The unruly mind : against doxastic normativism
This thesis is an evaluation of doxastic normativism. Doxastic normativism is the theory that belief is essentially normative, and that the norm of belief is a constitutive norm. After introducing the taxonomy of normativist views I use throughout the thesis, I discuss four versions of doxastic normativism: state normativism, conceptual normativism, intentional teleologism, and teleo-functionalism. The first two are those traditionally referred to as aÌÂÂdoxastic normativismaÌÂÂ, and they are the main targets of the thesis. Discussion of the second two is less extensive, and serves to show that the central problem for normativism lies not in the kind of normativity that it claims is essential to belief, but in the attempt to make any normative property whatsoever a necessary condition for belief. I develop undercutting objections to two arguments for state normativism and to one argument for conceptual normativism. My objections draw on i.a. the semantics of correctness ascriptions, the norms of other intentional states, the nature of rationality, and the evidential sensitivity of belief. Then there are several rebutting objections, drawing on non-agential mental states, the normative classification
Schnurr, Johanna Magdalena
The unruly mind : against doxastic normativism. This thesis is an evaluation of doxastic normativism. Doxastic normativism is the theory that belief is essentially normative, and that the norm of belief is a constitutive norm. After introducing the taxonomy of normativist views I use throughout the thesis, I discuss four versions of doxastic normativism: state normativism, conceptual normativism, intentional teleologism, and teleo-functionalism. The first two are those traditionally referred to as aÌÂÂdoxastic normativismaÌÂÂ, and they are the main targets of the thesis. Discussion of the second two is less extensive, and serves to show that the central problem for normativism lies not in the kind of normativity that it claims is essential to belief, but in the attempt to make any normative property whatsoever a necessary condition for belief. I develop undercutting objections to two arguments for state normativism and to one argument for conceptual normativism. My objections draw on i.a. the semantics of correctness ascriptions, the norms of other intentional states, the nature of rationality, and the evidential sensitivity of belief. Then there are several rebutting objections, drawing on non-agential mental states, the normative classification
mind doxastic evaluation doxastic doxastic theory belief essentially normative norm belief constitutive norm introduce taxonomy view use throughout discuss version doxastic state conceptual intentional functionalism first_two traditionally refer main target thesis discussion second less extensive serve show central problem lie kind normativity claim essential belief attempt_make normative property whatsoever necessary_condition belief develop objection argument state argument conceptual objection draw semantics correctness ascription norm intentional_state nature_rationality evidential sensitivity belief several rebut objection draw non mental_state normative classification