Justice, legitimacy and political boundaries : the morality of border control
The general problem of the morality of borders is to determine what kind of borders liberal democracies ought to have. This in turn raises two particular problems. First to determine the nature of states entitlement to control the administration of political and territorial borders and second, to determine what constitutes to exercise this entitlement in fair terms. This thesis is devoted to the first particular problem. I distinguish two kinds of approaches to legitimate border control: justice-based accounts and legitimacy oriented accounts. I argue that justice-based accounts are inappropriate to frame and address the legitimacy problem of borders because they typically merely assume that a set of institutions apply to those over whom coercion is exercised. But these accounts never provide an explanation about why we (and not others) have legitimate rights over territorial borders. This standard objection shows that these views fail to reach the boundary problem, but it does not say why. In this thesis I advance an explanation. I say that justice-based accounts are unfit to address problems of borders. The idea is that justice-based is a simplified account tailored to the problem of public justification,
Camacho, Enrique
JV Colonies and colonization. Emigration and immigration. International migration
Justice, legitimacy and political boundaries : the morality of border control. The general problem of the morality of borders is to determine what kind of borders liberal democracies ought to have. This in turn raises two particular problems. First to determine the nature of states entitlement to control the administration of political and territorial borders and second, to determine what constitutes to exercise this entitlement in fair terms. This thesis is devoted to the first particular problem. I distinguish two kinds of approaches to legitimate border control: justice-based accounts and legitimacy oriented accounts. I argue that justice-based accounts are inappropriate to frame and address the legitimacy problem of borders because they typically merely assume that a set of institutions apply to those over whom coercion is exercised. But these accounts never provide an explanation about why we (and not others) have legitimate rights over territorial borders. This standard objection shows that these views fail to reach the boundary problem, but it does not say why. In this thesis I advance an explanation. I say that justice-based accounts are unfit to address problems of borders. The idea is that justice-based is a simplified account tailored to the problem of public justification,
justice legitimacy political boundary morality border control general problem morality border determine kind border liberal_democracy ought have turn raise particular problem first determine_nature state control administration political territorial border second determine constitutes exercise fair term devote first particular problem distinguish_two kind approach legitimate border control justice based_account legitimacy orient account argue justice based_account inappropriate frame address legitimacy problem border typically merely assume set institution apply coercion exercise account never provide_explanation others legitimate right territorial border standard objection show view fail reach boundary problem say why advance explanation say justice based_account unfit address_problem border idea justice based account tailor problem public justification