An Aristotelian problem concerning first principles and substances
The thesis examines the last aporia in Metaphysics (Met. B), which asks whether the principles are particular or universal. On the basis of Met. A and B, chapter 2 argues that the principles are primary in being and in knowledge. Moreover, I show that several aporiai are closely interconnected and favour a solution of universal substantial principles. My main argument (in chapter 2) for this claim rests on the apparent ambiguity of the term 'numnerical oneness' as between particular-style oneness and oneness of type. In chapter 3 I discuss the notions of separation and priority in Aristotle's Met. Aristotle rejects the Platonist view that Fonns can exist independently of all their sensible instances but not conversely. I argue that his account of priority is neutral between asymmetric independence in existence and in ''being what it is'. The latter type of independence is the ontological correlate of separation and priority in account. I show that principles or substantial forms satisfy this ontological criterion but not the existential one: they are what they are independently ofall their composite instances being what they are but not conversely. In chapter 41 offer a detailed commentary on Met. M.IO. I
Peramatzis, Michail
An Aristotelian problem concerning first principles and substances. The thesis examines the last aporia in Metaphysics (Met. B), which asks whether the principles are particular or universal. On the basis of Met. A and B, chapter 2 argues that the principles are primary in being and in knowledge. Moreover, I show that several aporiai are closely interconnected and favour a solution of universal substantial principles. My main argument (in chapter 2) for this claim rests on the apparent ambiguity of the term 'numnerical oneness' as between particular-style oneness and oneness of type. In chapter 3 I discuss the notions of separation and priority in Aristotle's Met. Aristotle rejects the Platonist view that Fonns can exist independently of all their sensible instances but not conversely. I argue that his account of priority is neutral between asymmetric independence in existence and in ''being what it is'. The latter type of independence is the ontological correlate of separation and priority in account. I show that principles or substantial forms satisfy this ontological criterion but not the existential one: they are what they are independently ofall their composite instances being what they are but not conversely. In chapter 41 offer a detailed commentary on Met. M.IO. I
aristotelian problem_concern first principle substance examines last aporia metaphysics met ask_whether principle particular universal basis met argues principle primary knowledge moreover show several closely interconnected favour solution universal substantial principle main_argument claim rest apparent ambiguity term particular style type discuss notion separation priority aristotle met aristotle reject view fonns exist independently sensible instance conversely argue account priority neutral asymmetric independence existence latter type independence ontological correlate separation priority account show principles substantial form satisfy ontological criterion existential independently composite instance conversely offer_detailed commentary met