The experience in perception : a defence of a stative conception of experiences
In contemporary philosophy of perception, relatively little attention is paid to the fundamental question what we talk about when we talk about perceptual experiences, that is, what kind of entities they are. The present dissertation addresses this ontological question, so as to outline and partially to defend a stative view of perceptual experiences, that is, a view according to which perceptual experiences are mental states as opposed to mental processes. This project is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 unpacks and critically assesses the main target of this dissertation, a processive view or a view according to which processes of a phenomenally conscious kind are essential to our understanding of perceptual awareness. Chapter 2 formulates the ontological stance I advocate, namely, a stative view. The following two chapters turn to a positive defense of this position. Chapter 3 argues that the stative conception is better suited than a processive view to account for the identity over time of perceptual experiences. Chapter 4 turns to what is known as the assertive character of perceptual experiences: in a nutshell, the thought is that, when a subject is perceptually aware of her surroundings or undergoes
Sanhueza Rodriguez, S. I.
The experience in perception : a defence of a stative conception of experiences. In contemporary philosophy of perception, relatively little attention is paid to the fundamental question what we talk about when we talk about perceptual experiences, that is, what kind of entities they are. The present dissertation addresses this ontological question, so as to outline and partially to defend a stative view of perceptual experiences, that is, a view according to which perceptual experiences are mental states as opposed to mental processes. This project is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 unpacks and critically assesses the main target of this dissertation, a processive view or a view according to which processes of a phenomenally conscious kind are essential to our understanding of perceptual awareness. Chapter 2 formulates the ontological stance I advocate, namely, a stative view. The following two chapters turn to a positive defense of this position. Chapter 3 argues that the stative conception is better suited than a processive view to account for the identity over time of perceptual experiences. Chapter 4 turns to what is known as the assertive character of perceptual experiences: in a nutshell, the thought is that, when a subject is perceptually aware of her surroundings or undergoes
experience perception defence stative conception experience contemporary_philosophy perception relatively_little attention_pay fundamental_question talk talk perceptual_experience kind entity present address ontological_question outline partially defend stative view perceptual_experience view accord perceptual_experience mental_state oppose mental_process project divide_five chapter critically_assess main target view view accord process conscious kind essential perceptual awareness formulates ontological stance advocate namely stative view follow_two turn positive defense position argues stative conception well suit view account identity time perceptual_experience turn know assertive character perceptual_experience think subject perceptually aware surroundings undergoes