A chance for possibility : an investigation into the grounds of modality
The thesis defends the view that the (non-epistemic) modal realm is tripartite: truths about possible worlds supervene on modal truths, which in turn supervene on truths about objective chances. An understanding of supervenience is developed whichâunlike the standard understanding of supervenience as a purely modal notionâallows the question of what modal truths supervene on to have a non-trivial answer. Relying on this understanding, a negative result is established: modal truths do not supervene on truths about possible worlds, whether possible worlds are conceived of as Lewisian mereological sums of concrete individuals or as abstract objects of some kind. Instead, a conception of abstract possible worlds is developed and defended according to which the direction of supervenience is the reverse. This leaves the question of whether modal truths themselves supervene on still more basic truths. It is argued that it should be answered in the affirmative. Our use of natural language âmightâ and âmight haveâ sentencesâof those sentences with which we express non-epistemic possibility before we enter the philosophy classroomâprovide evidence that modal truths supervene on truths about objective
Steinberg, A. T.
A chance for possibility : an investigation into the grounds of modality. The thesis defends the view that the (non-epistemic) modal realm is tripartite: truths about possible worlds supervene on modal truths, which in turn supervene on truths about objective chances. An understanding of supervenience is developed whichâunlike the standard understanding of supervenience as a purely modal notionâallows the question of what modal truths supervene on to have a non-trivial answer. Relying on this understanding, a negative result is established: modal truths do not supervene on truths about possible worlds, whether possible worlds are conceived of as Lewisian mereological sums of concrete individuals or as abstract objects of some kind. Instead, a conception of abstract possible worlds is developed and defended according to which the direction of supervenience is the reverse. This leaves the question of whether modal truths themselves supervene on still more basic truths. It is argued that it should be answered in the affirmative. Our use of natural language âmightâ and âmight haveâ sentencesâof those sentences with which we express non-epistemic possibility before we enter the philosophy classroomâprovide evidence that modal truths supervene on truths about objective
chance possibility investigation ground modality defends view non epistemic modal realm tripartite truth possible_world supervene modal truth turn supervene truth objective chance supervenience develop unlike standard supervenience purely modal notion allow question modal truths supervene non_trivial answer negative establish modal truth supervene truth possible_world whether_possible world conceive mereological sum concrete individual abstract object kind instead conception abstract possible_world develop_defend accord direction supervenience reverse leaf question_whether modal truth supervene still basic truth argue answered affirmative use natural_language might might sentence sentence express non epistemic possibility enter philosophy classroom provide_evidence modal truth supervene truth objective