Common sense and metaphysics in the philosophy of perception
The fundamental and unargued assumption of the philosophy of perception is that there is such a thing as perception: where it appears explicitly, it is in the guise of common sense. Thus, it appears to corroborate the even more fundamental assumption that philosophy is an inquiry into ordinary questions, and, therefore, begins with concepts or ways of thinking which are non-philosophical. This thesis contrasts that theory with the arguments practised by philosophers of perception. Arguments which move from what you do believe to what you should believe are most effectively undermined by denying their premisses: the most pressing reasons for unmasking the technical language of philosophy is the need to ascertain whether you really do believe the things that philosophers say you do. I deal with those ideas, such as 'the senses' and 'seeing', which are used to slip to both 'perception' and the pretence that this is an ordinary idea. These belong to a tradition of thinking which makes the assumptions familiar, often even outwith philosophy. It is therefore imperative to distinguish the ordinary use to which such expressions are put from the ways in which philosophers employ them. The same applies to the very particular
Wilkie, S.
Common sense and metaphysics in the philosophy of perception. The fundamental and unargued assumption of the philosophy of perception is that there is such a thing as perception: where it appears explicitly, it is in the guise of common sense. Thus, it appears to corroborate the even more fundamental assumption that philosophy is an inquiry into ordinary questions, and, therefore, begins with concepts or ways of thinking which are non-philosophical. This thesis contrasts that theory with the arguments practised by philosophers of perception. Arguments which move from what you do believe to what you should believe are most effectively undermined by denying their premisses: the most pressing reasons for unmasking the technical language of philosophy is the need to ascertain whether you really do believe the things that philosophers say you do. I deal with those ideas, such as 'the senses' and 'seeing', which are used to slip to both 'perception' and the pretence that this is an ordinary idea. These belong to a tradition of thinking which makes the assumptions familiar, often even outwith philosophy. It is therefore imperative to distinguish the ordinary use to which such expressions are put from the ways in which philosophers employ them. The same applies to the very particular
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