On describing
The overarching topic of this dissertation is the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions. It focuses on the question whether sentences such as âthe king of France is baldâ literally assert the existence of a unique king (and therefore are false) or simply presuppose the existence of such a king (and thus fail to express propositions). One immediate obstacle to resolving this question is that immediate truth value judgments about such sentences (sentences with non-denoting descriptions) are particularly unstable; some elicit a clear intuition of falsity whereas others simply seem awkward or strange. Because of these variations, truth value judgments are generally considered unreliable. In the first chapter of the dissertation, an explanation of this phenomenon is developed. It is observed that when these types of sentences are considered in the context of a discourse, a systematic pattern in judgments emerges. This pattern, it is argued, should be explained in terms of certain pragmatic factors, e.g. whether a speakerâs utterance is interpreted as cooperative. A detailed and general explanation of the phenomenon is then presented which draws importantly on recent research in the semantics and
Schoubye, Anders Johan
Philosophy of language ; Semantics ; Pragmatics ; Descriptions ; Presuppositions ; Propositional attitudes ; Dynamic semantics ; Focus ; B105.D4S3 ; Description (Philosophy) ; Semantics (Philosophy)
On describing. The overarching topic of this dissertation is the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions. It focuses on the question whether sentences such as âthe king of France is baldâ literally assert the existence of a unique king (and therefore are false) or simply presuppose the existence of such a king (and thus fail to express propositions). One immediate obstacle to resolving this question is that immediate truth value judgments about such sentences (sentences with non-denoting descriptions) are particularly unstable; some elicit a clear intuition of falsity whereas others simply seem awkward or strange. Because of these variations, truth value judgments are generally considered unreliable. In the first chapter of the dissertation, an explanation of this phenomenon is developed. It is observed that when these types of sentences are considered in the context of a discourse, a systematic pattern in judgments emerges. This pattern, it is argued, should be explained in terms of certain pragmatic factors, e.g. whether a speakerâs utterance is interpreted as cooperative. A detailed and general explanation of the phenomenon is then presented which draws importantly on recent research in the semantics and
describing overarch topic semantics_pragmatic definite_description focus question_whether sentence king france literally assert existence unique king therefore false simply presuppose existence king thus fail express proposition immediate obstacle resolve question immediate truth_value judgment sentence sentence non denoting description particularly unstable elicit clear intuition falsity whereas_others simply seem strange variation truth_value judgment generally_consider unreliable first explanation_phenomenon develop observe type sentence consider context discourse systematic pattern judgment emerge pattern argue explain_term certain pragmatic_factor whether speaker utterance interpret cooperative detailed general explanation_phenomenon present draw importantly recent semantics