The particularity of visual perception : veridical hallucination and our concept of perception
In the thesis it is argued that the account of experience that fits best with our ordinary concept of perception involves a commitment to disjunctivism - the view that the experience a subject has when he perceives the world is not one that the subject could have if he were hallucinating. A critique of the most promising non-disjunctive account of experience is provided. This theory of perception involves an acceptance of an intentional theory of experience together with the causal theory of perception. According to the intentional theory, an experience is a psychological state with an intentional content that represents the world as being a certain way. The causal theory of perception is the theory that it is part of our ordinary concept of perception that in order for a subject to perceive the world the subject's experience must be appropriately caused by the objects he is perceiving. It is argued that in order to avoid a commitment to disjunctivism, the intentional theorist needs to accept the generality thesis - the thesis that the content of successful perceptual experience is an existentially quantified one that is not to be specified by using terms that refer to the particulars of which one is aware
Soteriou, Matthew John
Disjunctivism; Perceives; Intentional theory
The particularity of visual perception : veridical hallucination and our concept of perception. In the thesis it is argued that the account of experience that fits best with our ordinary concept of perception involves a commitment to disjunctivism - the view that the experience a subject has when he perceives the world is not one that the subject could have if he were hallucinating. A critique of the most promising non-disjunctive account of experience is provided. This theory of perception involves an acceptance of an intentional theory of experience together with the causal theory of perception. According to the intentional theory, an experience is a psychological state with an intentional content that represents the world as being a certain way. The causal theory of perception is the theory that it is part of our ordinary concept of perception that in order for a subject to perceive the world the subject's experience must be appropriately caused by the objects he is perceiving. It is argued that in order to avoid a commitment to disjunctivism, the intentional theorist needs to accept the generality thesis - the thesis that the content of successful perceptual experience is an existentially quantified one that is not to be specified by using terms that refer to the particulars of which one is aware
particularity visual_perception hallucination concept perception argued account experience fit best ordinary concept perception involve commitment disjunctivism view experience_subject perceive world subject could critique promise non account experience provide theory perception involve acceptance intentional theory experience together causal_theory perception according intentional theory experience psychological_state intentional content represent_world certain way causal_theory perception theory part ordinary concept perception order subject perceive world subject_experience must appropriately object perceive argue order_avoid commitment disjunctivism intentional theorist need accept generality content successful perceptual_experience quantify specify use term_refer aware