Molyneuxâs question and the phenomenology of shape
William Molyneux raised the following question: if a congenital blind person is made to see, and is visually presented with a cube and a globe, would he be able to call the shapes before him a cube and a globe before touching them? Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz, and Reid presented their phenomenological view of shape perception, i.e. their view as to what it is like to perceive shape by sight and touch, in responding to Molyneuxâs Question. The four philosophers shared the view that visual perception delivers no solid shape. This view would provide a premise for an argument for immaterial objects. The purpose of my thesis is to reject that argument. Kantâs view and John Campbellâs externalist account offer a way to reject the premise of the argument in question. However, my strategy is not to adopt their view. I pursue Reichenbachâs view that the there is no congruence or incongruence involved in the visual phenomenology. I develop his view, and propose the view that visual perception delivers no flat or solid shape. Although my view endorses the premise in question, I can offer a way to reject the argument. This is because my view is compatible with a form of externalism about perception (which differs
Shimizu, Shogo
BD Speculative Philosophy
Molyneuxâs question and the phenomenology of shape. William Molyneux raised the following question: if a congenital blind person is made to see, and is visually presented with a cube and a globe, would he be able to call the shapes before him a cube and a globe before touching them? Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz, and Reid presented their phenomenological view of shape perception, i.e. their view as to what it is like to perceive shape by sight and touch, in responding to Molyneuxâs Question. The four philosophers shared the view that visual perception delivers no solid shape. This view would provide a premise for an argument for immaterial objects. The purpose of my thesis is to reject that argument. Kantâs view and John Campbellâs externalist account offer a way to reject the premise of the argument in question. However, my strategy is not to adopt their view. I pursue Reichenbachâs view that the there is no congruence or incongruence involved in the visual phenomenology. I develop his view, and propose the view that visual perception delivers no flat or solid shape. Although my view endorses the premise in question, I can offer a way to reject the argument. This is because my view is compatible with a form of externalism about perception (which differs
question phenomenology shape william raise follow_question blind person make see visually present globe would able call shape globe touch locke berkeley leibniz present phenomenological view shape_perception view like perceive shape sight touch respond question philosopher share view visual_perception delivers solid shape view would_provide premise_argument immaterial object purpose reject argument kant view john campbell externalist account offer way reject premise_argument question however strategy_adopt view pursue view congruence involve visual phenomenology develop view propose view visual_perception delivers flat solid shape although view endorses premise question offer way reject argument view compatible form externalism perception differs