The origin of persons : tracing back the moral subject
In this thesis, 'person' is treated as a term with some moral content (fairly unspecific to begin with) describing the reader and myself, at least at the present time. I begin by looking at psychological theories of personal identity, both reductionist and 'Simple', and find that there are good reasons for abandoning both such approaches. Then I examine different theories on the necessity of origin, concluding that our time of origin is essential to our existence, and that the actual combination of our parents' gametes is essential to our origin, whether or not the two coincide. Our particular thoughts, in contrast, are not essential to our origin or existence; any or all these thoughts might never have occurred to us. I then look at theories according to which human persons are physical beings, but do not originate with the organism itself. Theories according to which personhood is a stage of an organism are, I argue, impossible to reconcile with the widespread belief that our personal status is inseparable from ourselves. Thus the organism before whatever stage is said to mark the onset of personhood will similarly be a candidate for personal status. On the other hand, the theory that the onset of personhood
Watt, Helen
The origin of persons : tracing back the moral subject. In this thesis, 'person' is treated as a term with some moral content (fairly unspecific to begin with) describing the reader and myself, at least at the present time. I begin by looking at psychological theories of personal identity, both reductionist and 'Simple', and find that there are good reasons for abandoning both such approaches. Then I examine different theories on the necessity of origin, concluding that our time of origin is essential to our existence, and that the actual combination of our parents' gametes is essential to our origin, whether or not the two coincide. Our particular thoughts, in contrast, are not essential to our origin or existence; any or all these thoughts might never have occurred to us. I then look at theories according to which human persons are physical beings, but do not originate with the organism itself. Theories according to which personhood is a stage of an organism are, I argue, impossible to reconcile with the widespread belief that our personal status is inseparable from ourselves. Thus the organism before whatever stage is said to mark the onset of personhood will similarly be a candidate for personal status. On the other hand, the theory that the onset of personhood
origin person trace_back moral subject person treated term moral content fairly begin_describe reader least present time begin_look psychological_theory personal_identity reductionist simple good_reason abandon approach examine different_theory necessity origin conclude time origin essential existence actual combination parent essential origin whether coincide particular thought contrast essential origin existence thought might never occur look theory accord human_person physical being originate organism itself theories accord personhood stage organism argue impossible reconcile widespread belief personal status inseparable ourselves thus organism whatever stage say mark onset personhood similarly candidate personal status hand theory onset personhood