Conceptual responsibility
This thesis concerns our moral and epistemic responsibilities regarding our concepts. I argue that certain concepts can be morally, epistemically, or socially problematic. This is particularly concerning with regard to our concepts of social kinds, which may have both descriptive and evaluative aspects. Being ignorant of certain concepts, or possessing mistaken conceptions, can be problematic for similar reasons, and contributes to various forms of epistemic injustice. I defend an expanded view of a type of epistemic injustice known as âhermeneutical injusticeâ, where widespread conceptual ignorance puts members of marginalized groups at risk of their distinctive and important experiences lacking intelligible interpretations. Together, I call the use of problematic concepts or the ignorance of appropriate concepts âconceptual incapacitiesâ. I discuss the conditions under which we may be responsible for our conceptual incapacities on several major theories of responsibility, developing my own account of responsibility in the process, according to which we are responsible for something just in case it was caused by one of our reasons-responsive constitutive psychological traits. However, I argue that
Goetze, Trystan S.
Conceptual responsibility. This thesis concerns our moral and epistemic responsibilities regarding our concepts. I argue that certain concepts can be morally, epistemically, or socially problematic. This is particularly concerning with regard to our concepts of social kinds, which may have both descriptive and evaluative aspects. Being ignorant of certain concepts, or possessing mistaken conceptions, can be problematic for similar reasons, and contributes to various forms of epistemic injustice. I defend an expanded view of a type of epistemic injustice known as âhermeneutical injusticeâ, where widespread conceptual ignorance puts members of marginalized groups at risk of their distinctive and important experiences lacking intelligible interpretations. Together, I call the use of problematic concepts or the ignorance of appropriate concepts âconceptual incapacitiesâ. I discuss the conditions under which we may be responsible for our conceptual incapacities on several major theories of responsibility, developing my own account of responsibility in the process, according to which we are responsible for something just in case it was caused by one of our reasons-responsive constitutive psychological traits. However, I argue that
conceptual responsibility concern moral epistemic responsibility regard concept argue certain concept morally epistemically socially problematic particularly concern regard concept social kind may descriptive evaluative aspect certain concept possess mistaken conception problematic similar reason contribute various_form epistemic injustice defend expand view type epistemic injustice know hermeneutical injustice widespread conceptual ignorance put member marginalize group risk distinctive important experience lack intelligible interpretation together call use problematic concept ignorance appropriate concept conceptual discuss condition may responsible conceptual several_major theory responsibility develop_account responsibility process accord responsible something case cause reasons responsive constitutive psychological trait however_argue