How inference isn't blind : self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency
This thesis brings together two concerns. The first is the nature of inferenceâwhat it is to inferâwhere inference is understood as a distinctive kind of conscious and self-conscious occurrence. The second concern is the possibility of doxastic agency. To be capable of doxastic agency is to be such that one is capable of directly exercising agency over oneâs beliefs. It is to be capable of exercising agency over oneâs beliefs in a way which does not amount to mere self-manipulation. Subjects who can exercise doxastic agency can settle questions for themselves. A challenge to the possibility of doxastic agency stems from the fact that we cannot believe or come to believe âat willâ, where this in turn seems to be so because belief âaims at truthâ. It must be explained how we are capable of doxastic agency despite that we cannot believe or come to believe at will. On the orthodox âcausalistâ conception of inference for an inference to occur is for one act of acceptance to cause another in some specifiable âright wayâ. This conception of inference prevents its advocates from adequately seeing how reasoning could be a means to exercise doxastic agency, as it is natural to think it is. Suppose,
Jenkins, David Russell
How inference isn't blind : self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency. This thesis brings together two concerns. The first is the nature of inferenceâwhat it is to inferâwhere inference is understood as a distinctive kind of conscious and self-conscious occurrence. The second concern is the possibility of doxastic agency. To be capable of doxastic agency is to be such that one is capable of directly exercising agency over oneâs beliefs. It is to be capable of exercising agency over oneâs beliefs in a way which does not amount to mere self-manipulation. Subjects who can exercise doxastic agency can settle questions for themselves. A challenge to the possibility of doxastic agency stems from the fact that we cannot believe or come to believe âat willâ, where this in turn seems to be so because belief âaims at truthâ. It must be explained how we are capable of doxastic agency despite that we cannot believe or come to believe at will. On the orthodox âcausalistâ conception of inference for an inference to occur is for one act of acceptance to cause another in some specifiable âright wayâ. This conception of inference prevents its advocates from adequately seeing how reasoning could be a means to exercise doxastic agency, as it is natural to think it is. Suppose,
inference blind self_conscious inference role doxastic agency brings_together concern first nature inference infer inference understand distinctive kind conscious self_conscious occurrence second concern possibility doxastic agency capable doxastic agency capable directly exercise agency belief capable exercise agency belief way amount mere self manipulation subjects exercise doxastic agency settle question themselves challenge possibility doxastic agency stem fact believe come believe turn seem belief aim truth must_explain capable doxastic agency despite believe come believe will orthodox conception inference inference occur act acceptance cause another right way conception inference prevents advocate adequately see reason could mean exercise doxastic agency natural think suppose