Mind : a property of matter
There are three broad possibilities regarding the basic ontology of mind. It could be a property of matter that reduces to the properties that are studied in physics. It could be a property of matter different from those that are studied in physics. It could be nothing to do with matter. The second of these, known in the literature as non-reductive physicalism, is generally considered by philosophers in limited form with mental states, albeit nonreducible, fully determined by other properties of matter (taken to be âemergent fromâ, and âsupervening onâ, the properties of matter studied in physics). My thesis puts the case for the ontological status of mind being similar to that of the other properties of matter, those studied in physics. The approach lends itself to the proposition that mental states can be causally effective per se, since that is the case for the other properties of matter. This proposition runs counter to the usual assumption in the philosophy literature relating to mental causation known as âthe completeness of physicsâ, which requires that all physical events are fully caused by purely physical (non-mental) prior histories. However, theoretical physicists often propose new
Rowlatt, P. A.
Mind : a property of matter. There are three broad possibilities regarding the basic ontology of mind. It could be a property of matter that reduces to the properties that are studied in physics. It could be a property of matter different from those that are studied in physics. It could be nothing to do with matter. The second of these, known in the literature as non-reductive physicalism, is generally considered by philosophers in limited form with mental states, albeit nonreducible, fully determined by other properties of matter (taken to be âemergent fromâ, and âsupervening onâ, the properties of matter studied in physics). My thesis puts the case for the ontological status of mind being similar to that of the other properties of matter, those studied in physics. The approach lends itself to the proposition that mental states can be causally effective per se, since that is the case for the other properties of matter. This proposition runs counter to the usual assumption in the philosophy literature relating to mental causation known as âthe completeness of physicsâ, which requires that all physical events are fully caused by purely physical (non-mental) prior histories. However, theoretical physicists often propose new
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