The Air Ministry and the bomb dropping problem : bombsights, scientists, and techno-military invention, 1918-45
This thesis presents the first history of the British mechanical bombsight, from 1918 to 1945. It provides new evidence on the efficacy of military scientists, the interventions of prominent war scientists, and the influence of the scientific elite. It demonstrates that British bombsight development was located entirely within the military, facilitated by specialist engineers, entrepreneurial inventors, and small firms located mainly within the environs of London. The bombsight story does not conform to the standard civilian centric role in techno-military invention: science, heroic private inventors, corporate laboratories, and large armament firms contributed little. This thesis shows that the military engaged effectively with the bomb dropping problem during the interwar years, as exemplified by the work of Leonard Bygrave, a quasi-paramilitary defender of the Empire, and his Air Ministry colleague, Frederick Meredith, a Soviet spy. Post 1935, bombsight development was disrupted by death, espionage, and ill-advised interventions by two members of the scientific elite: Henry Tizard and Melvill Jones. This, not development failures, led to what I call the 1940 Bombsight Crisis. Secondly, it shows that Frederick
Marsh, Stephen John
The Air Ministry and the bomb dropping problem : bombsights, scientists, and techno-military invention, 1918-45. This thesis presents the first history of the British mechanical bombsight, from 1918 to 1945. It provides new evidence on the efficacy of military scientists, the interventions of prominent war scientists, and the influence of the scientific elite. It demonstrates that British bombsight development was located entirely within the military, facilitated by specialist engineers, entrepreneurial inventors, and small firms located mainly within the environs of London. The bombsight story does not conform to the standard civilian centric role in techno-military invention: science, heroic private inventors, corporate laboratories, and large armament firms contributed little. This thesis shows that the military engaged effectively with the bomb dropping problem during the interwar years, as exemplified by the work of Leonard Bygrave, a quasi-paramilitary defender of the Empire, and his Air Ministry colleague, Frederick Meredith, a Soviet spy. Post 1935, bombsight development was disrupted by death, espionage, and ill-advised interventions by two members of the scientific elite: Henry Tizard and Melvill Jones. This, not development failures, led to what I call the 1940 Bombsight Crisis. Secondly, it shows that Frederick
air ministry bomb drop problem scientist military invention present first history british mechanical provide_new evidence efficacy military scientist intervention prominent war scientist influence scientific elite demonstrates british development locate entirely within military facilitated specialist engineer entrepreneurial inventor small firm locate mainly within environs london story conform standard civilian centric role military invention science heroic private inventor corporate laboratory large armament firm contribute little show military engage effectively bomb drop problem interwar_year exemplify work quasi paramilitary defender empire air ministry colleague soviet spy post development disrupt death ill intervention member scientific elite henry jones development failure lead call crisis secondly show