Should eliminative materialism be eliminated?
The thesis consists of a critical evaluation of Paul Churchland's eliminative materialism. The first of the central claims of the thesis is that it is unclear how radical an eliminativism Churchland wishes to adopt, in that his published work appears to vacillate between a position which is too modest to be regarded as a genuinely eliminative form of materialism, and positions which, while radical in their eliminativism, are not supported by the empirical evidence which Churchland presents. I conclude that eliminative materialism is itself a candidate for elimination, on the grounds that the radical positions are unsupportable in principle, while the only eliminativist position which is defensible effectively fails to qualify as a form of 'eliminative materialism'. The early chapters of the thesis consider the negative element in Churchland's position - the claim that 'folk psychology' will not ultimately reduce to neuroscience, and that, this being a constraint on the acceptability of folk psychology as a putative source of mental explanation, folk psychology ought therefore to be eliminated. The positive element of Churchland's position is then considered: his claims that research programmes currently being
Gordon, John
Should eliminative materialism be eliminated?. The thesis consists of a critical evaluation of Paul Churchland's eliminative materialism. The first of the central claims of the thesis is that it is unclear how radical an eliminativism Churchland wishes to adopt, in that his published work appears to vacillate between a position which is too modest to be regarded as a genuinely eliminative form of materialism, and positions which, while radical in their eliminativism, are not supported by the empirical evidence which Churchland presents. I conclude that eliminative materialism is itself a candidate for elimination, on the grounds that the radical positions are unsupportable in principle, while the only eliminativist position which is defensible effectively fails to qualify as a form of 'eliminative materialism'. The early chapters of the thesis consider the negative element in Churchland's position - the claim that 'folk psychology' will not ultimately reduce to neuroscience, and that, this being a constraint on the acceptability of folk psychology as a putative source of mental explanation, folk psychology ought therefore to be eliminated. The positive element of Churchland's position is then considered: his claims that research programmes currently being
materialism eliminate consist critical_evaluation paul materialism first central_claim unclear radical wish adopt publish_work appear position modest regard genuinely form materialism position radical support empirical_evidence present conclude materialism candidate elimination ground radical position principle position defensible effectively fail qualify form materialism early consider negative element position claim folk_psychology ultimately reduce neuroscience constraint acceptability folk_psychology putative source mental explanation folk_psychology ought therefore eliminate positive element position consider claim programme currently