The prospects for sufficientarianism
The thesis argues that we should be optimistic about the prospects for sufficientarianism, the view that securing enough is an important part of justice. I begin by noting the different kinds of sufficientarianism that have been advocated and the objections that they are vulnerable to. I then ask whether these objections apply to all, or only some, versions of sufficientarianism. To answer this question I characterize sufficientarianism generally, highlighting its main claims, and I argue that sufficientarianism can avoid these objections. I then argue that we can and should re-examine the prospects for sufficientarianism, so understood, by exploring two lines of argument. The first line of argument claims that sufficiency principles will be indispensable where we have certain reasons which can support a shift, I call these sufficientarian reasons. The second line of argument claims that sufficiency principles will be indispensable where there are clashes between values and where once one value is realized to a certain extent the importance of promoting that value further shifts relative to the other value. In Chapter Two I argue that a sufficientarian reason to live under the conditions of freedom supports
Shields, Liam
BD Speculative Philosophy
The prospects for sufficientarianism. The thesis argues that we should be optimistic about the prospects for sufficientarianism, the view that securing enough is an important part of justice. I begin by noting the different kinds of sufficientarianism that have been advocated and the objections that they are vulnerable to. I then ask whether these objections apply to all, or only some, versions of sufficientarianism. To answer this question I characterize sufficientarianism generally, highlighting its main claims, and I argue that sufficientarianism can avoid these objections. I then argue that we can and should re-examine the prospects for sufficientarianism, so understood, by exploring two lines of argument. The first line of argument claims that sufficiency principles will be indispensable where we have certain reasons which can support a shift, I call these sufficientarian reasons. The second line of argument claims that sufficiency principles will be indispensable where there are clashes between values and where once one value is realized to a certain extent the importance of promoting that value further shifts relative to the other value. In Chapter Two I argue that a sufficientarian reason to live under the conditions of freedom supports
prospect argues optimistic prospect view secure enough important_part justice begin note different_kind advocate objection vulnerable ask_whether objection apply version answer_question characterize generally highlight main_claim argue avoid objection argue examine prospect understood explore line_argument first line_argument claim sufficiency principle indispensable certain reason support shift call reason second line_argument claim sufficiency principle indispensable clash value value realize certain_extent importance promote value shift relative value argue reason live condition freedom support