Resource egalitarianism as a realisation of relational justice in the distributive sphere : an analysis of personal and interpersonal responsibility
In this thesis I examine the role of personal and interpersonal responsibility in relational egalitarianism and argue that Dworkinâs resource egalitarianism should be understood as a means by which to realise this aspect of justice, rather than as a competing and incompatible comprehensive theory. I hope to show that resource egalitarianism neutralises the effects of brute luck, not merely so as to put âcosmic injusticesâ to rights, but to ensure, insofar as possible, that individuals can relate to one another on equitable terms by taking responsibility for the effects of their actions. I focus especially on Elizabeth Andersonâs criticisms of responsibility-catering distributive theories and attempt to demonstrate how the interpersonal conception of justification she identifies as the central feature of relational egalitarian theories underlies Dworkinâs hypothetical insurance mechanism. I argue that the distinction Dworkin draws between brute and option luck depends on a highly contextual conception of what it is reasonable to expect of one another under various circumstances, informed by the capabilities one cannot reasonably be expected to give up or risk losing. I draw out the relational egalitarian
Shanahan, G. D.
Resource egalitarianism as a realisation of relational justice in the distributive sphere : an analysis of personal and interpersonal responsibility. In this thesis I examine the role of personal and interpersonal responsibility in relational egalitarianism and argue that Dworkinâs resource egalitarianism should be understood as a means by which to realise this aspect of justice, rather than as a competing and incompatible comprehensive theory. I hope to show that resource egalitarianism neutralises the effects of brute luck, not merely so as to put âcosmic injusticesâ to rights, but to ensure, insofar as possible, that individuals can relate to one another on equitable terms by taking responsibility for the effects of their actions. I focus especially on Elizabeth Andersonâs criticisms of responsibility-catering distributive theories and attempt to demonstrate how the interpersonal conception of justification she identifies as the central feature of relational egalitarian theories underlies Dworkinâs hypothetical insurance mechanism. I argue that the distinction Dworkin draws between brute and option luck depends on a highly contextual conception of what it is reasonable to expect of one another under various circumstances, informed by the capabilities one cannot reasonably be expected to give up or risk losing. I draw out the relational egalitarian
resource egalitarianism realisation relational justice distributive sphere analysis personal_interpersonal responsibility examine_role personal_interpersonal responsibility relational egalitarianism argue resource egalitarianism understood mean realise aspect justice rather compete incompatible comprehensive theory hope_show resource egalitarianism effect brute luck merely put cosmic injustice right ensure insofar possible individual relate one_another equitable term take responsibility effect action focus especially elizabeth criticisms responsibility distributive theory attempt interpersonal conception justification identify central feature relational egalitarian theory underlies hypothetical insurance mechanism argue distinction draw brute option luck depend highly contextual conception reasonable expect one_another various circumstance inform capability reasonably expect give risk draw relational egalitarian