Understanding in contemporary epistemology
My main aim is to contribute to the exploration of the nature of the epistemic state of understanding. It seems that the most productive way in which this might be done is by (i) investigating what sort of conditions must be fulfilled in order for one to understand, and (ii) comparing understandingâs place in certain contemporary debates to the place that knowledge has in those debates. Regarding conditions for understanding, I will argue that there are two types of understanding that are most relevant to epistemologyâobjectual understanding and atomistic understanding. I will contend that atomistic understanding is entirely factive while objectual understanding is moderately factive, that objectual understanding admits of degrees, that both types involve some sort of grasp of explanatory relations, that both possess a measure of luck immunity, and that both are cognitive achievements with instrumental, teleological, contributory and (crucially) final value. It must be stressed that the general accounts of both types of understanding that I attempt to provide are not supposed to be exhaustive sets of necessary and sufficient conditionsâI remain particularly open to the possibility that there are further
Gordon, Emma Catherine
philosophy ; epistemology understanding ; knowledge ; epistemic value
Understanding in contemporary epistemology. My main aim is to contribute to the exploration of the nature of the epistemic state of understanding. It seems that the most productive way in which this might be done is by (i) investigating what sort of conditions must be fulfilled in order for one to understand, and (ii) comparing understandingâs place in certain contemporary debates to the place that knowledge has in those debates. Regarding conditions for understanding, I will argue that there are two types of understanding that are most relevant to epistemologyâobjectual understanding and atomistic understanding. I will contend that atomistic understanding is entirely factive while objectual understanding is moderately factive, that objectual understanding admits of degrees, that both types involve some sort of grasp of explanatory relations, that both possess a measure of luck immunity, and that both are cognitive achievements with instrumental, teleological, contributory and (crucially) final value. It must be stressed that the general accounts of both types of understanding that I attempt to provide are not supposed to be exhaustive sets of necessary and sufficient conditionsâI remain particularly open to the possibility that there are further
contemporary epistemology main_aim contribute exploration nature epistemic state understanding seem productive way might investigate sort condition must fulfil order compare place certain contemporary_debate place knowledge debate regarding condition argue two_type relevant epistemology understanding contend entirely degree type involve sort grasp explanatory relation possess measure luck cognitive achievement instrumental teleological contributory crucially final value must stress general account type attempt_provide suppose exhaustive set necessary_sufficient condition remain particularly open_possibility