Grounding and explanation
This thesis defends the notion of grounding â an explanatory connection of non-causal determination. I present four challenges to developing a systematic theory of grounding, and show that they can be met satisfactorily. The first challenge is that grounding is unintelligible or uninformativeâor at any rate, that its work can be done by more familiar notions. If so, the notion of grounding is not even prima facie justified. I argue that grounding is at least as informative asâand, in some respects, more informative thanâthe more familiar notions it is supposed to supplant. It is necessary because we can express with it certain explanatory relation-ships which are just inexpressible with weaker notions of determination. My defence of grounding is preferable to extant defences since it is less concessive, requiring fewer assumptions about the nature of grounding. A key motivation for grounding is that it is an explanatory connection. The second challenge is that the sense in which grounding is a (distinctly) explanatory relation is unclear, wherefore the case for grounding is severely weakened. I motivate a theory of explanation and argue that it comports nicely with the sense in which grounding is explanatory.
Bodle, Matthew James
Grounding and explanation. This thesis defends the notion of grounding â an explanatory connection of non-causal determination. I present four challenges to developing a systematic theory of grounding, and show that they can be met satisfactorily. The first challenge is that grounding is unintelligible or uninformativeâor at any rate, that its work can be done by more familiar notions. If so, the notion of grounding is not even prima facie justified. I argue that grounding is at least as informative asâand, in some respects, more informative thanâthe more familiar notions it is supposed to supplant. It is necessary because we can express with it certain explanatory relation-ships which are just inexpressible with weaker notions of determination. My defence of grounding is preferable to extant defences since it is less concessive, requiring fewer assumptions about the nature of grounding. A key motivation for grounding is that it is an explanatory connection. The second challenge is that the sense in which grounding is a (distinctly) explanatory relation is unclear, wherefore the case for grounding is severely weakened. I motivate a theory of explanation and argue that it comports nicely with the sense in which grounding is explanatory.
grounding explanation defends notion ground explanatory connection non_causal determination present challenge develop systematic theory grounding show meet satisfactorily first challenge ground unintelligible rate work familiar notion notion ground even prima_facie justified argue ground least informative respect informative familiar notion suppose supplant necessary express certain explanatory relation weak notion determination defence ground preferable extant defence since less concessive require few assumption nature grounding key motivation ground explanatory connection second challenge sense grounding distinctly explanatory relation unclear case ground severely weaken motivate theory explanation_argue sense ground explanatory