Knowing selves
This dissertation is about first person thought. More specifically, it's about the interface between two initially tempting features of first person thought. The first is its pure reflexivity; first person thought is thought about its thinker 'no matter what else might be the case' with the her at the time of thinking. First person thought, that is to say, doesn't depend on the vagaries of contingent empirical facts about the subject at the time the thought is thought; it will always just be thought that is about its thinker. The second has to do with a special cluster of ways we have of being aware of ourselves as ourselves, as it is sometimes put. No further cognitive work is required, for instance, when I come to know in the normal way about the presence of hunger, anger, or blushing to put me in a position to know that I am hungry, angry or blushing. The deliverances of these epistemic channels come ready-formed, as it were, for uptake in a first person thought. To suggest that there is a tension between these two features of first person thought would perhaps be something of an exaggeration. But by placing them side-by-side we can more readily see that there is something about holding them together than
Salje, LeÌa-CeÌcile
Knowing selves. This dissertation is about first person thought. More specifically, it's about the interface between two initially tempting features of first person thought. The first is its pure reflexivity; first person thought is thought about its thinker 'no matter what else might be the case' with the her at the time of thinking. First person thought, that is to say, doesn't depend on the vagaries of contingent empirical facts about the subject at the time the thought is thought; it will always just be thought that is about its thinker. The second has to do with a special cluster of ways we have of being aware of ourselves as ourselves, as it is sometimes put. No further cognitive work is required, for instance, when I come to know in the normal way about the presence of hunger, anger, or blushing to put me in a position to know that I am hungry, angry or blushing. The deliverances of these epistemic channels come ready-formed, as it were, for uptake in a first person thought. To suggest that there is a tension between these two features of first person thought would perhaps be something of an exaggeration. But by placing them side-by-side we can more readily see that there is something about holding them together than
knowing self first_person thought specifically interface initially tempt feature first_person thought first pure reflexivity first_person think think thinker matter else might case time thinking first_person thought say depend contingent empirical_fact subject time think thought always think thinker second special cluster way aware sometimes put cognitive work require instance come_know normal way presence anger put position know deliverance epistemic channel come ready formed uptake first_person thought suggest tension feature first_person think would perhaps something place side side readily see something hold_together