An apology for materialism
It is natural to suppose that mental and physical properties are importantly distinct. Yet whatever this difference is, it has to be compatible with interaction between the mind and the body. Satisfaction of these desiderata leads to a paradox. If you make the mind strongly separate from the body, then there is the problem of bringing them together. If you unite them, then there is the problem of preserving their distinctiveness. It is the aim of this thesis to resolve the paradox. From the outset, it is assumed that the nature of interaction is most satisfactorily explained by an account of mental properties in monistic terms. For reasons for space, the arguments of Materialism are concentrated upon at the exposure of Idealism. Three strategies are examined, and found wanting. First, an instance of a non-reductive account provided by Davidson's 'Anomalous Monism'. Here, mental properties seem to be left with no role in influencing behaviour. Second, a review of reductionist accounts, ranging from Identity Theories to Representationalism. Criticism focuses upon the failure of reductionism to explain the connection between the function of a conscious state and its particular character. A Materialist treats
Renton, Alistair
philosophy ; Agnostic Materialism ; mental properties ; physical properties ; paradox ; Materialism ; Idealism ; interaction between the mind and the body ; scientific explanation
An apology for materialism. It is natural to suppose that mental and physical properties are importantly distinct. Yet whatever this difference is, it has to be compatible with interaction between the mind and the body. Satisfaction of these desiderata leads to a paradox. If you make the mind strongly separate from the body, then there is the problem of bringing them together. If you unite them, then there is the problem of preserving their distinctiveness. It is the aim of this thesis to resolve the paradox. From the outset, it is assumed that the nature of interaction is most satisfactorily explained by an account of mental properties in monistic terms. For reasons for space, the arguments of Materialism are concentrated upon at the exposure of Idealism. Three strategies are examined, and found wanting. First, an instance of a non-reductive account provided by Davidson's 'Anomalous Monism'. Here, mental properties seem to be left with no role in influencing behaviour. Second, a review of reductionist accounts, ranging from Identity Theories to Representationalism. Criticism focuses upon the failure of reductionism to explain the connection between the function of a conscious state and its particular character. A Materialist treats
apology materialism natural suppose mental_physical property importantly distinct yet whatever difference compatible interaction mind_body satisfaction desideratum lead paradox make mind strongly separate body problem bring_together unite problem distinctiveness aim resolve paradox outset assumed nature interaction satisfactorily explain account mental_property term reason space argument materialism concentrate_upon exposure idealism strategy examine find wanting first_instance non_reductive account provide davidson anomalous monism mental_property seem leave role influence behaviour second review reductionist account range identity theories representationalism criticism focus_upon failure reductionism explain connection function conscious state particular character materialist treat