Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what
In this thesis I focus on dismissivism in metaphysics. Some philosophers argue that at least some metaphysical disputes are not substantial, and as a consequence should be dismissed. In this work I restrict my attention to metaphysics and focus on debates about existence and grounding. In particular I am interested in finding out whether there is a difference between the possible options available for dismissing debates about what there is and the possible options available for dismissing debates about what grounds what. I will delve into this in two different steps. First of all I explore the possibility to dismiss debates about what there is, and as a case study I analyse the debate between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism. Secondly I delve into whether it is possible to dismiss debates about what grounds what, thanks to the discussion of another case study, i.e. the debate between tropes ontologies and universals ontologies. It is worth exploring the nature of dismissivism, because it bears on the future of philosophy. If philosophy has to have a future, we have to make sure that at least some disagreements within it are substantial. My conclusions will be that metaphysical debates about what
Porro, Laura Cecilia
Dismissivism ; Metaphysics ; Metametaphysics ; Tropes ; Universals ; Grounding ; Three-dimensionalism ; Four-dimensionalism ; Parsimony ; Existence ; BD111.P7 ; Metaphysics ; Existentialism ; Knowledge, Theory of
Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what. In this thesis I focus on dismissivism in metaphysics. Some philosophers argue that at least some metaphysical disputes are not substantial, and as a consequence should be dismissed. In this work I restrict my attention to metaphysics and focus on debates about existence and grounding. In particular I am interested in finding out whether there is a difference between the possible options available for dismissing debates about what there is and the possible options available for dismissing debates about what grounds what. I will delve into this in two different steps. First of all I explore the possibility to dismiss debates about what there is, and as a case study I analyse the debate between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism. Secondly I delve into whether it is possible to dismiss debates about what grounds what, thanks to the discussion of another case study, i.e. the debate between tropes ontologies and universals ontologies. It is worth exploring the nature of dismissivism, because it bears on the future of philosophy. If philosophy has to have a future, we have to make sure that at least some disagreements within it are substantial. My conclusions will be that metaphysical debates about what
metaphysics debate debate ground what focus metaphysics philosopher_argue least metaphysical dispute substantial consequence dismiss work restrict attention metaphysics focus debate existence ground particular interested find whether_difference possible option_available dismiss debate possible option_available dismiss debate ground what delve two_different step first explore_possibility dismiss debate case_study analyse debate secondly delve whether_possible dismiss debate ground thanks discussion another case_study debate trope ontology universal ontology worth explore_nature bear future philosophy philosophy future make least disagreement within substantial conclusion metaphysical debate