Freedom, responsibility, and Frankfurt-style cases
In this thesis I consider an argument against the claim that an agent is responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases are proposed as scenarios in which an agent is responsible for what they have done, despite having been unable to do otherwise. A successful Frankfurt-style case would render the question of the compatibility of the ability to do otherwise and determinism or indeterminism irrelevant to the question of the compatibility of responsibility and determinism or indeterminism. My aim is to assess whether this style of argument succeeds. I begin by considering a strategy employed by some âleeway compatibilistsâ who have argued, via a modified conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise, that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case could, in fact, have done otherwise in some relevant sense. I argue that these views fail to establish that the agent could have done otherwise in a sense relevant to accounting for that agentâs responsibility. I suggest that, for all that these views show, Frankfurtâs challenge may stand against leeway compatibilism. I go on to argue that, insofar as Frankfurt-style cases are proposed to count against âleeway
Macdonald, B. J.
Freedom, responsibility, and Frankfurt-style cases. In this thesis I consider an argument against the claim that an agent is responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases are proposed as scenarios in which an agent is responsible for what they have done, despite having been unable to do otherwise. A successful Frankfurt-style case would render the question of the compatibility of the ability to do otherwise and determinism or indeterminism irrelevant to the question of the compatibility of responsibility and determinism or indeterminism. My aim is to assess whether this style of argument succeeds. I begin by considering a strategy employed by some âleeway compatibilistsâ who have argued, via a modified conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise, that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case could, in fact, have done otherwise in some relevant sense. I argue that these views fail to establish that the agent could have done otherwise in a sense relevant to accounting for that agentâs responsibility. I suggest that, for all that these views show, Frankfurtâs challenge may stand against leeway compatibilism. I go on to argue that, insofar as Frankfurt-style cases are proposed to count against âleeway
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