The possibility of empirical knowledge
This thesis offers a reassessment of the philosophical problem of scepticism about knowledge of the external world. It distinguishes between different forms of this sceptical problem and considers two kinds of response: a strategy developed by Tim Williamson, and a disjunctivist approach. Chapters one and two offer an introduction to the problem of scepticism: the sceptical arguments of Descartes and Hume are compared, and Williamsonâs approach to scepticism is introduced. Chapter three considers three different ways of responding to Humean scepticism. This chapter offers an interpretation of Stroudâs objection to externalism and considers whether disjunctivist accounts are vulnerable to a similar objection. Chapter four compares Williamsonâs approach with one form of disjunctivist account. Central to this discussion is a distinction between responses to scepticism which question whether there is guaranteed epistemic access to oneâs own mental states, and a disjunctivist account which proposes that the subjectâs perspective on their conscious states is not grounded on a mode of knowing something independent of it. Chapter five considers a further debate about disjunctivism and scepticism. Wrightâs
Fenton, Michael P.
BD Speculative Philosophy
The possibility of empirical knowledge. This thesis offers a reassessment of the philosophical problem of scepticism about knowledge of the external world. It distinguishes between different forms of this sceptical problem and considers two kinds of response: a strategy developed by Tim Williamson, and a disjunctivist approach. Chapters one and two offer an introduction to the problem of scepticism: the sceptical arguments of Descartes and Hume are compared, and Williamsonâs approach to scepticism is introduced. Chapter three considers three different ways of responding to Humean scepticism. This chapter offers an interpretation of Stroudâs objection to externalism and considers whether disjunctivist accounts are vulnerable to a similar objection. Chapter four compares Williamsonâs approach with one form of disjunctivist account. Central to this discussion is a distinction between responses to scepticism which question whether there is guaranteed epistemic access to oneâs own mental states, and a disjunctivist account which proposes that the subjectâs perspective on their conscious states is not grounded on a mode of knowing something independent of it. Chapter five considers a further debate about disjunctivism and scepticism. Wrightâs
possibility empirical_knowledge offer reassessment philosophical_problem scepticism knowledge external_world distinguishes different_form sceptical problem considers two_kind response strategy develop approach offer introduction problem scepticism sceptical_argument descartes hume compare scepticism introduce three_considers three_different way_respond humean scepticism offer_interpretation objection externalism consider_whether account vulnerable similar objection compare form account central discussion distinction responses scepticism question_whether epistemic access mental_state account proposes subject perspective conscious state ground mode know something independent five_considers debate disjunctivism scepticism wright