The nature of rationality : a critical analysis of the naturalistic view of rationality
This thesis aims to provide a theory of human rationality which is consistent with, and supportive of, the naturalistic approach to philosophy of mind. I analyse why the common tendency not to furnish a systematic and rigorous account of rationality is philosophically inadequate - namely, because this overlooks the critical role which the concept of rationality plays in the 'principle of charity' (Quine 1960; Davidson 1984) in philosophy of mind, which is a central part of a unified naturalistic approach to philosophy of mind and rationality. I aim to contribute to the field by rectifying this omission. I identify the theoretical commitments of any naturalistic approach to the theory of rationality - in particular, I argue for the neglected fact that naturalism commits us to an instrumental theory of rationality. I defend the theory of instrumental rationality against its critics, by means of elaborating the implications of the notion - also frequently overlooked - that the concept of rationality is one which applies paradigmatically to agents, rather than to reasoning processes considered in isolation (for example). The resultant instrumental theory of personal rationality which I develop and defend is characterised
Saunders, Clare Elaine
Reasoning; Self; Naturalism
The nature of rationality : a critical analysis of the naturalistic view of rationality. This thesis aims to provide a theory of human rationality which is consistent with, and supportive of, the naturalistic approach to philosophy of mind. I analyse why the common tendency not to furnish a systematic and rigorous account of rationality is philosophically inadequate - namely, because this overlooks the critical role which the concept of rationality plays in the 'principle of charity' (Quine 1960; Davidson 1984) in philosophy of mind, which is a central part of a unified naturalistic approach to philosophy of mind and rationality. I aim to contribute to the field by rectifying this omission. I identify the theoretical commitments of any naturalistic approach to the theory of rationality - in particular, I argue for the neglected fact that naturalism commits us to an instrumental theory of rationality. I defend the theory of instrumental rationality against its critics, by means of elaborating the implications of the notion - also frequently overlooked - that the concept of rationality is one which applies paradigmatically to agents, rather than to reasoning processes considered in isolation (for example). The resultant instrumental theory of personal rationality which I develop and defend is characterised
nature_rationality critical_analysis naturalistic view rationality aim_provide theory human rationality consistent supportive naturalistic philosophy_mind analyse common tendency furnish systematic rigorous account rationality philosophically inadequate namely overlook critical role concept rationality play principle charity quine davidson philosophy_mind central_part unify naturalistic philosophy_mind rationality aim_contribute field rectify omission identify theoretical commitment naturalistic theory rationality particular argue neglect fact naturalism commit instrumental theory rationality defend theory instrumental rationality critic mean elaborate implication notion also frequently overlook concept rationality apply paradigmatically agent rather reason process consider isolation example resultant instrumental theory personal rationality develop_defend characterise