Self-representationalism and the Russellian ignorance hypothesis : a hybrid response to the problem of consciousness
This thesis aims to provide a compelling and distinctive response to the Problem of Consciousness. This is achieved by offering a bipartite analysis of the epistemic gap at the heart of that problem, and by building upon the hypothesis that the apparent problem is symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical. Chapter 1 introduces the problem. The key question is whether phenomenal consciousness is onticly dependent on the physical, or onticly independent of it. There are powerful arguments for the Primitivist view that consciousness is independent of the physical. These arguments rest on the apparent epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. I propose that this apparent gap must be understood as a composite of two deeper conceptual gaps pertaining to the subjective character and qualitative character of consciousness respectively. The ââtivity gap' claims that physical states are objective, phenomenal states are subjective and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ââtrinsicality gap' claims that physical properties are extrinsic (structural), that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic (non-structural) and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic
McClelland, Thomas William
BF0309 Consciousness. Cognition Including learning, attention, comprehension, memory, imagination, genius, intelligence, thought and thinking, psycholinguistics, mental fatigue
Self-representationalism and the Russellian ignorance hypothesis : a hybrid response to the problem of consciousness. This thesis aims to provide a compelling and distinctive response to the Problem of Consciousness. This is achieved by offering a bipartite analysis of the epistemic gap at the heart of that problem, and by building upon the hypothesis that the apparent problem is symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical. Chapter 1 introduces the problem. The key question is whether phenomenal consciousness is onticly dependent on the physical, or onticly independent of it. There are powerful arguments for the Primitivist view that consciousness is independent of the physical. These arguments rest on the apparent epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. I propose that this apparent gap must be understood as a composite of two deeper conceptual gaps pertaining to the subjective character and qualitative character of consciousness respectively. The ââtivity gap' claims that physical states are objective, phenomenal states are subjective and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ââtrinsicality gap' claims that physical properties are extrinsic (structural), that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic (non-structural) and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic
self representationalism russellian ignorance hypothesis hybrid response_problem consciousness aim_provide compel distinctive response_problem consciousness achieve offer analysis epistemic gap heart problem build_upon hypothesis apparent problem symptomatic limited conception physical introduces problem key_question whether phenomenal_consciousness dependent physical independent powerful argument view consciousness independent physical argument rest apparent epistemic gap physical phenomenal propose apparent gap must_understand composite deep conceptual gap pertain subjective character qualitative character consciousness respectively gap claim physical state objective phenomenal state subjective entailment objective subjective gap claim physical_property extrinsic structural phenomenal quality intrinsic non structural entailment extrinsic