The problem of evil as a moral objection to theism
I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackieâs criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral âanti-theodicistsâ, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the plausibility of a morally motivated non-cognitive atheism, offering an example (Dostoevskyâs Ivan Karamazov), before finally distilling the central claims of this thesis into the form of a slogan: God lacks humanity.
Betenson, Toby George
B Philosophy (General) ; BJ Ethics ; BL Religion
The problem of evil as a moral objection to theism. I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackieâs criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral âanti-theodicistsâ, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the plausibility of a morally motivated non-cognitive atheism, offering an example (Dostoevskyâs Ivan Karamazov), before finally distilling the central claims of this thesis into the form of a slogan: God lacks humanity.
problem_evil moral objection theism argue problem_evil moral objection theistic belief three_broad section establish element argument section_one establish logically binding nature problem_evil problem_evil must solve believe god yet borrow criticisms moral argument_existence god argue fundamentally evaluative nature premise within problem_evil entail use argue non existence_god section_two establish moral many response_problem evil theodicy discus work moral anti support key premise within argument via appeal moral_philosophy combine claim section_one section_two conclude theism moral theodicy section_three establish plausibility morally motivate non cognitive atheism offer example finally distil central_claim form god lack humanity