On judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar
This thesis explores conceptions of judgement which have been central to various philosophical and scientific traditions. Beginning with Hume, I situate his conception of judgement within his overarching constructivist program, his science of man. Defending Hume from criticism regarding the naturalistic credentials of this program, I argue that Humeâs science of man, along with the conception of judgement which is integral to it, is appropriately understood as a forerunner to contemporary cognitive science. Despite this, I contend that Humeâs conception of judgement prompts a problem regarding the intentionality of judgement â a problem which he does not adequately address. In the second part of my thesis I show how the intentionality problem which Hume grapples with is also crucial, constituting a point of departure, for Kantâs transcendental undertaking. Following Kantâs reasoning, I illustrate how an original concern with this intentionality issue leads Kant to a distinct conception of judgement, according to which concepts only exist in the context of a judgement. Having arrived at Kantâs conception of a judgement, the remainder of the thesis is devoted to the issue of judgement forms. Kantâs
Kirkby, David James
On judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar. This thesis explores conceptions of judgement which have been central to various philosophical and scientific traditions. Beginning with Hume, I situate his conception of judgement within his overarching constructivist program, his science of man. Defending Hume from criticism regarding the naturalistic credentials of this program, I argue that Humeâs science of man, along with the conception of judgement which is integral to it, is appropriately understood as a forerunner to contemporary cognitive science. Despite this, I contend that Humeâs conception of judgement prompts a problem regarding the intentionality of judgement â a problem which he does not adequately address. In the second part of my thesis I show how the intentionality problem which Hume grapples with is also crucial, constituting a point of departure, for Kantâs transcendental undertaking. Following Kantâs reasoning, I illustrate how an original concern with this intentionality issue leads Kant to a distinct conception of judgement, according to which concepts only exist in the context of a judgement. Having arrived at Kantâs conception of a judgement, the remainder of the thesis is devoted to the issue of judgement forms. Kantâs
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