Desire and value in practical reasoning
Intentional actions are those which are performed because the subject sees something tobe said for performing them; the subject sees performing the action âin a positive lightâ. Intentional actions are therefore susceptible to a distinctive kind of explanation, which explains them as intentional; that is, which accounts for them in terms oftheir unique property, of being performed because the subject sees that there is something to be said for doing so. Practical reasoning is the process of figuring out what there is reason to do; that is, what actions are best supported by the considerations available to the subject. To put it another way, practical reasoning is the process of figuring out which actions there is the most to be said for; so practical reasoning explains intentional action âproperlyâ, i.e., in terms of its special properties. Many philosophers, loosely following the lead of David Hume, have argued for a close connection between desire and intentional action. If desires explain intentional actions properly, then they must do so through practical reasoning; that being the case, how do they do it? Another sizeable group of philosophers, the anti-Humeans, have argued that desires cannot
Fossey, Peter
B Philosophy (General)
Desire and value in practical reasoning. Intentional actions are those which are performed because the subject sees something tobe said for performing them; the subject sees performing the action âin a positive lightâ. Intentional actions are therefore susceptible to a distinctive kind of explanation, which explains them as intentional; that is, which accounts for them in terms oftheir unique property, of being performed because the subject sees that there is something to be said for doing so. Practical reasoning is the process of figuring out what there is reason to do; that is, what actions are best supported by the considerations available to the subject. To put it another way, practical reasoning is the process of figuring out which actions there is the most to be said for; so practical reasoning explains intentional action âproperlyâ, i.e., in terms of its special properties. Many philosophers, loosely following the lead of David Hume, have argued for a close connection between desire and intentional action. If desires explain intentional actions properly, then they must do so through practical reasoning; that being the case, how do they do it? Another sizeable group of philosophers, the anti-Humeans, have argued that desires cannot
desire value practical reasoning intentional_action perform subject see something say subject see perform action positive light intentional_action therefore susceptible distinctive kind explanation explain intentional account term unique property perform subject see something say practical_reason process figure reason_action best support consideration available subject put another way practical reasoning process figure action say practical reasoning explain intentional_action properly term special property many_philosopher loosely follow lead david_hume argue close_connection desire intentional_action desire explain intentional_action properly must practical reasoning case another sizeable group philosopher anti argue desire