Party to the hypothetical contract : obligation, legitimacy, and autonomy
Since Ronald Dworkin rubbished the idea that hypothetical consent could bind an agent in the same way that her actual consent does, social contract theorists have concentrated on refining a purely justificatory strategy for establishing moral and political principles. They have shied away from questions about why, and especially how, we are bound to keep off the grass when a suitably just government tells us to keep off the grass. I develop a sanction theory of obligation that explains the bindingness of obligations using the cost to an individual of undermining her practical identity. I then explicate the role of hypothetical consent as expanding a practical identity from core principles. To establish an individualâs hypothetical consent to some principle is to invite her to exact a cost from herself in terms of her own self-understanding if she violates it. Although an individual cannot act as her own commander, she can police her commitments. I also argue that our commitment to our practical identities can, and should, be voluntary since we aim to autonomously construct or endorse our identities on the basis of reasons. My goal is to reset the relationship between the social contract and obligation, explain
Fox, Carl
Party to the hypothetical contract : obligation, legitimacy, and autonomy. Since Ronald Dworkin rubbished the idea that hypothetical consent could bind an agent in the same way that her actual consent does, social contract theorists have concentrated on refining a purely justificatory strategy for establishing moral and political principles. They have shied away from questions about why, and especially how, we are bound to keep off the grass when a suitably just government tells us to keep off the grass. I develop a sanction theory of obligation that explains the bindingness of obligations using the cost to an individual of undermining her practical identity. I then explicate the role of hypothetical consent as expanding a practical identity from core principles. To establish an individualâs hypothetical consent to some principle is to invite her to exact a cost from herself in terms of her own self-understanding if she violates it. Although an individual cannot act as her own commander, she can police her commitments. I also argue that our commitment to our practical identities can, and should, be voluntary since we aim to autonomously construct or endorse our identities on the basis of reasons. My goal is to reset the relationship between the social contract and obligation, explain
party hypothetical contract obligation legitimacy autonomy since rubbish idea hypothetical consent could bind agent way actual consent social_contract theorist concentrate refine purely justificatory strategy establish moral_political principle away question especially bound keep grass suitably government tell keep grass develop sanction theory obligation explain obligation use cost individual undermining practical identity explicate role hypothetical consent expand practical identity core principle establish individual hypothetical consent principle invite exact cost term self_understanding although individual act commander police commitment also_argue commitment practical identity voluntary since aim autonomously construct endorse identity basis reason goal reset relationship social_contract obligation explain