Action and volition
Despite views to the contrary, 'action' is not a concept alien to ordinary ways of thinking, hence the significance of the philosophical problem of action, which demands that we ground this concept in some real difference between actions and other occurrences. I argue that of the two likely candidates, the causal and the volitional theories of action, the causal approach will not suffice because it is unable to cope with instances of wayward causality. My concern is principally with the volition theory of which the views of James and Prichard are discussed at length. James's account of the will is deemed unacceptable by virtue of its emphasis upon introspection. While Prichard appears to offer good reasons for believing that willing is fundamental to action, his identification of action with volition is rejected. Subsequently, detailed consideration is given to the relation of volition to action, and I suggest that volition be regarded neither as action nor cause of action. Instead, actions are best understood as causings, which embrace both volitions and their effects. This analysis of action is extended through the concept of 'basic action', and it emerges that there is a clear sense in which willing is
Weir, George R. S.
Philosophy
Action and volition. Despite views to the contrary, 'action' is not a concept alien to ordinary ways of thinking, hence the significance of the philosophical problem of action, which demands that we ground this concept in some real difference between actions and other occurrences. I argue that of the two likely candidates, the causal and the volitional theories of action, the causal approach will not suffice because it is unable to cope with instances of wayward causality. My concern is principally with the volition theory of which the views of James and Prichard are discussed at length. James's account of the will is deemed unacceptable by virtue of its emphasis upon introspection. While Prichard appears to offer good reasons for believing that willing is fundamental to action, his identification of action with volition is rejected. Subsequently, detailed consideration is given to the relation of volition to action, and I suggest that volition be regarded neither as action nor cause of action. Instead, actions are best understood as causings, which embrace both volitions and their effects. This analysis of action is extended through the concept of 'basic action', and it emerges that there is a clear sense in which willing is
action volition despite view contrary action concept alien ordinary way_think hence significance philosophical_problem action demand ground concept real difference action occurrence argue likely candidate causal theory action causal suffice unable cope instance causality concern principally volition theory view james discuss length james account deem unacceptable virtue emphasis_upon introspection appear offer good_reason believe willing fundamental action identification action volition reject subsequently detailed_consideration give relation volition action suggest volition regard neither action cause action instead action best_understood embrace volition effect analysis action extend concept basic action emerge clear sense willing