The form and scope of naturalised epistemology
This thesis is about the methodology of philosophy. In particular, it represents an attempt to answer the question 'What is it to do naturalised epistemology?' Naturalised epistemology has become a popular movement in the last thirty years, but there is no consensus as to what exactly it is to subscribe to this movement. In my thesis I locate what I call a ~core idea~ which is common to all conceptions of naturalised epistemology, portraying it as a philosophical movement with an inclusive attitude to empirical science. I then attempt to work out the way in which this ~core idea~ can best be developed into a defensible and broad programme of philosophical inquiry. Naturalism is also usually seen as a reaction against a prior philosophical orthodoxy; and I argue that the key respect in which naturalism should be seen as differing from earlier philosophical movements is in its rejection of the view that philosophical inquiry can be conducted <I>a priori. </I>I explore the consequences of this move for philosophical methodology, with particular reference to the problem of Cartesian scepticism.
Inglis, S.
The form and scope of naturalised epistemology. This thesis is about the methodology of philosophy. In particular, it represents an attempt to answer the question 'What is it to do naturalised epistemology?' Naturalised epistemology has become a popular movement in the last thirty years, but there is no consensus as to what exactly it is to subscribe to this movement. In my thesis I locate what I call a ~core idea~ which is common to all conceptions of naturalised epistemology, portraying it as a philosophical movement with an inclusive attitude to empirical science. I then attempt to work out the way in which this ~core idea~ can best be developed into a defensible and broad programme of philosophical inquiry. Naturalism is also usually seen as a reaction against a prior philosophical orthodoxy; and I argue that the key respect in which naturalism should be seen as differing from earlier philosophical movements is in its rejection of the view that philosophical inquiry can be conducted <I>a priori. </I>I explore the consequences of this move for philosophical methodology, with particular reference to the problem of Cartesian scepticism.
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