The separateness of persons
This thesis is concerned with how we might interpret the famous complaint that, (S) consequentialism fails to take seriously the distinction between persons. Chapter One introduces the Compensation View. On this view, (S) amounts to the claim that consequentialist moral conceptions, such as utilitarianism, fail to respect the fact of what I call the disunity of the group: an individual is not compensated for a burden that they undergo by another's receipt of a greater benefit. I explain the origins of the compensation view in Rawls' A Theory of Justice, and how the separateness of persons objection, (S), relates to the puzzle, leftover from Mill, of why utilitarians believe that individuals would, in any case, be motivated to pursue 'aggregate welfare' given that 'aggregate welfare' is not a good with which any individual can engage. Chapter Two describes how philosophers such as Rawls and Nozick attribute to the utilitarian interpretations of 'aggregate welfare' that answer both the questions of: (i) why utilitarians believe that individuals would be motivated to pursue aggregate welfare; and (ii) why the disunity of the group (the 'separateness of persons') may be overlooked in doing so. The attribution
Ali, S.
The separateness of persons. This thesis is concerned with how we might interpret the famous complaint that, (S) consequentialism fails to take seriously the distinction between persons. Chapter One introduces the Compensation View. On this view, (S) amounts to the claim that consequentialist moral conceptions, such as utilitarianism, fail to respect the fact of what I call the disunity of the group: an individual is not compensated for a burden that they undergo by another's receipt of a greater benefit. I explain the origins of the compensation view in Rawls' A Theory of Justice, and how the separateness of persons objection, (S), relates to the puzzle, leftover from Mill, of why utilitarians believe that individuals would, in any case, be motivated to pursue 'aggregate welfare' given that 'aggregate welfare' is not a good with which any individual can engage. Chapter Two describes how philosophers such as Rawls and Nozick attribute to the utilitarian interpretations of 'aggregate welfare' that answer both the questions of: (i) why utilitarians believe that individuals would be motivated to pursue aggregate welfare; and (ii) why the disunity of the group (the 'separateness of persons') may be overlooked in doing so. The attribution
person concerned might interpret famous complaint consequentialism fails take_seriously distinction person one_introduce compensation view view amount claim moral conception utilitarianism fail respect fact call group_individual compensate burden undergo another receipt great benefit explain origin compensation view rawls_theory justice person objection relate puzzle mill believe individual would case motivate pursue aggregate welfare give aggregate welfare good individual_engage describes philosopher rawls attribute utilitarian interpretation aggregate welfare answer_question believe individual would motivate pursue aggregate welfare group person may overlook attribution