Contractualism and intergenerational justice
This thesis extends an approach to justice grounded in the idea of agreement between equals to the question of justice between generations. Taking as its starting point the claim that distributive principles should be justifiable to all who will be subject to them - in this case, those who comprise the present and future generations - it begins by identifying two issues which militate against the extension of this method to the intergenerational context: the nonidentity problem and the mutuality problem. In order to overcome the non-identity problem I appeal to - and defend - the claim that it is possible to wrong future people without necessarily harming them: from this, it can be inferred that we have humanitarian obligations toward future generations, by virtue of their status as rights-bearers. I then begin my discussion of the mutuality problem with a critical assessment of the idea of a universal contract with transgenerational scope. Despite rejecting this approach, I suggest that it captures certain fundamental intuitions that we have toward future generations, which complement an analysis grounded in indirect reciprocity. In this way, the mutuality problem comes to occupy a position of centrality
Cormack, David Manson
Contractualism and intergenerational justice. This thesis extends an approach to justice grounded in the idea of agreement between equals to the question of justice between generations. Taking as its starting point the claim that distributive principles should be justifiable to all who will be subject to them - in this case, those who comprise the present and future generations - it begins by identifying two issues which militate against the extension of this method to the intergenerational context: the nonidentity problem and the mutuality problem. In order to overcome the non-identity problem I appeal to - and defend - the claim that it is possible to wrong future people without necessarily harming them: from this, it can be inferred that we have humanitarian obligations toward future generations, by virtue of their status as rights-bearers. I then begin my discussion of the mutuality problem with a critical assessment of the idea of a universal contract with transgenerational scope. Despite rejecting this approach, I suggest that it captures certain fundamental intuitions that we have toward future generations, which complement an analysis grounded in indirect reciprocity. In this way, the mutuality problem comes to occupy a position of centrality
justice extends justice ground idea agreement equal question justice generation taking start_point claim distributive principle justifiable subject case comprise present_future generation begin_identify issue extension method context problem problem order overcome non identity problem appeal defend_claim possible wrong future people without necessarily harm infer humanitarian obligation toward future generation virtue status rights begin_discussion problem critical_assessment idea universal contract scope despite reject suggest capture certain_fundamental intuition toward future generation complement analysis ground indirect reciprocity way problem come occupy position centrality