Moral status and political liberalism
This thesis develops and defends an account of our fundamental moral and political reasons for action. Part 1 argues for a Kantian position which I call the Moral Status View, according to which our fundamental moral reasons are reasons to respond to each person's moral status, which she has in virtue of being able to use her reason to cause events. Part 2 argues for a version of Political Liberalism according to which our fundamental political reasons are reasons to respond to each person's political status as free and equal. Part 3 applies the conclusions of the first two parts to the sex trade, and thereby demonstrates that taken together, these positions are not only plausible and consistent, but of great practical significance.
Lamb, E. R.
Moral status and political liberalism. This thesis develops and defends an account of our fundamental moral and political reasons for action. Part 1 argues for a Kantian position which I call the Moral Status View, according to which our fundamental moral reasons are reasons to respond to each person's moral status, which she has in virtue of being able to use her reason to cause events. Part 2 argues for a version of Political Liberalism according to which our fundamental political reasons are reasons to respond to each person's political status as free and equal. Part 3 applies the conclusions of the first two parts to the sex trade, and thereby demonstrates that taken together, these positions are not only plausible and consistent, but of great practical significance.
moral_status political_liberalism develops defend_account fundamental moral_political reason_action part argue kantian position call moral_status view accord fundamental moral_reason reason respond person moral_status virtue able use reason cause event part argue version political_liberalism accord fundamental political reason reason respond person political status free equal part applies conclusion first_two part sex trade thereby demonstrate take together position plausible consistent great practical significance