Aristotle and Augustine on voluntary action and freedom and weakness of the will
Aristotle's remarks on free will suggest, not so much an <i>argument for the existence of</i> free will, as an <i>account of its nature</i>. This account depends on his making no hard distinction between what we call 'free action' and 'voluntary action'. For him, these would be interchangeable terms. The Aristotelian can, then, point out that, <i>if</i> we give up our belief in free will, we must give up many other natural beliefs too. In particular, we must stop believing in voluntary action. There are, in Aristotelian terms, three conditions (not two, as Aristotle himself evidently supposed), which any behaviour must satisfy to count as free/voluntary action. The behaviour (i) must not be compelled, but must be performed by the agent's own power and desire; (ii) must not be done in ignorance, but must be action on relevant knowledge; and (iii) must not be irrational but must result from the combination of the agent's own power and desire with the agents relevant knowledge. (i) leads me to discuss Aristotle's account of what he calls <i>kinesis</i>; (ii) leads me into epistemology; (iii) into an account of Aristotle's theory of <i>proairesis</i> and practical reasoning as the cause of voluntary action. One
Chappell, Timothy David John
Aristotle and Augustine on voluntary action and freedom and weakness of the will. Aristotle's remarks on free will suggest, not so much an <i>argument for the existence of</i> free will, as an <i>account of its nature</i>. This account depends on his making no hard distinction between what we call 'free action' and 'voluntary action'. For him, these would be interchangeable terms. The Aristotelian can, then, point out that, <i>if</i> we give up our belief in free will, we must give up many other natural beliefs too. In particular, we must stop believing in voluntary action. There are, in Aristotelian terms, three conditions (not two, as Aristotle himself evidently supposed), which any behaviour must satisfy to count as free/voluntary action. The behaviour (i) must not be compelled, but must be performed by the agent's own power and desire; (ii) must not be done in ignorance, but must be action on relevant knowledge; and (iii) must not be irrational but must result from the combination of the agent's own power and desire with the agents relevant knowledge. (i) leads me to discuss Aristotle's account of what he calls <i>kinesis</i>; (ii) leads me into epistemology; (iii) into an account of Aristotle's theory of <i>proairesis</i> and practical reasoning as the cause of voluntary action. One
aristotle augustine voluntary action freedom weakness will aristotle remark free suggest much argument_existence free account nature account depend make_hard distinction call free action voluntary action would term aristotelian point give belief free must give many natural belief too particular must stop voluntary action aristotelian term condition aristotle evidently suppose behaviour must satisfy count free voluntary action behaviour must compel must perform agent power desire must ignorance must action relevant knowledge iii must irrational must combination agent power desire agent relevant knowledge lead discuss aristotle_account call lead epistemology iii account aristotle_theory practical reasoning cause voluntary action