Innovation and development in the psychology and epistemology of Epictetus
The subject of this thesis is the relationship of the psychology and epistemology of the philosopher Epictetus (c.55-135 A.D.) to the Stoic tradition to which he belonged. Epictetus' psychology is characterised by the subsuming of psychological functions and development under the single term prohairesis, and his epistemology under a corresponding term 'use of impressions' (chrĂȘsis phantasiĂŽn); the two terms being used largely interchangeably. The status of the prohairesis as a faculty is investigated and it is concluded that it is the principal over-arching faculty of the governing-principle of the soul (hĂȘgemonikon), and thus occupies a similar position to that occupied by Reason (logos) in the Stoic tradition. Prohairesis is used to define the 'end' and 'good' for man in Epictetus' teaching, displacing 'wisdom' and 'virtue' with 'prohairesis as it ought to be'. Epictetus thus seeks to reflect the concerns of the 'person making progress' by making the end an extreme point on a continuum of mental and moral states on which he already occupies a place. The self-contemplating ability of prohairesis allows it to be used to define the human self as a single unified consciousness, and also distinguish it from
Girdwood, Allan Browning
Knowledge, Theory of ; Psychology ; History ; Stoics
Innovation and development in the psychology and epistemology of Epictetus. The subject of this thesis is the relationship of the psychology and epistemology of the philosopher Epictetus (c.55-135 A.D.) to the Stoic tradition to which he belonged. Epictetus' psychology is characterised by the subsuming of psychological functions and development under the single term prohairesis, and his epistemology under a corresponding term 'use of impressions' (chrĂȘsis phantasiĂŽn); the two terms being used largely interchangeably. The status of the prohairesis as a faculty is investigated and it is concluded that it is the principal over-arching faculty of the governing-principle of the soul (hĂȘgemonikon), and thus occupies a similar position to that occupied by Reason (logos) in the Stoic tradition. Prohairesis is used to define the 'end' and 'good' for man in Epictetus' teaching, displacing 'wisdom' and 'virtue' with 'prohairesis as it ought to be'. Epictetus thus seeks to reflect the concerns of the 'person making progress' by making the end an extreme point on a continuum of mental and moral states on which he already occupies a place. The self-contemplating ability of prohairesis allows it to be used to define the human self as a single unified consciousness, and also distinguish it from
innovation development psychology epistemology subject relationship psychology epistemology philosopher stoic tradition belong psychology characterise subsume psychological function development single term epistemology correspond term use impression term use largely status faculty investigate concluded principal over faculty governing principle soul thus occupy similar position occupy reason logo stoic tradition use define end good man teaching displace wisdom virtue ought thus seek reflect concern person make_progress make end extreme point continuum mental moral state already occupy place self ability allow use define human self single unified consciousness also distinguish