Is there an exit strategy from a preventive war? : the opposing cases of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) and Rome in the Macedonian Wars (214-205 BC) through the lens of International Relations' theory
It was once said that âif Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to endure forever?â (J. J. Rousseau, âSocial Contract, Discoursesâ, B.III.ch. IX). The Peloponnesian and Macedonian wars have been scrutinized to the extent that the surviving sources may allow for it, but they have never been put under the magnifying glass in terms of International Relationsâ schools of thought, namely âRealistsâ, âRationalistsâ and âRevolutionistsâ, despite their striking similarities as to the prevention of competing stateâs ascending power, as well as of their underlying dissimilarities regarding the respective exit strategies followed from the said preventive wars. This thesis brings together the principal episodes of these two war periods placing particular emphasis on notions of power, international anarchy, morality, security dilemma which all answer as to why the wars started, how they were fought and how they were ended. Furthermore, I extrapolate these deductions into the future in an attempt to forecast the main constants of great power behaviour in a similar situation of preventive wars. In this regard I demonstrate that âRealismâ may provide the best toolkit not exclusively at
Zafeirakos, Theofilos Ioannis
Is there an exit strategy from a preventive war? : the opposing cases of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) and Rome in the Macedonian Wars (214-205 BC) through the lens of International Relations' theory. It was once said that âif Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to endure forever?â (J. J. Rousseau, âSocial Contract, Discoursesâ, B.III.ch. IX). The Peloponnesian and Macedonian wars have been scrutinized to the extent that the surviving sources may allow for it, but they have never been put under the magnifying glass in terms of International Relationsâ schools of thought, namely âRealistsâ, âRationalistsâ and âRevolutionistsâ, despite their striking similarities as to the prevention of competing stateâs ascending power, as well as of their underlying dissimilarities regarding the respective exit strategies followed from the said preventive wars. This thesis brings together the principal episodes of these two war periods placing particular emphasis on notions of power, international anarchy, morality, security dilemma which all answer as to why the wars started, how they were fought and how they were ended. Furthermore, I extrapolate these deductions into the future in an attempt to forecast the main constants of great power behaviour in a similar situation of preventive wars. In this regard I demonstrate that âRealismâ may provide the best toolkit not exclusively at
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