Imagining and reasoning : an attempt to define a clear conceptual distinction between two cognitive strategies available for the manipulation of information
In this study, I attempt to identify a distinct role for the imagination in manipulating and organising information states. To this end, I begin with an exegesis of Aristotle's account of phantasia in De Anima. I argue against two established views of the nature of Aristotle's phantasia-the view that phantasia is merely a faculty for apprehending appearances, and the view that it is a special catch all faculty for having ~non-paradigmatic sensory experiences~. I then continue to argue that for Aristotle, phantasia was a distinct faculty that discriminates between experiences by virtue of recognition. Once I have established the plausibility of such a position, I move from consideration of Aristotle's idea of phantasia to an account of recent evidence provided by cognitive science for distinguishing a capacity for manipulating information which is recognition based, and conceptually distinct from reason, or ~theory-driven~ thought. To this end, I appeal to evidence concerning the nature of spatial reasoning, and provide an exhaustive account of the ~Imagery Debate~ as paradigmatic of non-theory driven cognitive capacities. Finally, I provide an account of the mechanisms that underlie the efficacy and domain
Williams, Bryn Rhys
Aristotle; De Anima
Imagining and reasoning : an attempt to define a clear conceptual distinction between two cognitive strategies available for the manipulation of information. In this study, I attempt to identify a distinct role for the imagination in manipulating and organising information states. To this end, I begin with an exegesis of Aristotle's account of phantasia in De Anima. I argue against two established views of the nature of Aristotle's phantasia-the view that phantasia is merely a faculty for apprehending appearances, and the view that it is a special catch all faculty for having ~non-paradigmatic sensory experiences~. I then continue to argue that for Aristotle, phantasia was a distinct faculty that discriminates between experiences by virtue of recognition. Once I have established the plausibility of such a position, I move from consideration of Aristotle's idea of phantasia to an account of recent evidence provided by cognitive science for distinguishing a capacity for manipulating information which is recognition based, and conceptually distinct from reason, or ~theory-driven~ thought. To this end, I appeal to evidence concerning the nature of spatial reasoning, and provide an exhaustive account of the ~Imagery Debate~ as paradigmatic of non-theory driven cognitive capacities. Finally, I provide an account of the mechanisms that underlie the efficacy and domain
imagining reasoning attempt_define clear conceptual distinction_two cognitive strategy available manipulation information study_attempt identify distinct role_imagination manipulate organise information state end_begin exegesis aristotle_account anima argue establish view nature aristotle the view merely faculty apprehend appearance view special catch faculty non paradigmatic sensory experiences continue argue aristotle distinct faculty experience virtue recognition establish plausibility position move consideration aristotle idea account recent evidence_provide cognitive_science distinguish capacity manipulate information recognition base conceptually distinct reason theory driven thought end appeal evidence concern_nature spatial reasoning provide exhaustive account imagery debate paradigmatic non theory driven cognitive capacity finally provide_account mechanism_underlie efficacy domain