Predicates of personal taste and perspective dependence
Judgments of personal taste such as ~Haggis is delicious~ are puzzling. On the one hand they express the speaker's personal taste. On the other hand it is normal to disagree about the truth of such judgments. Giving semantics for predicates of taste that can accommodate both intuitions has proven challenging. Let us call the phenomenon that the truth of judgments of taste depends on variable tastes perspective dependence. The thesis discusses two most popular semantic accounts for predicates of taste. Contextualists hold that the speaker's perspective is an element of the content of predicates of taste. However, the view has trouble explaining what disagreements of taste are about if speakers in fact make compatible judgments. Semantic relativism is a recent framework which is motivated by its alleged ability to explain both perspective dependence and disagreements. Relativists hold that whereas the content of a judgment of taste doesn't refer to a perspective, it gets a truth-value only when evaluated relative to a perspective. I argue that neither account is successful, and their fundamental mistake is to hold that people know that judgments of taste are perspectivedependent. I argue that majority of speakers
Hirvonen, S. M.
Predicates of personal taste and perspective dependence. Judgments of personal taste such as ~Haggis is delicious~ are puzzling. On the one hand they express the speaker's personal taste. On the other hand it is normal to disagree about the truth of such judgments. Giving semantics for predicates of taste that can accommodate both intuitions has proven challenging. Let us call the phenomenon that the truth of judgments of taste depends on variable tastes perspective dependence. The thesis discusses two most popular semantic accounts for predicates of taste. Contextualists hold that the speaker's perspective is an element of the content of predicates of taste. However, the view has trouble explaining what disagreements of taste are about if speakers in fact make compatible judgments. Semantic relativism is a recent framework which is motivated by its alleged ability to explain both perspective dependence and disagreements. Relativists hold that whereas the content of a judgment of taste doesn't refer to a perspective, it gets a truth-value only when evaluated relative to a perspective. I argue that neither account is successful, and their fundamental mistake is to hold that people know that judgments of taste are perspectivedependent. I argue that majority of speakers
personal taste perspective dependence personal taste puzzling one_hand express speaker personal taste hand normal disagree truth judgment giving semantics predicate taste accommodate intuition proven challenge let call phenomenon truth judgment taste depend variable taste perspective dependence discus popular semantic account predicate taste contextualists hold speaker perspective element content predicate taste however view trouble explain disagreement taste speaker fact make compatible judgment semantic relativism recent framework motivate alleged ability explain perspective dependence disagreement hold whereas content judgment taste refer perspective get truth_value evaluated relative perspective argue_neither account successful fundamental mistake hold people know judgment taste argue majority speaker