Individuals, society and the world : a defence of collective environmental duties
This thesis defends a collective duty to establish a global-level institution to tackle climate change. This is motivated through collective responsibility for environmental harm, and collective self-interest. Building on Larry May, it is contended that a number of individuals can be collectively responsible, in a weak but morally significant sense, for the (even unintended) predictable result of the combination of their individual acts. It is argued that this gives rise to a collective duty to remedy or end the harm, and correlative individual duties. The dominant intentionalist model of collectivities is rejected. Arguing against Margaret Gilbert, it is claimed that a collectivity is constituted by a set of individuals mutually dependent through some common goal, purpose or all-things-considered interest, whether or not they acknowledge it themselves. A capabilities model of human flourishing is defended, according to which it is not in someone's all-things-considered interest to be deprived of a central functional capability, on something like Martha Nussbaum's list. To undermine a person's capability to enjoy a central functioning is to do morally significant harm. It is argued that, especially for larger
Cripps, Elizabeth Blanche
Individuals, society and the world : a defence of collective environmental duties. This thesis defends a collective duty to establish a global-level institution to tackle climate change. This is motivated through collective responsibility for environmental harm, and collective self-interest. Building on Larry May, it is contended that a number of individuals can be collectively responsible, in a weak but morally significant sense, for the (even unintended) predictable result of the combination of their individual acts. It is argued that this gives rise to a collective duty to remedy or end the harm, and correlative individual duties. The dominant intentionalist model of collectivities is rejected. Arguing against Margaret Gilbert, it is claimed that a collectivity is constituted by a set of individuals mutually dependent through some common goal, purpose or all-things-considered interest, whether or not they acknowledge it themselves. A capabilities model of human flourishing is defended, according to which it is not in someone's all-things-considered interest to be deprived of a central functional capability, on something like Martha Nussbaum's list. To undermine a person's capability to enjoy a central functioning is to do morally significant harm. It is argued that, especially for larger
society world defence collective environmental duty defends collective duty establish global level institution tackle climate_change motivate collective responsibility environmental harm collective self_interest building may contend number_individual collectively responsible weak morally significant sense even unintended predictable combination individual act argue give_rise collective duty remedy end harm correlative individual duty dominant model reject arguing claim constitute set individual mutually dependent common goal purpose all things considered interest whether acknowledge themselves capability model human flourishing defend accord someone all things considered interest deprive central functional capability something_like martha_nussbaum list undermine person capability enjoy central function morally significant harm argue especially large