The United Kingdom and Italy, between Bretton Woods and European monetary integration
This dissertation describes the formation of support for monetary integration among European countries in the period between 1968 and 1973, claiming that there was a clear connection between the demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the rise of support for a European solution to the subsequent monetary turmoil. During the late 1960s, the US administration's attitude of financing the economy through budgetary deficit put the dollar's credibility into question until, in the summer of 1971, fears of a worldwide ~bank run~ convinced US President Nixon to revoke the gold backing of the currency, hence marking the transition from the Bretton Woods ~gold exchange standard~ to a pure ~dollar standard~. However, monetary stability was too important to the European Economic Community, which in 1972 decided to narrow the Bretton Woods exchange rate margins among its members, creating a de facto ~snake~ within the ~tunnel~ of Bretton Woods. Historians of the international monetary system described the former part of this story, while historians of European integration focused on the latter. Little has been said on the links between the two processes, and on how they contributed to change the views of the different
Natali, Paolo
The United Kingdom and Italy, between Bretton Woods and European monetary integration. This dissertation describes the formation of support for monetary integration among European countries in the period between 1968 and 1973, claiming that there was a clear connection between the demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the rise of support for a European solution to the subsequent monetary turmoil. During the late 1960s, the US administration's attitude of financing the economy through budgetary deficit put the dollar's credibility into question until, in the summer of 1971, fears of a worldwide ~bank run~ convinced US President Nixon to revoke the gold backing of the currency, hence marking the transition from the Bretton Woods ~gold exchange standard~ to a pure ~dollar standard~. However, monetary stability was too important to the European Economic Community, which in 1972 decided to narrow the Bretton Woods exchange rate margins among its members, creating a de facto ~snake~ within the ~tunnel~ of Bretton Woods. Historians of the international monetary system described the former part of this story, while historians of European integration focused on the latter. Little has been said on the links between the two processes, and on how they contributed to change the views of the different
united kingdom italy european monetary integration describes formation support monetary integration among european_country period claim clear connection demise monetary_system rise support european solution subsequent monetary turmoil administration attitude finance economy deficit put credibility question fear worldwide bank run convince president nixon gold currency hence mark transition gold exchange standard pure standard however monetary stability important european economic community decide narrow exchange rate margin among member create facto within tunnel historians international monetary_system describe former part story historian european_integration focus latter little say link process contribute change view different