Philosophical scepticism and the conditions of thought
Scepticism of the External World is a persistent philosophical problem. One characteristic response to scepticism is to argue that such a stance cannot be consistently maintained insofar that a sceptical position involves doubting or denying a necessary condition of thought and/or experience, and hence doubting or denying something which framing the very problem of scepticism itself tacitly takes for granted. Such a line of argument, following Immanuel Kant, is often termed transcendental. This thesis examines the viability of such a response. Transcendental arguments are defended against the charges that they fail to successfully answer the sceptic because (a) they embody a commitment to verificationism, and/or (b) because they attempt to establish the impossible in showing our conceptual scheme to be unique. It is argued, rather, that the essential problem with transcendental arguments is that they fail to grapple with the kinds of reflection which motivate scepticism in the first place. A transcendental argument may show that scepticism involves doubting or denying a condition of thought and/or experience, but if it is just the conclusion of a sceptical argument that is called into question, and not the
Levett, Jonathan
Philosophy
Philosophical scepticism and the conditions of thought. Scepticism of the External World is a persistent philosophical problem. One characteristic response to scepticism is to argue that such a stance cannot be consistently maintained insofar that a sceptical position involves doubting or denying a necessary condition of thought and/or experience, and hence doubting or denying something which framing the very problem of scepticism itself tacitly takes for granted. Such a line of argument, following Immanuel Kant, is often termed transcendental. This thesis examines the viability of such a response. Transcendental arguments are defended against the charges that they fail to successfully answer the sceptic because (a) they embody a commitment to verificationism, and/or (b) because they attempt to establish the impossible in showing our conceptual scheme to be unique. It is argued, rather, that the essential problem with transcendental arguments is that they fail to grapple with the kinds of reflection which motivate scepticism in the first place. A transcendental argument may show that scepticism involves doubting or denying a condition of thought and/or experience, but if it is just the conclusion of a sceptical argument that is called into question, and not the
philosophical scepticism condition think scepticism external world persistent philosophical_problem characteristic response scepticism argue stance consistently maintain insofar sceptical position involve doubt deny necessary_condition think and experience hence doubt deny something frame problem scepticism tacitly take_grant line_argument follow immanuel_kant often term transcendental examines viability response transcendental_argument defend charge fail successfully answer sceptic embody commitment and attempt_establish impossible show conceptual scheme unique argue rather essential problem transcendental_argument fail grapple kind reflection motivate scepticism first_place transcendental_argument may show scepticism involve doubt deny condition think and experience conclusion sceptical_argument call_question