On rules and the metaphysics of meaning
In this work I develop an argument which shows that rule-following is impossible, and investigate its impact on the philosophy of language. By way of orientation, I start with a critical evaluation of existing ârule-following considerationsâ, arguments derived from Wittgenstein which purportedly put rule-following under pressure. Having shown that its predecessors are unsound, and with the explicit aim of avoiding their flaws, I then formulate the new âindexicalâ argument. The conclusion that rule-following is impossible is difficult to accept because we think that the ability to folldiw rules is constitutive of language-mastery. If this is correct, then to show that rule-following is impossible is to show that language is impossible. Such âmeaning nihilismâ is not a tenable position, and some way of avoiding this conclusion has to be found. Various proposals in the literature have the potential to do this: principally (a) the irrealism suggested by Kripke; and (b) subjective on-gong determination advocated by Wright. I argue that neither strategy is successful. The correct response to the indexical argument is to accept that rule-following is not constitutive of language-mastery. In this case,
Campbell, Peter
philosophy of language ; indexical argument
On rules and the metaphysics of meaning. In this work I develop an argument which shows that rule-following is impossible, and investigate its impact on the philosophy of language. By way of orientation, I start with a critical evaluation of existing ârule-following considerationsâ, arguments derived from Wittgenstein which purportedly put rule-following under pressure. Having shown that its predecessors are unsound, and with the explicit aim of avoiding their flaws, I then formulate the new âindexicalâ argument. The conclusion that rule-following is impossible is difficult to accept because we think that the ability to folldiw rules is constitutive of language-mastery. If this is correct, then to show that rule-following is impossible is to show that language is impossible. Such âmeaning nihilismâ is not a tenable position, and some way of avoiding this conclusion has to be found. Various proposals in the literature have the potential to do this: principally (a) the irrealism suggested by Kripke; and (b) subjective on-gong determination advocated by Wright. I argue that neither strategy is successful. The correct response to the indexical argument is to accept that rule-following is not constitutive of language-mastery. In this case,
rule metaphysics meaning work develop_argument show rule_following impossible investigate_impact philosophy_language way orientation start critical_evaluation exist rule_following consideration argument derive wittgenstein put rule_following pressure show predecessor explicit aim avoid flaw formulate_new indexical argument conclusion rule_following impossible difficult accept think ability rule constitutive language mastery correct show rule_following impossible show language impossible mean nihilism tenable position way avoid conclusion find various proposal literature potential principally suggest kripke subjective determination advocate wright argue_neither strategy successful correct response indexical argument accept rule_following constitutive language mastery case