Singular thought and the nonexistent
I argue that a straightforward account of empty names can be given which allows them to contribute to the expression of thoughts, as seems to be the case. But that we can offer such an account does not mean that we should, as it should be conceded on all sides that what is happening in the case of empty names is radically different from what is happening in the case of non-empty names. Moreover, in the case of non-conniving uses of empty names, the subject is under a misapprehension, and so could be under the misapprehension that they are expressing a thought. Nevertheless, if we want to hold on to the truth of some singular negative existential claims, which is recognized as a desiderata even by those hostile to the intelligibility of empty names, we are forced to recognize that empty names can contribute to the expression of thoughts. But once we make this admission we then open the door to empty names being used to express other thoughts too. But that we can give a coherent account of empty names and singular negative existentials does not mean that we should be irrealists wherever we think we see empty names and true singular negative existentials. And I argue that this is the case with fictional names.
Walters, L.
Singular thought and the nonexistent. I argue that a straightforward account of empty names can be given which allows them to contribute to the expression of thoughts, as seems to be the case. But that we can offer such an account does not mean that we should, as it should be conceded on all sides that what is happening in the case of empty names is radically different from what is happening in the case of non-empty names. Moreover, in the case of non-conniving uses of empty names, the subject is under a misapprehension, and so could be under the misapprehension that they are expressing a thought. Nevertheless, if we want to hold on to the truth of some singular negative existential claims, which is recognized as a desiderata even by those hostile to the intelligibility of empty names, we are forced to recognize that empty names can contribute to the expression of thoughts. But once we make this admission we then open the door to empty names being used to express other thoughts too. But that we can give a coherent account of empty names and singular negative existentials does not mean that we should be irrealists wherever we think we see empty names and true singular negative existentials. And I argue that this is the case with fictional names.
singular think argue straightforward account empty names give allow contribute expression thought seem case offer_account mean concede side happen case empty name radically_different happen case non empty name moreover case non empty name subject could express thought nevertheless want hold truth singular negative existential claim recognize desideratum even hostile intelligibility empty name force recognize empty name contribute expression thought make admission open door empty name use_express thought too give coherent_account empty name singular negative mean wherever think_see empty name true singular negative argue case fictional name