Examining experience
I think visual experiences are intentional. And I think that different philosophical views about visual experience may be understood in terms of what they say about the intentionality of visual experience. In this thesis, I evaluate different views of experience and experiential intentionality by examining connections between experiential intentionality and further phenomenological, doxastic, epistemic and content-fixing features present in cases of perception and hallucination. I argue from consideration of such connections that visual experiences are intentionally directed on material objects with sensory qualities in their subjectâs environments. And I argue that there are some intentional features which are not constituted by experiential relations between the subject and such material objects with sensory qualities actually present in the subjectâs environment. For such features, we should accept a representational view of experiential intentionality.
Lakeman, G. J. T.
Examining experience. I think visual experiences are intentional. And I think that different philosophical views about visual experience may be understood in terms of what they say about the intentionality of visual experience. In this thesis, I evaluate different views of experience and experiential intentionality by examining connections between experiential intentionality and further phenomenological, doxastic, epistemic and content-fixing features present in cases of perception and hallucination. I argue from consideration of such connections that visual experiences are intentionally directed on material objects with sensory qualities in their subjectâs environments. And I argue that there are some intentional features which are not constituted by experiential relations between the subject and such material objects with sensory qualities actually present in the subjectâs environment. For such features, we should accept a representational view of experiential intentionality.
examining experience think visual experience intentional think different philosophical view visual experience may_understand term say intentionality visual experience evaluate_different view experience experiential intentionality examine_connection experiential intentionality phenomenological doxastic epistemic content feature present case perception hallucination argue consideration connection visual experience intentionally direct material_object sensory quality subject environment argue intentional feature constitute experiential relation subject material_object sensory quality actually present subject environment feature accept representational view experiential intentionality