it be justified? and ii) can it be explained? The answers will be i) No; ii) Yes. Chapter 1 attempts to clarify just what is involved in regarding a statement or rule of inference as necessary. It discusses and rejects a number of suggestions, including one of Quine's. It settles on an answer of Ian McFetridge's (1.4-5) considers arguments of Wright and Hale that the practice of refuting theories on the basis of observation imposes a methodological imperative to treat some statements or inferences as necessary. The chapter attempts to rebut these arguments and to defend a Quinean methodology that imposes no such need for necessity. It is conceded, though, that the arguments drive the Quinean into Dummettian anti-realism about doxastic modification. It is concluded that the answer to question i) is ~No~. Chapter 2 discusses the connection commonly held to obtain between these two distinctions: necessary/contingent and imaginable/unimaginable.
study necessity concern widely held belief necessity strong_sense certain statement inference particular whose truth truth preservation matter simple arithmetic logic apply experience concerning belief ask justify explain answer yes attempt_clarify involve regard statement rule inference necessary discus reject number suggestion include quine settle answer considers argument wright practice refute theory basis observation impose methodological imperative treat statement inference necessary attempt rebut argument defend imposes need necessity concede though argument drive anti_realism doxastic modification conclude answer_question discus connection commonly_hold obtain distinction necessary contingent