An argument in defence of scientific realism
Scientific realism deals primarily with the scope of scientific knowledge. Based on the realist assumption about the independence of physical reality of man's mental faculty and mental constructs (such as languages, conceptual schemes, and conventions), it asserts that science can and does provide us with knowledge about both the observable and unobservable aspects of the physical reality. Anti-realists, from different denominations, reject the central tenet of scientific realism. While few amongst them may deny the very possibility of acquiring scientific knowledge, all would dispute the scope of such knowledge as considered by realists. In anti-realists' view, science, at best, can provide us with the knowledge of observable phenomena. In this essay, after a brief exposition of the main issues involved in the (scientific) realist - anti-realist dispute (Ch.1), and a short historical excursion concerning the development of the central themes in this controversy since the late nineteenth century (Ch.2), I shall concentrate on the cases of a number of modern anti-realists (mostly van Fraassen and Larry Laudan - Chs. 3 & 4), as well as a number of realists who have broken rank with the realist tradition (Ch.5).
Paya, Ali
Philosophy
An argument in defence of scientific realism. Scientific realism deals primarily with the scope of scientific knowledge. Based on the realist assumption about the independence of physical reality of man's mental faculty and mental constructs (such as languages, conceptual schemes, and conventions), it asserts that science can and does provide us with knowledge about both the observable and unobservable aspects of the physical reality. Anti-realists, from different denominations, reject the central tenet of scientific realism. While few amongst them may deny the very possibility of acquiring scientific knowledge, all would dispute the scope of such knowledge as considered by realists. In anti-realists' view, science, at best, can provide us with the knowledge of observable phenomena. In this essay, after a brief exposition of the main issues involved in the (scientific) realist - anti-realist dispute (Ch.1), and a short historical excursion concerning the development of the central themes in this controversy since the late nineteenth century (Ch.2), I shall concentrate on the cases of a number of modern anti-realists (mostly van Fraassen and Larry Laudan - Chs. 3 & 4), as well as a number of realists who have broken rank with the realist tradition (Ch.5).
argument defence scientific_realism scientific_realism deal_primarily scope scientific_knowledge based realist assumption independence physical reality man mental faculty mental construct language conceptual scheme convention assert science provide knowledge observable aspect physical reality anti_realists different denomination reject central_tenet scientific_realism amongst may deny possibility acquire scientific_knowledge would dispute scope knowledge consider realist anti_realists view science best provide knowledge observable phenomenon essay brief exposition main_issue involve scientific realist_anti realist dispute short historical concern development central_theme controversy since shall concentrate case number modern anti_realists mostly chs well number realist break rank realist tradition