Practical reason: desires and imagination
This thesis offers an account of certain aspects of practical reason. The chief aim is to develop our understanding of practical rationality by undermining some of the connections which are thought to exist between explicit criteria and codifiable rules on the one hand, and practical reason on the other. The thesis begins with a consideration of the question of what reasons for action are constituted from. It is argued that a necessary component of any practical reason is a desire of the person for whoa the reason is a reason (Part One). Equipped with this account of practical reasons two rationalistic prejudices are then attacked. The first of these is the claim that it must be possible to formulate explicit criteria of rational choice which set the standards of deliberation over a wide range of deliberative problems. It is argued that this claim is undermined by an examination of the actual circumstances in which deliberation takes place. On the positive side it is then contended that an understanding of deliberation requires consideration of the process of deliberation, and that this leads, in particular, to a recognition of the important role of imaginative thinking in solving deliberative problems (Part
Dickson, Barnabas W.
Practical reason: desires and imagination. This thesis offers an account of certain aspects of practical reason. The chief aim is to develop our understanding of practical rationality by undermining some of the connections which are thought to exist between explicit criteria and codifiable rules on the one hand, and practical reason on the other. The thesis begins with a consideration of the question of what reasons for action are constituted from. It is argued that a necessary component of any practical reason is a desire of the person for whoa the reason is a reason (Part One). Equipped with this account of practical reasons two rationalistic prejudices are then attacked. The first of these is the claim that it must be possible to formulate explicit criteria of rational choice which set the standards of deliberation over a wide range of deliberative problems. It is argued that this claim is undermined by an examination of the actual circumstances in which deliberation takes place. On the positive side it is then contended that an understanding of deliberation requires consideration of the process of deliberation, and that this leads, in particular, to a recognition of the important role of imaginative thinking in solving deliberative problems (Part
practical_reason desire imagination offer_account certain_aspect practical_reason chief aim_develop practical_rationality undermine connection think exist explicit criterion rule one_hand practical_reason other begin consideration question reason_action constitute from argue necessary component practical_reason desire person reason reason part_one equipped account_practical reason rationalistic prejudice attack first claim must possible formulate explicit criterion rational_choice set standard deliberation wide_range deliberative problem argued claim undermine examination actual circumstance deliberation take_place positive side contend deliberation require consideration process deliberation lead particular recognition important_role imaginative think solve deliberative problem part