The ethics of war
Pronouncing an action or course of actions to be prohibited, permitted or obligatory by Just War theory does not thereby establish the moral grounds of that prohibition, permission or obligation; nor does such a pronouncement have sufficient persuasive force to govern actions in the public arena. So what are the moral grounds of laws concerning war, and what ought the laws to be? I work within a Just War framework, adopting the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. From there, I argue that rules governing conduct in war can be morally grounded in a form of rule-consequentialism of negative duties; rules aiming to achieve optimal results regarding the prevention of the violation of certain rights. Rules governing the war decision itself are grounded in self-defence and a duty to rescue; the locus of rightful authority to use force is dependent on institutional design. Looking towards the public rules, I argue for a new interpretation of some existing law, and in some cases new law. These include recognising rights of encompassing groups to necessary self-defence; recognising a duty to rescue; weapons and tactics that asymmetrically remove risk should be assessed on whether their use violates discrimination;
Lamb, Antony Edward
The ethics of war. Pronouncing an action or course of actions to be prohibited, permitted or obligatory by Just War theory does not thereby establish the moral grounds of that prohibition, permission or obligation; nor does such a pronouncement have sufficient persuasive force to govern actions in the public arena. So what are the moral grounds of laws concerning war, and what ought the laws to be? I work within a Just War framework, adopting the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. From there, I argue that rules governing conduct in war can be morally grounded in a form of rule-consequentialism of negative duties; rules aiming to achieve optimal results regarding the prevention of the violation of certain rights. Rules governing the war decision itself are grounded in self-defence and a duty to rescue; the locus of rightful authority to use force is dependent on institutional design. Looking towards the public rules, I argue for a new interpretation of some existing law, and in some cases new law. These include recognising rights of encompassing groups to necessary self-defence; recognising a duty to rescue; weapons and tactics that asymmetrically remove risk should be assessed on whether their use violates discrimination;
ethic war action course action prohibit permit obligatory war theory thereby establish moral_ground prohibition permission obligation pronouncement sufficient persuasive force govern action public arena moral_ground law concern war ought law work within war framework_adopt distinction argue rule govern conduct war morally ground form rule consequentialism negative duty rule aim_achieve optimal regard prevention violation certain right govern war decision ground self defence duty rescue locus rightful authority use force dependent institutional design looking towards public rule argue new_interpretation exist law case new law include recognise right encompass group necessary self defence recognise duty rescue weapon tactic remove risk assess_whether use violate discrimination