Knowledge and morality
This dissertation explores how we know moral truths, and argues for three principal conclusions. The first is that Edward Craigâs hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge does for us explains why knowledgeâboth of moral and non-moral truthsâtypically must be reached in certain ways. Second, that experience of the world is an important route to moral knowledge. Third, that someone can have moral knowledge even when they cannot articulate a reason to defend it. Chapter I examines recent work by Quassim Cassam on âways of knowingâ. I propose some emendations to Cassamâs account and raise questions: what is the relationship between ways of knowing and the concept of knowledge? Are there tests for sorting good from bad ways of knowing? Chapter II gives a ânormativeâ definition of justification, and it is explained how that coheres with the account of ways of knowing. In Chapter III, I discuss the relationship between ways of knowing and the concept of knowledge, using Edward Craigâs work <i>Knowledge and the State of Nature</i>. I believe we can give a genealogical rationale for being interested in ways of knowing. Chapter IV is concerned exclusively with moral epistemology. I give a brief
Adamson, H. M.
Knowledge and morality. This dissertation explores how we know moral truths, and argues for three principal conclusions. The first is that Edward Craigâs hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge does for us explains why knowledgeâboth of moral and non-moral truthsâtypically must be reached in certain ways. Second, that experience of the world is an important route to moral knowledge. Third, that someone can have moral knowledge even when they cannot articulate a reason to defend it. Chapter I examines recent work by Quassim Cassam on âways of knowingâ. I propose some emendations to Cassamâs account and raise questions: what is the relationship between ways of knowing and the concept of knowledge? Are there tests for sorting good from bad ways of knowing? Chapter II gives a ânormativeâ definition of justification, and it is explained how that coheres with the account of ways of knowing. In Chapter III, I discuss the relationship between ways of knowing and the concept of knowledge, using Edward Craigâs work <i>Knowledge and the State of Nature</i>. I believe we can give a genealogical rationale for being interested in ways of knowing. Chapter IV is concerned exclusively with moral epistemology. I give a brief
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