Agents and principals : the Crown agents for the colonies 1880-1914
The Office of the Crown agents acted as the UK commercial and financial agent of the Crown colonies, supplying all non-locally manufactured stores, organising the provision of external finance, supervising the construction of infrastructure, and performing various personnel services. Although under the supervision of the colonial Secretary, who appointed the Agents and fixed their salaries, the Office, through a system of charges for work done, was financially and administratively independent of the government. The thesis examines the Office from the perspective of principal-agent theory. It is argued that the Agents at the start of the period maximised their self-interest through the provision of a quality, but costly service, which reduced the likelihood of colonial criticism and the reorganisation/closure of the Agency, and increased its commission income. As they had difficulty monitoring costs and the loss suffered was relatively small when compared to the potential cost of the supply of poor quality goods/public works, both the Colonial Office and colonies tolerated the Agents' behaviour. In the late 1890s, however, the situation changed. A fall in the Office's receipts led the Agents to become more
Sunderland, David
History
Agents and principals : the Crown agents for the colonies 1880-1914. The Office of the Crown agents acted as the UK commercial and financial agent of the Crown colonies, supplying all non-locally manufactured stores, organising the provision of external finance, supervising the construction of infrastructure, and performing various personnel services. Although under the supervision of the colonial Secretary, who appointed the Agents and fixed their salaries, the Office, through a system of charges for work done, was financially and administratively independent of the government. The thesis examines the Office from the perspective of principal-agent theory. It is argued that the Agents at the start of the period maximised their self-interest through the provision of a quality, but costly service, which reduced the likelihood of colonial criticism and the reorganisation/closure of the Agency, and increased its commission income. As they had difficulty monitoring costs and the loss suffered was relatively small when compared to the potential cost of the supply of poor quality goods/public works, both the Colonial Office and colonies tolerated the Agents' behaviour. In the late 1890s, however, the situation changed. A fall in the Office's receipts led the Agents to become more
agents principal crown agent colony office crown agent act commercial financial agent crown supply non locally manufacture store organise provision external finance supervise construction infrastructure perform various personnel service although supervision colonial secretary appoint agents fixed office system charge work financially independent government examines office perspective principal agent theory argue agents start period maximise self_interest provision quality costly service reduce likelihood colonial criticism reorganisation closure agency increase commission income difficulty monitoring cost loss suffer relatively_small compare potential cost supply poor_quality goods public work colonial_office colony tolerate agents behaviour however situation change fall office receipt lead agents become