Language, necessity and convention : reconsidering the linguistic approach to modality
This thesis is an examination of the linguistic approach to modality (also known as 'linguistic conventionalism') - i.e. the view that necessity is to be explained in terms of the linguistic rules that we have adopted. Drawing on an investigation into the history of this approach, I argue against the currently prevalent attitude that it can be dismissed as misguided. The aim, however, is not to argue that the linguistic approach is correct, but, more modestly, to put it back on the table as an interesting and viable research program. The thesis is divided into three parts. In part A, I articulate a conception of the commitments of the approach based on the ideas that influenced it, how it emerged and developed in the work of the logical positivists, and, in particular, the role it was meant to play in ~making a consistent empiricism possible~. Next, in part B, I defend the core ideas of the approach against various objections. Notably, I consider the objection that truth cannot be ~created~ by convention, the objection that necessities cannot be explained in terms of contingencies, and the objection that determining what the linguistic conventions are, unlike determining what the modal facts are, is a straightforwardly
Nyseth, Fredrik
linguistic conventionalism ; necessary truth ; logical positivism ; modality ; necessity ; logical empiricism
Language, necessity and convention : reconsidering the linguistic approach to modality. This thesis is an examination of the linguistic approach to modality (also known as 'linguistic conventionalism') - i.e. the view that necessity is to be explained in terms of the linguistic rules that we have adopted. Drawing on an investigation into the history of this approach, I argue against the currently prevalent attitude that it can be dismissed as misguided. The aim, however, is not to argue that the linguistic approach is correct, but, more modestly, to put it back on the table as an interesting and viable research program. The thesis is divided into three parts. In part A, I articulate a conception of the commitments of the approach based on the ideas that influenced it, how it emerged and developed in the work of the logical positivists, and, in particular, the role it was meant to play in ~making a consistent empiricism possible~. Next, in part B, I defend the core ideas of the approach against various objections. Notably, I consider the objection that truth cannot be ~created~ by convention, the objection that necessities cannot be explained in terms of contingencies, and the objection that determining what the linguistic conventions are, unlike determining what the modal facts are, is a straightforwardly
language necessity convention reconsidering linguistic modality examination linguistic modality also_know linguistic view necessity explain_term linguistic_rule adopt drawing investigation history argue currently prevalent attitude dismiss misguide aim however_argue linguistic correct put back table interesting viable program divide_three_part part articulate conception commitment base_idea influence emerge develop work logical positivist particular_role mean play making consistent empiricism possible next part defend core_idea various objection notably consider objection truth created convention objection necessity explain_term contingency objection determine linguistic_convention unlike determine modal fact straightforwardly