What sorts of entities does grounding relate?
The topics of Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation have been at the forefront of research and debate within metaphysics for the last decade. Grounding is commonly taken to be a relation of non-causal dependence. In this thesis I address the pertinent question as to what sorts of entities are related in instances of grounding. There has so far been little enquiry into this issue, and it therefore requires urgent attention. I argue here that the entities involved in grounding are facts, where facts are true Fregean propositions. True Fregean propositions are abstract entities composed of senses, and are individuated according the senses which they involve. I proceed by setting out some desiderata which the entities involved in grounding will fulfil. Firstly, they will be individuated sufficiently finely as to provide instances of grounding to back all putative cases of non-causal explanation. Secondly, they will ensure that there is unity between instances of grounding and instances of causation. Finally, they will be mind- independent. I survey different types of entity and show that true Fregean propositions are best-equipped to fulfil these desiderata. We therefore have reason to believe that grounding
Barnett, Sylvia
Facts ; Two-Dimensional Semantics ; Fregean Propositions ; Metaphysical Explanation ; Grounding
What sorts of entities does grounding relate?. The topics of Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation have been at the forefront of research and debate within metaphysics for the last decade. Grounding is commonly taken to be a relation of non-causal dependence. In this thesis I address the pertinent question as to what sorts of entities are related in instances of grounding. There has so far been little enquiry into this issue, and it therefore requires urgent attention. I argue here that the entities involved in grounding are facts, where facts are true Fregean propositions. True Fregean propositions are abstract entities composed of senses, and are individuated according the senses which they involve. I proceed by setting out some desiderata which the entities involved in grounding will fulfil. Firstly, they will be individuated sufficiently finely as to provide instances of grounding to back all putative cases of non-causal explanation. Secondly, they will ensure that there is unity between instances of grounding and instances of causation. Finally, they will be mind- independent. I survey different types of entity and show that true Fregean propositions are best-equipped to fulfil these desiderata. We therefore have reason to believe that grounding
sort entity ground relate topic grounding metaphysical explanation forefront debate_within metaphysics grounding commonly take relation non_causal dependence address pertinent question sort entity related instance ground far little enquiry issue therefore_require urgent attention argue entity involve grounding fact fact true fregean proposition true fregean proposition abstract entity compose sens individuate accord sens involve proceed set entity involve ground fulfil firstly individuate sufficiently finely provide instance ground back putative case non_causal explanation secondly ensure unity instance ground instance causation finally mind independent survey different_type entity show true fregean proposition best equipped fulfil desideratum therefore reason_believe grounding