Ways of thinking : an essay on referential coordination
Referential coordination occurs when a thinker is rational in treating her thoughts as being about the same thing. This is manifested primarily in the thinker's dispositions to make inferences, paradigmatically the disposition to infer an existential generalisation conjoining two or more properties without recourse to an additional premise concerning an identity. It therefore presents an indispensable way for identity to figure in thought. This topic is often addressed in the form of discussions of so-called Frege cases, identity judgements, or coreference de jure. I argue that referential coordination should be treated as an independent and prior explanatory problem. The problem referential coordination presents is to explain the rationality of the paradigmatic inferential dispositions. I discuss three prominent theories of thought in relation to this problem: the appeal to propositional contents akin to Frege's notion of sense; the appeal to mental representations that can be typed in some way; and the appeal to mental files and their functional properties. Representatives of these theories fail to provide an explanation that is at once non-circular, psychologically realistic, and sufficiently general. I
Clarke, H. H. P.
Ways of thinking : an essay on referential coordination. Referential coordination occurs when a thinker is rational in treating her thoughts as being about the same thing. This is manifested primarily in the thinker's dispositions to make inferences, paradigmatically the disposition to infer an existential generalisation conjoining two or more properties without recourse to an additional premise concerning an identity. It therefore presents an indispensable way for identity to figure in thought. This topic is often addressed in the form of discussions of so-called Frege cases, identity judgements, or coreference de jure. I argue that referential coordination should be treated as an independent and prior explanatory problem. The problem referential coordination presents is to explain the rationality of the paradigmatic inferential dispositions. I discuss three prominent theories of thought in relation to this problem: the appeal to propositional contents akin to Frege's notion of sense; the appeal to mental representations that can be typed in some way; and the appeal to mental files and their functional properties. Representatives of these theories fail to provide an explanation that is at once non-circular, psychologically realistic, and sufficiently general. I
thinking essay referential coordination referential coordination occur thinker rational thought thing manifest primarily thinker disposition make inference paradigmatically disposition infer existential generalisation conjoin property without recourse additional premise concern identity therefore present indispensable way identity figure thought topic often address form discussion so_called frege case identity judgement argue referential coordination treat independent prior explanatory problem problem referential coordination present explain rationality paradigmatic inferential disposition discus_three prominent theory think relation problem appeal propositional content akin frege notion sense appeal mental_representation type way appeal mental file functional_property theory fail provide_explanation non circular psychologically realistic sufficiently general