Meaning change in the context of Thomas S. Kuhn's philosophy
Thomas S. Kuhn claimed that the meanings of scientific terms change in theory changes or in scientific revolutions. In philosophy, meaning change has been taken as the source of a group of problems, such as untranslatability, incommensurability, and referential variance. For this reason, the majority of analytic philosophers have sought to deny that there can be meaning change by focusing on developing a theory of reference that would guarantee referential stability. A number of philosophers have also claimed that Kuhnâs view can be explained by the fact that he accepted and further developed many central tenets of logical empiricism. I maintain that the genesis of Kuhnâs meaning theorising lies in his historical approach and that his view of meaning change is justified. Later in his career he attempted to advance a theory of meaning and can be said to have had limited success in it. What is more, recent cognitive science has unexpectedly managed to shed light on Kuhnâs insights on the organisation of information in the mind, concept learning, and concept definition. Furthermore, although Kuhnâs critique of Putnamâs causal theory of reference has often been dismissed as irrelevant, he has a serious
Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti
Kuhn ; Meaning change ; Scientific change ; Convergent realism ; Causal theory of reference ; Cognitive history and philosophy of science ; History of ideas
Meaning change in the context of Thomas S. Kuhn's philosophy. Thomas S. Kuhn claimed that the meanings of scientific terms change in theory changes or in scientific revolutions. In philosophy, meaning change has been taken as the source of a group of problems, such as untranslatability, incommensurability, and referential variance. For this reason, the majority of analytic philosophers have sought to deny that there can be meaning change by focusing on developing a theory of reference that would guarantee referential stability. A number of philosophers have also claimed that Kuhnâs view can be explained by the fact that he accepted and further developed many central tenets of logical empiricism. I maintain that the genesis of Kuhnâs meaning theorising lies in his historical approach and that his view of meaning change is justified. Later in his career he attempted to advance a theory of meaning and can be said to have had limited success in it. What is more, recent cognitive science has unexpectedly managed to shed light on Kuhnâs insights on the organisation of information in the mind, concept learning, and concept definition. Furthermore, although Kuhnâs critique of Putnamâs causal theory of reference has often been dismissed as irrelevant, he has a serious
meaning change context thomas philosophy thomas claim meaning scientific term change theory change scientific_revolution philosophy mean change take source group problem incommensurability referential variance reason majority analytic philosopher seek deny meaning change focus develop_theory reference would guarantee referential stability number philosopher also claim view explain fact accept develop many central_tenet logical empiricism maintain genesis meaning theorise lie historical view mean change justify later career attempt advance theory_meaning say limited success recent cognitive_science unexpectedly manage shed_light insight organisation information mind concept learning concept definition furthermore although critique putnam causal_theory reference often dismiss irrelevant serious