Modality and anti-metaphysics
My principal aims are: to defend metaphysics, chiefly against the logical positivists; to defend objective non-logical modality against empiricist views which hold that the very notion is unintelligible and which reject the view that there is ontologically grounded modality. (As an adjunct, I defend a conception of the tasks of ontology against the objectual conception adopted in some contemporary discussions.) Chapter 1 concerns philosophies which have been thought to seek the elimination of metaphysics. I argue that the common view that Hume considered all metaphysics meaningless and sought its elimination is the misguided result of the positivist appropriation of Hume. I suggest that Carnap's revisionary view of meaning, in accordance with his notion of logical syntax, poses no serious threat to metaphysics. In Chapter 2, informed by developments in contemporary anti-realism (with which I am not allied), I set out my argument so that the initial issue is not that of realism/anti-realism about modality, but that of primitivism/anti-primitivism. I argue that modal discourse is primitive: i.e., neither eliminable nor reducible to non-modal discourse. I endorse a strict distinction between eliminativism and
McLeod, Stephen K.
Philosophy
Modality and anti-metaphysics. My principal aims are: to defend metaphysics, chiefly against the logical positivists; to defend objective non-logical modality against empiricist views which hold that the very notion is unintelligible and which reject the view that there is ontologically grounded modality. (As an adjunct, I defend a conception of the tasks of ontology against the objectual conception adopted in some contemporary discussions.) Chapter 1 concerns philosophies which have been thought to seek the elimination of metaphysics. I argue that the common view that Hume considered all metaphysics meaningless and sought its elimination is the misguided result of the positivist appropriation of Hume. I suggest that Carnap's revisionary view of meaning, in accordance with his notion of logical syntax, poses no serious threat to metaphysics. In Chapter 2, informed by developments in contemporary anti-realism (with which I am not allied), I set out my argument so that the initial issue is not that of realism/anti-realism about modality, but that of primitivism/anti-primitivism. I argue that modal discourse is primitive: i.e., neither eliminable nor reducible to non-modal discourse. I endorse a strict distinction between eliminativism and
modality anti metaphysics principal_aim defend metaphysics chiefly logical positivist defend objective non logical modality empiricist view hold notion unintelligible reject view ontologically ground modality adjunct defend conception task ontology conception adopt contemporary discussions concern philosophy think seek elimination metaphysics argue common view hume consider metaphysics meaningless sought elimination misguide positivist appropriation hume suggest carnap revisionary view meaning accordance notion logical syntax pose serious threat metaphysics inform_development contemporary anti_realism ally set_argument initial issue realism_anti realism modality primitivism anti primitivism argue modal discourse primitive neither reducible non modal discourse endorse strict distinction