Enacting knowledge : Spinoza's dynamic of politics
The central claims of my thesis are that Spinoza's philosophy of mind and affect entails that human knowledge is distinctively creative; and that understanding this makes it possible to understand Spinoza's political philosophy as grounded in the interplay between knowing and the effects of knowledge. I develop the arguments underpinning these claims to show that the tensions commonly perceived in Spinoza's political philosophy are a manifestation of its dynamism and creativity. The first part of my thesis proposes that, within Spinoza's metaphysics, individual modes should be understood as distinguished by their effects on other modes, rather than by essence. I proceed from this interpretive premise to an explication of Spinoza's theory of knowledge: situating it within the philosophy of mind adumbrated in Part 2 of the Ethics, I develop a reading of Spinoza's epistemology as a theory of 'affective knowing'. I argue that his account of knowledge formation implies a necessary interdependence among the three kinds of knowledge discussed in E2p40s2, with all knowledge shaped by both the knower's encounters with other modes and her own acting. A significant implication of this interpretation is that in Spinoza's
Marston, Stephanie
Enacting knowledge : Spinoza's dynamic of politics. The central claims of my thesis are that Spinoza's philosophy of mind and affect entails that human knowledge is distinctively creative; and that understanding this makes it possible to understand Spinoza's political philosophy as grounded in the interplay between knowing and the effects of knowledge. I develop the arguments underpinning these claims to show that the tensions commonly perceived in Spinoza's political philosophy are a manifestation of its dynamism and creativity. The first part of my thesis proposes that, within Spinoza's metaphysics, individual modes should be understood as distinguished by their effects on other modes, rather than by essence. I proceed from this interpretive premise to an explication of Spinoza's theory of knowledge: situating it within the philosophy of mind adumbrated in Part 2 of the Ethics, I develop a reading of Spinoza's epistemology as a theory of 'affective knowing'. I argue that his account of knowledge formation implies a necessary interdependence among the three kinds of knowledge discussed in E2p40s2, with all knowledge shaped by both the knower's encounters with other modes and her own acting. A significant implication of this interpretation is that in Spinoza's
enacting knowledge spinoza dynamic politics central_claim spinoza philosophy_mind affect entail human_knowledge distinctively creative make_possible spinoza political_philosophy ground interplay know effect knowledge develop_argument underpin claim show tension commonly perceive spinoza political_philosophy manifestation dynamism creativity first_part propose within spinoza metaphysics individual mode understood distinguished effect mode rather essence proceed interpretive premise explication spinoza theory_knowledge situating within philosophy_mind part ethics develop read spinoza epistemology theory affective knowing argue account knowledge_formation implies necessary interdependence among kind_knowledge discuss knowledge shape knower encounter mode act significant_implication interpretation spinoza