The nature and purpose of relative terms in Plato
Relative terms are those such as âlargerâ, âsmallerâ, âparentâ and âoffspringâ. Questions concerning the nature of this type of term in Plato fall under three themes. First, logic: what is the syntax and semantics of relative terms? Second, metaphysics: what structures in the world constitute relative properties? Third, taxonomy: do relative terms form a distinguishable class? Questions concerning purpose ask what role these terms have in the wider economy of Platoâs thought. Only one existing approach addresses all of these themes and questions: it was put forward by G.E.L. Owen in 1957, although it was subsequently developed by others. The Owenian view holds that relatives are syntactically or semantically incomplete, that they are identical to metaphysically dyadic relations and that they do form a taxonomic class. According to Owen, Plato introduces relative terms to bolster a certain argument for the separation of forms and participants. Therefore, they have an ontological purpose. This thesis aims to offer a plausible, nonâanachronistic alternative to the Owenian view. To give such an account I have to argue for a radically different logic, metaphysics and purpose for relatives in
Duncombe, Matthew
Plato ; Relations ; Relative ; Categories ; Logic ; Ontology ; Metaphysics ; Taxonomy ; Dialectic
The nature and purpose of relative terms in Plato. Relative terms are those such as âlargerâ, âsmallerâ, âparentâ and âoffspringâ. Questions concerning the nature of this type of term in Plato fall under three themes. First, logic: what is the syntax and semantics of relative terms? Second, metaphysics: what structures in the world constitute relative properties? Third, taxonomy: do relative terms form a distinguishable class? Questions concerning purpose ask what role these terms have in the wider economy of Platoâs thought. Only one existing approach addresses all of these themes and questions: it was put forward by G.E.L. Owen in 1957, although it was subsequently developed by others. The Owenian view holds that relatives are syntactically or semantically incomplete, that they are identical to metaphysically dyadic relations and that they do form a taxonomic class. According to Owen, Plato introduces relative terms to bolster a certain argument for the separation of forms and participants. Therefore, they have an ontological purpose. This thesis aims to offer a plausible, nonâanachronistic alternative to the Owenian view. To give such an account I have to argue for a radically different logic, metaphysics and purpose for relatives in
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