Dimensions of deprivation and freedom
The thesis addresses the relationship between coercion and poverty. On a sociological level, people in poverty are often described as coerced by their circumstances: for example, when they have no option but to agree to unacceptable job conditions. However, current philosophical accounts of coercion are poorly equipped to explain why some proposals made to those in poverty are aptly conceived as coercive. These accounts assume that an offer is coercive only if, when and because it threatens to make a person worse off. Yet, a central type of case is when a person in conditions of poverty has no reasonable alternative but to accept a proposal which does make them better off, but also unduly submits their will to the will of another. The thesis argues that dominant accounts of coercion suffer from being overly individualistic and distributive. Instead, I take a relational and structural approach. The central definitional and normative feature of coercion is the subjection of one's will. This can occur, I claim, even without one's options being wrongfully restricted. Moreover, wrongful coercion does not happen solely through intentional individual action, but also because of structural factors. Finally, the wrong
Zur-Szpiro, Eliana
Dimensions of deprivation and freedom. The thesis addresses the relationship between coercion and poverty. On a sociological level, people in poverty are often described as coerced by their circumstances: for example, when they have no option but to agree to unacceptable job conditions. However, current philosophical accounts of coercion are poorly equipped to explain why some proposals made to those in poverty are aptly conceived as coercive. These accounts assume that an offer is coercive only if, when and because it threatens to make a person worse off. Yet, a central type of case is when a person in conditions of poverty has no reasonable alternative but to accept a proposal which does make them better off, but also unduly submits their will to the will of another. The thesis argues that dominant accounts of coercion suffer from being overly individualistic and distributive. Instead, I take a relational and structural approach. The central definitional and normative feature of coercion is the subjection of one's will. This can occur, I claim, even without one's options being wrongfully restricted. Moreover, wrongful coercion does not happen solely through intentional individual action, but also because of structural factors. Finally, the wrong
dimensions deprivation freedom address relationship coercion poverty sociological level people poverty often describe circumstance example option agree unacceptable job condition however current philosophical account coercion poorly equip explain proposal_make poverty conceive coercive account assume offer coercive make person bad off yet central type case person condition poverty reasonable alternative accept proposal_make good also unduly submit another argues dominant account coercion suffer overly individualistic distributive instead take relational structural approach central definitional normative feature coercion subjection will occur claim even without option restrict moreover wrongful coercion happen solely intentional individual action also structural factor finally wrong