Perception and common sense : a study of twentieth-century direct realism
This thesis is a critical examination of the direct realist theory of perception. A common-sense analysis of perception is defended against arguments which are widely believed to rule out the direct realist's notion of a direct contact with external physical reality. I argue that a common-sense version of direct realism can adequately account for hallucinations, perceptual relativity, perceptual illusions, severe time-lags and the causal processes involved in perception. The views of prominent, twentieth-century direct realists are critically examined with the intention of identifying constraints on any plausible direct realist theory of perception. I maintain that there are representationalist tensions in the work of leading, twentieth-century direct realists, and that a principal source of these representationalist tensions is their adherence to the common element thesis, the notion that hallucinations and genuine perceptions are the very same experience. Appealing to recent cognitive science experiments on the imagination, I defend a disjunctivist analysis of experience, one which holds that hallucinations and genuine perceptions involve fundamentally different experience-types, rather than sharing a common,
Taylor, Gerald G.
Perception and common sense : a study of twentieth-century direct realism. This thesis is a critical examination of the direct realist theory of perception. A common-sense analysis of perception is defended against arguments which are widely believed to rule out the direct realist's notion of a direct contact with external physical reality. I argue that a common-sense version of direct realism can adequately account for hallucinations, perceptual relativity, perceptual illusions, severe time-lags and the causal processes involved in perception. The views of prominent, twentieth-century direct realists are critically examined with the intention of identifying constraints on any plausible direct realist theory of perception. I maintain that there are representationalist tensions in the work of leading, twentieth-century direct realists, and that a principal source of these representationalist tensions is their adherence to the common element thesis, the notion that hallucinations and genuine perceptions are the very same experience. Appealing to recent cognitive science experiments on the imagination, I defend a disjunctivist analysis of experience, one which holds that hallucinations and genuine perceptions involve fundamentally different experience-types, rather than sharing a common,
perception common_sense study twentieth_century direct realism critical_examination direct realist theory perception common_sense analysis perception defend argument widely believe rule direct realist notion direct_contact external physical reality argue common_sense version direct realism adequately account hallucination perceptual relativity perceptual illusion severe time causal_process involve perception view prominent twentieth_century direct realist critically_examine intention identify constraint plausible direct realist theory perception maintain tension work lead twentieth_century direct realist principal_source tension adherence common element notion hallucination genuine perception experience recent cognitive_science imagination defend analysis experience hold hallucination genuine perception involve fundamentally_different experience types rather share_common