The headless Thompson gunner : marines, diplomats, Secretaries of State and the U.S. interventions in Nicaragua, 1924-1933
The U. S. intervention in Nicaragua of 1927-1933 was both a long-term success and a short-term failure. The United States' most important policy goals for Nicaragua--the protection of the flanks and sea lanes of the Panama Canal and the Nicaraguan canal route, the maintenance of American hegemony in Central America, and continued access to Central American markets--were achieved through the intervention--along with several less important secondary aims, such as sponsoring free elections and the preservation of 'democratic' institutions. However, frequently flawed and short-term thinking, an unwillingness to make policy commitments, and inconsistent and often inaccurate intelligence made the cost of long-term success considerably higher than necessary. The work focuses upon U. S. policy towards the 1924 Nicaraguan elections, the creation of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua (GNN), the 1925 Chamorro revolution, the 1926 Liberal counterrevolution, the U. S. decision to intervene in January 1927, the Stimson mission to Nicaragua, and the 1927-1933 U. S. /GNN war against the Sandinistas. With the use of documents from the U. S. State Department, U. S. Marine Corps, several U. S. intelligence agencies, and the British
Zimov, David Michael
Sandinastas
The headless Thompson gunner : marines, diplomats, Secretaries of State and the U.S. interventions in Nicaragua, 1924-1933. The U. S. intervention in Nicaragua of 1927-1933 was both a long-term success and a short-term failure. The United States' most important policy goals for Nicaragua--the protection of the flanks and sea lanes of the Panama Canal and the Nicaraguan canal route, the maintenance of American hegemony in Central America, and continued access to Central American markets--were achieved through the intervention--along with several less important secondary aims, such as sponsoring free elections and the preservation of 'democratic' institutions. However, frequently flawed and short-term thinking, an unwillingness to make policy commitments, and inconsistent and often inaccurate intelligence made the cost of long-term success considerably higher than necessary. The work focuses upon U. S. policy towards the 1924 Nicaraguan elections, the creation of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua (GNN), the 1925 Chamorro revolution, the 1926 Liberal counterrevolution, the U. S. decision to intervene in January 1927, the Stimson mission to Nicaragua, and the 1927-1933 U. S. /GNN war against the Sandinistas. With the use of documents from the U. S. State Department, U. S. Marine Corps, several U. S. intelligence agencies, and the British
marine diplomat secretaries state_intervention intervention long_term success short_term failure united_states important policy goal protection flank sea panama canal canal route maintenance american hegemony central_america continue access central american market achieve intervention along several less_important secondary_aim sponsor free election preservation democratic institution however frequently flaw short_term thinking unwillingness make policy commitment inconsistent often inaccurate intelligence make cost long_term success considerably high necessary work focus_upon policy_towards election creation revolution liberal decision intervene mission war use document state department marine corps several intelligence agency british