A defense of a deflationary theory of self-deception
In this thesis I take the basic idea of self-deception to be that of believing something against good evidence to the contrary because you want it to be true. I then identify the central theoretical problem concerning this phenomenon as being that of giving an account of the explanatory connection between the desire and belief in real life cases of this sort. The two main approaches to answering this question in the philosophical literature are traditionalism and deflationism. Traditionalists hold that the desire leads to the belief by motivating the subject to intentionally acquire the belief, a belief he/she initially knows to be false/unwarranted (i.e., it motivates her to intentionally deceive herself), while deflationists deny this. I defend a deflationary account of how self-deceivers end up with their unwarranted beliefs, but one which differs from other deflationist accounts, either in substance or in emphasis, by trying to preserve a central role for agency and intentional action in the explanation and by trying to elucidate the nature of these culpable actions and intentions. Accordingly, an account is developed which holds that self-deceivers end up self-deceived because of their own actions, actions
Lynch, Kevin
BD Speculative Philosophy
A defense of a deflationary theory of self-deception. In this thesis I take the basic idea of self-deception to be that of believing something against good evidence to the contrary because you want it to be true. I then identify the central theoretical problem concerning this phenomenon as being that of giving an account of the explanatory connection between the desire and belief in real life cases of this sort. The two main approaches to answering this question in the philosophical literature are traditionalism and deflationism. Traditionalists hold that the desire leads to the belief by motivating the subject to intentionally acquire the belief, a belief he/she initially knows to be false/unwarranted (i.e., it motivates her to intentionally deceive herself), while deflationists deny this. I defend a deflationary account of how self-deceivers end up with their unwarranted beliefs, but one which differs from other deflationist accounts, either in substance or in emphasis, by trying to preserve a central role for agency and intentional action in the explanation and by trying to elucidate the nature of these culpable actions and intentions. Accordingly, an account is developed which holds that self-deceivers end up self-deceived because of their own actions, actions
defense deflationary theory self_deception take basic idea self_deception believe something good evidence contrary want true identify central theoretical_problem concern phenomenon give_account explanatory connection desire_belief real_life case sort two_main approach answer_question philosophical_literature hold desire lead belief motivate subject intentionally acquire belief belief she initially know false unwarranted motivate intentionally deceive deny this defend deflationary account self end unwarranted belief differs deflationist account either substance emphasis try preserve central_role agency intentional_action explanation try elucidate_nature action intention accordingly account developed hold self end self action action