Environmental rights
In this thesis I address the claim that theories of moral rights are incompatible with environmental concerns. This claim is often made on the grounds that rights are too individualistic and human-centred. I attempt to answer this, not on the grounds that it misrepresents all theories of rights or that these concerns are not important, but rather by demonstrating that concepts of environmental rights can be developed that will do this work. I argue that rights are dynamic concepts which have altered over their history to accommodate new challenges and problems (a fact frequently disguised by the often rigid and legalistic frameworks of twentieth-century rights theories) and that their associations with individualism and agency should not be seen as central to the âcoreâ concept of a right. I examine various cases that might be regarded as difficult for âtraditionalâ theories, including the rights of future people, groups and animals. I show that certain theories are unable to account for moral rights in these cases (especially, but not only, âchoice theoriesâ of the kind espoused by H. L. A. Hart). I develop an account of what an adequate theory of environmental rights must involve. This includes
McKinnell, Elizabeth Mary
Environmental rights. In this thesis I address the claim that theories of moral rights are incompatible with environmental concerns. This claim is often made on the grounds that rights are too individualistic and human-centred. I attempt to answer this, not on the grounds that it misrepresents all theories of rights or that these concerns are not important, but rather by demonstrating that concepts of environmental rights can be developed that will do this work. I argue that rights are dynamic concepts which have altered over their history to accommodate new challenges and problems (a fact frequently disguised by the often rigid and legalistic frameworks of twentieth-century rights theories) and that their associations with individualism and agency should not be seen as central to the âcoreâ concept of a right. I examine various cases that might be regarded as difficult for âtraditionalâ theories, including the rights of future people, groups and animals. I show that certain theories are unable to account for moral rights in these cases (especially, but not only, âchoice theoriesâ of the kind espoused by H. L. A. Hart). I develop an account of what an adequate theory of environmental rights must involve. This includes
environmental right address claim theory moral right incompatible environmental concern claim often make ground right individualistic human centred attempt_answer ground theory right concern important rather demonstrate concept environmental right develop work argue right dynamic concept alter history accommodate new challenge problem fact frequently disguise often rigid framework twentieth_century right theory association individualism agency see central core concept right examine_various case might regard difficult traditional theory include right future people group animal show certain theory unable account_moral right case especially choice theory kind develop_account adequate theory environmental right must involve include