Retribution, proportionality and retributivism
I consider a number of characterizations of retribution and reject all on the grounds that none of them substantively meets the requirement of simple proportionality, viz. that the more blameworthy an agent or the more immoral his action the greater the distress inflicted on him should be. I then formulate a concept of retribution based on equivalence where this latter relation is understood to hold between certain properties of blameworthinesses or immoral actions on the one hand and properties of distressing actions (putative retributions) on the other. These properties are given rankings within special sets, maximal sets. A large part of the thesis is then given over to an analysis of this suggested equivalence and its deficiencies. I then introduce further criteria for an equivalence relation definitive of retribution, much of which turns on giving precise conditions for when relations involving terms like 'much greater than,' 'quite a lot greater than' and 'a little greater than' are to hold. These conditions make much use of relations between certain subsets elements of which are ordered in a particular way. These relations pose problems, notably two: cases where the truth-value of claims involving them
Martin, Robert Edward
Punishment
Retribution, proportionality and retributivism. I consider a number of characterizations of retribution and reject all on the grounds that none of them substantively meets the requirement of simple proportionality, viz. that the more blameworthy an agent or the more immoral his action the greater the distress inflicted on him should be. I then formulate a concept of retribution based on equivalence where this latter relation is understood to hold between certain properties of blameworthinesses or immoral actions on the one hand and properties of distressing actions (putative retributions) on the other. These properties are given rankings within special sets, maximal sets. A large part of the thesis is then given over to an analysis of this suggested equivalence and its deficiencies. I then introduce further criteria for an equivalence relation definitive of retribution, much of which turns on giving precise conditions for when relations involving terms like 'much greater than,' 'quite a lot greater than' and 'a little greater than' are to hold. These conditions make much use of relations between certain subsets elements of which are ordered in a particular way. These relations pose problems, notably two: cases where the truth-value of claims involving them
retribution consider number characterization retribution reject ground none meet_requirement simple viz agent immoral action great distress inflict formulate concept retribution base equivalence latter relation understood hold certain property immoral action one_hand property distress action putative retribution other property give ranking within special set maximal set large_part give analysis suggest equivalence deficiency introduce criterion equivalence relation definitive retribution much turn give precise condition relation involve term like much great quite lot great little great hold condition make much use relation certain subset element order particular_way relation pose_problem notably two_case truth_value claim involve