The meaning of truth : Tarski, deflationism, and interpretation
The aim of my thesis is to develop a third way to truth, between traditional substantive theories, and deflationist accounts which seek to show that truth has no content. I begin with Tarski's definition of truth, and show that the definition enables the elimination of 'is true' in terms of the concepts expressible in the object-language (+logic/set theory). The definition, therefore, appears to provide a basis for deflationism. I consider a variety of deflationisms. Their common denominator is the thought that the content of truth is exhausted by the content of the sentences to which truth is applied: truth has no independent content; it has a mere grammatical convenience. While I admit the deflationist hue of Tarski's definition, I show that the definition contains resources to account for ~. substantive features of our semantic competence. Extrapolating from these resources, I claim that a suitably constrained truth theory is an interpretive theory (ITT). The significance of the notion of an ITT is that it provides an interpretive conception of truth. I show that such a conception is neither reductionist nor deflationary. Further, I argue that an adequate ITT, although extensional, does capture the distinctions
Collins, John Patrick
Philosophy
The meaning of truth : Tarski, deflationism, and interpretation. The aim of my thesis is to develop a third way to truth, between traditional substantive theories, and deflationist accounts which seek to show that truth has no content. I begin with Tarski's definition of truth, and show that the definition enables the elimination of 'is true' in terms of the concepts expressible in the object-language (+logic/set theory). The definition, therefore, appears to provide a basis for deflationism. I consider a variety of deflationisms. Their common denominator is the thought that the content of truth is exhausted by the content of the sentences to which truth is applied: truth has no independent content; it has a mere grammatical convenience. While I admit the deflationist hue of Tarski's definition, I show that the definition contains resources to account for ~. substantive features of our semantic competence. Extrapolating from these resources, I claim that a suitably constrained truth theory is an interpretive theory (ITT). The significance of the notion of an ITT is that it provides an interpretive conception of truth. I show that such a conception is neither reductionist nor deflationary. Further, I argue that an adequate ITT, although extensional, does capture the distinctions
mean truth interpretation aim_develop third way truth traditional substantive theory deflationist account seek_show truth content begin definition truth show definition enables elimination true term concept object language_logic set_theory definition therefore appear provide_basis consider variety common denominator think content truth exhaust content sentence_truth apply truth independent content mere grammatical convenience admit deflationist definition show definition contains resource account substantive feature semantic competence resource claim suitably constrain truth theory interpretive theory significance notion provide interpretive conception truth show conception neither reductionist deflationary argue adequate although extensional capture distinction