A study in metaphysics for free will : using models of causality, determinism and supervenience in the search for free will
We have two main aims: to construct mathematical models for analysing determinism, causality and supervenience; and then to use these to demonstrate the possibility of constructing an ontic construal of the operation of free will - one requiring both the presentation of genuine alternatives to an agent and their selecting between them in a manner that permits the attribution of responsibility. Determinism is modelled using trans-temporal ontic links between discrete juxtaposed universe states and shown to be distinct from predictability. Causality is defined on a temporal sequence of ÎŽ-algebras and quantified using a measure. The measure leads to definitions of causal overdetermination and epiphenomena. Proofs are constructed to demonstrate deterministic universes must carry their properties essentially but not necessarily locally. We argue determinism and causality are separate doctrines. These models and results are marshalled to put the case that a counterfactual construal of ontic choice cannot work. In response we propose âimmanence' - a modified form of indeterminism whereby a universe can present choices to its denizens. We prove that beings subsumed within a universe cannot pilot their own actions.
Robson, David
BD095 Metaphysics
A study in metaphysics for free will : using models of causality, determinism and supervenience in the search for free will. We have two main aims: to construct mathematical models for analysing determinism, causality and supervenience; and then to use these to demonstrate the possibility of constructing an ontic construal of the operation of free will - one requiring both the presentation of genuine alternatives to an agent and their selecting between them in a manner that permits the attribution of responsibility. Determinism is modelled using trans-temporal ontic links between discrete juxtaposed universe states and shown to be distinct from predictability. Causality is defined on a temporal sequence of ÎŽ-algebras and quantified using a measure. The measure leads to definitions of causal overdetermination and epiphenomena. Proofs are constructed to demonstrate deterministic universes must carry their properties essentially but not necessarily locally. We argue determinism and causality are separate doctrines. These models and results are marshalled to put the case that a counterfactual construal of ontic choice cannot work. In response we propose âimmanence' - a modified form of indeterminism whereby a universe can present choices to its denizens. We prove that beings subsumed within a universe cannot pilot their own actions.
study metaphysics free use model causality determinism supervenience search free_will two_main aim construct mathematical model analyse determinism causality supervenience use possibility constructing construal operation free require presentation genuine alternative agent select manner permit attribution responsibility determinism model use trans temporal link discrete universe state show distinct predictability causality define temporal sequence quantify use measure measure lead definition causal construct deterministic universe must carry property essentially necessarily locally argue determinism causality separate doctrine model marshal put case construal choice work response propose immanence modify form whereby universe present choice prove being subsume within universe pilot action