On the viability of presentism
Although he does not know it, the man on the Clapham omnibus is a presentist. Or to put it more accurately, the man on the Clapham omnibus has ideas about time, which (at least) imply much of presentism. Or so I argue in this thesis. While some of our pre-theoretic ideas about time are no doubt under-determined in certain respects, the man on the bus might be alarmed to learn that the majority of philosophers claim that our intuitive views about time are naiÌve and wrong. This is a serious claim. And it requires a clear explanation; for it suggests that ordinary people are living under the illusion that temporal reality is a certain way, when in fact it is not. Starting from the assumption that presentism is the common-sense view of time, this thesis asks the following questions. Is presentism a viable theory? Are the metaphysical theories of time presented as the alternatives to presentism viable theories? And in what respects, if any, are these alternative theories superior to presentism, such that they require us to give up or amend our common-sense ideas about time? To answer these questions, I explain what each of these theories are, and what their commitments are. This is in order to clarify what the
Allison, Rose Philippa
On the viability of presentism. Although he does not know it, the man on the Clapham omnibus is a presentist. Or to put it more accurately, the man on the Clapham omnibus has ideas about time, which (at least) imply much of presentism. Or so I argue in this thesis. While some of our pre-theoretic ideas about time are no doubt under-determined in certain respects, the man on the bus might be alarmed to learn that the majority of philosophers claim that our intuitive views about time are naiÌve and wrong. This is a serious claim. And it requires a clear explanation; for it suggests that ordinary people are living under the illusion that temporal reality is a certain way, when in fact it is not. Starting from the assumption that presentism is the common-sense view of time, this thesis asks the following questions. Is presentism a viable theory? Are the metaphysical theories of time presented as the alternatives to presentism viable theories? And in what respects, if any, are these alternative theories superior to presentism, such that they require us to give up or amend our common-sense ideas about time? To answer these questions, I explain what each of these theories are, and what their commitments are. This is in order to clarify what the
viability although know man put accurately man ideas time least imply much argue thesis pre theoretic idea time doubt under determined certain respect man bus might alarm learn majority philosopher claim intuitive view time wrong serious claim require clear explanation suggest ordinary_people live illusion temporal reality certain way fact not starting assumption common_sense view time ask follow_question viable theory metaphysical theory_time present_alternative viable theory respect alternative theory superior require give amend common_sense idea time answer_question explain theory commitment order_clarify