Naturalising phenomenology : using phenomenology to close the explanatory gap
The naturalist takes philosophy to be a discipline that is continuous with the natural sciences, while phenomenology defines itself by its opposition to such a view of philosophy. My thesis project argues that this opposition is unfounded. My thesis begins by introducing the phenomenologistâs conception of a subjective fact. I call a situation âa subjective factâ when it essentially involves a subject of experience. I go on to explain why phenomenologists thought the world we experience is a world of subjective facts. Naturalists hold that all facts are objective facts, and it is generally supposed that no fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that it is the contrast between these two kinds of facts that led phenomenologists to conclude that a naturalistic theory of mind will have no place in it for subjective facts. A central claim in my thesis is that a fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that a naturalist could accept the existence of subjective facts if s/he could admit the existence of situations that essentially involve relations to subjects of experience. A creature becomes a subject of experience, I claim, when it takes itself to be the owner of its experiences. Recent
Kiverstein, Julian D.
Naturalising phenomenology : using phenomenology to close the explanatory gap. The naturalist takes philosophy to be a discipline that is continuous with the natural sciences, while phenomenology defines itself by its opposition to such a view of philosophy. My thesis project argues that this opposition is unfounded. My thesis begins by introducing the phenomenologistâs conception of a subjective fact. I call a situation âa subjective factâ when it essentially involves a subject of experience. I go on to explain why phenomenologists thought the world we experience is a world of subjective facts. Naturalists hold that all facts are objective facts, and it is generally supposed that no fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that it is the contrast between these two kinds of facts that led phenomenologists to conclude that a naturalistic theory of mind will have no place in it for subjective facts. A central claim in my thesis is that a fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that a naturalist could accept the existence of subjective facts if s/he could admit the existence of situations that essentially involve relations to subjects of experience. A creature becomes a subject of experience, I claim, when it takes itself to be the owner of its experiences. Recent
naturalising phenomenology use phenomenology close explanatory gap naturalist take philosophy discipline continuous natural_science phenomenology defines opposition view philosophy project argue opposition begin_introduce conception subjective fact call situation subjective fact essentially involve subject_experience explain phenomenologists think world experience world subjective fact hold fact objective fact generally suppose fact subjective objective argue contrast two_kind fact lead phenomenologists conclude naturalistic theory_mind place subjective fact central_claim fact subjective objective argue naturalist could accept existence subjective fact could admit existence situation essentially involve relation subject_experience creature become subject_experience claim take owner experience recent