On collective action : underpinning the plural subject with a model of planning agency
This thesis aims to give an account of collective action. It starts with a detailed presentation of its underlying phenomenology. It is argued that in order to understand this phenomenology, we must move beyond the framework of individual agency; thus rejecting Michael Bratman's Shared Cooperative Activity Account. Doing so opens up a space for Margaret Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory. Plural Subject Theory is presented as capturing this phenomenology by allowing that we can act as collective agents. However, it also creates a puzzle centring on the relation between individual autonomy and constraint by the collective will. The solution to this puzzle, this thesis argues, is to apply Bratman's planning theory of agency to the collective agent. In doing so, Gilbert's theory is improved, such that it is better able to capture the sense in which living social lives entangles our sense of individual agentive identity with our sense of collective agentive identity.
Kisolo-Ssonko, Joseph
On collective action : underpinning the plural subject with a model of planning agency. This thesis aims to give an account of collective action. It starts with a detailed presentation of its underlying phenomenology. It is argued that in order to understand this phenomenology, we must move beyond the framework of individual agency; thus rejecting Michael Bratman's Shared Cooperative Activity Account. Doing so opens up a space for Margaret Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory. Plural Subject Theory is presented as capturing this phenomenology by allowing that we can act as collective agents. However, it also creates a puzzle centring on the relation between individual autonomy and constraint by the collective will. The solution to this puzzle, this thesis argues, is to apply Bratman's planning theory of agency to the collective agent. In doing so, Gilbert's theory is improved, such that it is better able to capture the sense in which living social lives entangles our sense of individual agentive identity with our sense of collective agentive identity.
collective_action underpinning plural subject model planning agency aim give_account collective_action start detail presentation underlie phenomenology argue order phenomenology must move_beyond framework individual agency thus reject shared cooperative activity account open_space plural subject theory plural subject theory present capture phenomenology allow act_collective agent however_also create puzzle centre relation individual_autonomy constraint collective will solution puzzle argue apply plan theory agency collective agent theory improve well able capture sense live social_life sense individual agentive identity sense collective agentive identity