Natural kinds in affective science
In this thesis I argue that the category of emotion is a social natural kind and that this claim has implications for the scientific study of emotion. It is a social kind because it includes social features that are necessary for the explanation of emotional phenomena. It is a natural kind because it is a stable property cluster which shows an aptness for successful induction and explanation. In chapter 1 I introduce the main views on natural kinds in affective science. I present three different views to claim that all three rely heavily on an influential psychological theory, namely Basic Emotion Theory. I claim that the natural kind status of several affective phenomena is not exclusively a metaphysical or philosophical issue and show its implications for interpreting experimental data and designing experiments. This thesis is divided in two parts. Part A (chapters 2 and 3) deals with the metaphysics of natural kinds and social kinds. In chapter 2 I outline and reject the traditional view of natural kinds (essentialism) in favour of an epistemological view where natural kinds are property clusters showing an aptness for successful induction and explanation of the phenomena included in them. The epistemological
Farina, Lydia
Social Construction ; Natural kinds ; Emotion ; Affective science
Natural kinds in affective science. In this thesis I argue that the category of emotion is a social natural kind and that this claim has implications for the scientific study of emotion. It is a social kind because it includes social features that are necessary for the explanation of emotional phenomena. It is a natural kind because it is a stable property cluster which shows an aptness for successful induction and explanation. In chapter 1 I introduce the main views on natural kinds in affective science. I present three different views to claim that all three rely heavily on an influential psychological theory, namely Basic Emotion Theory. I claim that the natural kind status of several affective phenomena is not exclusively a metaphysical or philosophical issue and show its implications for interpreting experimental data and designing experiments. This thesis is divided in two parts. Part A (chapters 2 and 3) deals with the metaphysics of natural kinds and social kinds. In chapter 2 I outline and reject the traditional view of natural kinds (essentialism) in favour of an epistemological view where natural kinds are property clusters showing an aptness for successful induction and explanation of the phenomena included in them. The epistemological
natural_kind affective science argue category emotion social natural_kind claim implication scientific study emotion social kind include social feature necessary explanation emotional phenomenon natural_kind stable property cluster show successful induction explanation introduce main view natural_kind affective science present three_different view claim rely_heavily influential psychological_theory namely basic emotion theory claim natural_kind status several affective phenomenon exclusively metaphysical philosophical_issue show implication interpret experimental_data design experiment divide_two_part part_deal metaphysics natural_kind social kind outline reject traditional_view natural_kind essentialism favour epistemological view natural_kind property cluster show successful induction explanation_phenomenon include them epistemological