The Royal Navy and Soviet seapower, 1930-1950 : intelligence, naval cooperation and antagonism
British estimates of Soviet seapower from 1930 to 1950 covered three main phases. These were primarily characterised by pre-war suspicion of Communism and the Soviet Union, enforced wartime naval cooperation from June 1941 until the end of the Second World War and, finally, a shift towards Cold War antagonism.It is argued that the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division was able to collect sufficient data to maintain a credible intelligence picture of the Soviet Navy's order of battle and war-fighting capabilities, thereby allowing informed decision-making in London. In general, the United Kingdom considered that the Red Navy was poorly equipped and trained, and that it posed little threat to British interests. This was borne out by the Soviet Union's poor employment of seapower during the war.Knowledge of the Soviet Navy was always difficult to obtain. However, a major finding of this thesis is that the wartime Anglo-Soviet alliance allowed British naval representativesin the USSR unprecedented access to Russian warships, facilities and commanders. Though the basing of a naval mission in Russia was principally intended to assist in the common fight against Nazi Germany and to promote liaison between the Royal
Ryan, Joseph Francis
History ; Military manoeuvres
The Royal Navy and Soviet seapower, 1930-1950 : intelligence, naval cooperation and antagonism. British estimates of Soviet seapower from 1930 to 1950 covered three main phases. These were primarily characterised by pre-war suspicion of Communism and the Soviet Union, enforced wartime naval cooperation from June 1941 until the end of the Second World War and, finally, a shift towards Cold War antagonism.It is argued that the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division was able to collect sufficient data to maintain a credible intelligence picture of the Soviet Navy's order of battle and war-fighting capabilities, thereby allowing informed decision-making in London. In general, the United Kingdom considered that the Red Navy was poorly equipped and trained, and that it posed little threat to British interests. This was borne out by the Soviet Union's poor employment of seapower during the war.Knowledge of the Soviet Navy was always difficult to obtain. However, a major finding of this thesis is that the wartime Anglo-Soviet alliance allowed British naval representativesin the USSR unprecedented access to Russian warships, facilities and commanders. Though the basing of a naval mission in Russia was principally intended to assist in the common fight against Nazi Germany and to promote liaison between the Royal
royal_navy soviet intelligence naval cooperation antagonism british estimate soviet cover_three main phase primarily characterise pre_war suspicion communism soviet_union enforce wartime naval cooperation end_second_world_war finally shift_towards cold_war argue admiralty naval intelligence division able collect sufficient data maintain credible intelligence picture soviet navy order battle war fighting capability thereby allow inform decision_making london general united_kingdom consider red navy poorly equip train pose little threat british_interest borne soviet_union poor employment soviet navy always difficult obtain however major find wartime anglo soviet alliance allow british naval ussr unprecedented access russian warship facility commander though base naval mission russia principally intend assist common fight nazi_germany promote liaison royal