Fairness, ~ought implies can~, and the origin of alternate possibilities
The goal of this thesis is to set out an argument which demonstrates that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent may only be blameworthy for performing a given action if they were able to do otherwise than it, can be logically derived from a certain interpretation of the common moral principle that ~ought implies can~ (OIC). In pursuing this ~Derivation~, I follow David Copp in claiming that both PAP and OIC are in large part motivated by the same considerations about fairness and the role that our genuine moral obligations may play in our processes of moral deliberation. I begin by outlining a case in favour of my preferred sense of OIC which is grounded in these shared motivations, before protecting it from a varied range of counterexamples. I then turn my attention to defending what I call the ~connecting premises~ of the Derivation- a set of reasonably uncontroversial moral beliefs which, in conjunction with my understanding of OIC, show that PAP is true. In arguing for these premises, I draw on a broader normative picture in which our moral obligations, blameworthiness for failing in those obligations, and the morally relevant sense of ability which underpins both of
Waters, Sam
Fairness, ~ought implies can~, and the origin of alternate possibilities. The goal of this thesis is to set out an argument which demonstrates that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent may only be blameworthy for performing a given action if they were able to do otherwise than it, can be logically derived from a certain interpretation of the common moral principle that ~ought implies can~ (OIC). In pursuing this ~Derivation~, I follow David Copp in claiming that both PAP and OIC are in large part motivated by the same considerations about fairness and the role that our genuine moral obligations may play in our processes of moral deliberation. I begin by outlining a case in favour of my preferred sense of OIC which is grounded in these shared motivations, before protecting it from a varied range of counterexamples. I then turn my attention to defending what I call the ~connecting premises~ of the Derivation- a set of reasonably uncontroversial moral beliefs which, in conjunction with my understanding of OIC, show that PAP is true. In arguing for these premises, I draw on a broader normative picture in which our moral obligations, blameworthiness for failing in those obligations, and the morally relevant sense of ability which underpins both of
ought imply can origin alternate possibility goal set_argument demonstrate principle alternate hold agent may perform give action able otherwise logically derive certain interpretation common moral_principle ought imply can pursue derivation follow claim large_part motivate consideration role genuine moral_obligation may_play process moral deliberation begin_outline case favour prefer sense ground share motivation protect varied range counterexample turn_attention defend call derivation set reasonably uncontroversial moral_belief conjunction show true argue premise draw_broad normative picture moral_obligation fail obligation morally relevant sense ability underpins