Psychophysical supervenience
I argue that, contrary to what is believed today by many philosophers, a supervenience claim can be quite strong (i.e. it can entail many further claims). To this extent, claims of psychophysical supervenience can be used to capture some possible positions with respect to the Mind-Body problem. In some cases, however, the strength of supervenience claims depends on adopting views which are not congenial to all. After considering the variety of forms of supervenience, and establishing what - in my opinion - are the important distinctions, I put forward and defend the thesis (Th) that psychophysical supervenience in its full generality can be satisfactorily supported if and only if one is willing to make any of some substantial assumptions (the 'Assumptions') about the nature of mental and physical properties. Given the nature of the Assumptions, (Th) adds potential strength to supervenience claims. I then argue for the idea of supervenience as a potentially strong thesis by showing that (a) psychophysical supervenience can yield reduction under certain understandings of 'reduction'; (b) a claim of psychophysical supervenience can, relatedly, correspond to a position which is inconsistent with some significant
Hendel, Giovanna Enrica
Mind-body problem
Psychophysical supervenience. I argue that, contrary to what is believed today by many philosophers, a supervenience claim can be quite strong (i.e. it can entail many further claims). To this extent, claims of psychophysical supervenience can be used to capture some possible positions with respect to the Mind-Body problem. In some cases, however, the strength of supervenience claims depends on adopting views which are not congenial to all. After considering the variety of forms of supervenience, and establishing what - in my opinion - are the important distinctions, I put forward and defend the thesis (Th) that psychophysical supervenience in its full generality can be satisfactorily supported if and only if one is willing to make any of some substantial assumptions (the 'Assumptions') about the nature of mental and physical properties. Given the nature of the Assumptions, (Th) adds potential strength to supervenience claims. I then argue for the idea of supervenience as a potentially strong thesis by showing that (a) psychophysical supervenience can yield reduction under certain understandings of 'reduction'; (b) a claim of psychophysical supervenience can, relatedly, correspond to a position which is inconsistent with some significant
psychophysical supervenience argue contrary believe today many_philosopher supervenience claim quite strong entail many claim extent claim psychophysical supervenience use_capture possible position_respect mind_body problem case however strength supervenience claim depend adopt view all consider variety form supervenience establish opinion important distinction put_forward defend psychophysical supervenience full generality satisfactorily support willing make_substantial assumption nature mental_physical property given nature add potential strength supervenience claim argue idea supervenience potentially strong showing psychophysical supervenience yield reduction certain understandings reduction claim psychophysical supervenience correspond position inconsistent significant