James and Russell on neutral monism
This thesis evaluates and compares two versions of neutral monism, one developed by William James and the other by Bertrand Russell. Both argued against Cartesianism in favour of a ~subjectless given~ as the basic stuff which constitutes both mind and matter. My evaluation will demonstrate that Jamesâs and Russell's supposedly neutral entities are not neutral as their exponents claim because they fail to satisfy important criteria set for a theory to be genuinely neutral. There are two fundamental elements within my discussion of the neutral entities. Firstly, I shall demonstrate that although James's initial repudiation of dualistic epistemology of subject and object, knower and known, led him to avoid metaphysical dualism of mental and physical, in Cartesian sense, by committing him to the view that there is one kind of entity called ~experience~, his final analysis admitted an internal distinction within the supposedly simple neutral entities. I shall call this covert dualism. Accepting Jamesâs radical empiricism as an archetype, Russellâs early commitment to neutral monism led him to assert three distinctive kinds of entities, sensation (neutral), image (subjective) and unperceived (objective), and
Ahmad, Saeedah
B Philosophy (General)
James and Russell on neutral monism. This thesis evaluates and compares two versions of neutral monism, one developed by William James and the other by Bertrand Russell. Both argued against Cartesianism in favour of a ~subjectless given~ as the basic stuff which constitutes both mind and matter. My evaluation will demonstrate that Jamesâs and Russell's supposedly neutral entities are not neutral as their exponents claim because they fail to satisfy important criteria set for a theory to be genuinely neutral. There are two fundamental elements within my discussion of the neutral entities. Firstly, I shall demonstrate that although James's initial repudiation of dualistic epistemology of subject and object, knower and known, led him to avoid metaphysical dualism of mental and physical, in Cartesian sense, by committing him to the view that there is one kind of entity called ~experience~, his final analysis admitted an internal distinction within the supposedly simple neutral entities. I shall call this covert dualism. Accepting Jamesâs radical empiricism as an archetype, Russellâs early commitment to neutral monism led him to assert three distinctive kinds of entities, sensation (neutral), image (subjective) and unperceived (objective), and
james russell neutral monism evaluates compare version neutral monism develop william james russell argue cartesianism favour given basic stuff constitutes mind matter evaluation james russell supposedly neutral entity neutral exponent claim fail satisfy important criterion set_theory genuinely neutral two_fundamental element_within discussion neutral entity firstly shall although james initial repudiation dualistic epistemology subject_object knower know lead avoid metaphysical dualism mental_physical cartesian sense commit view kind entity call experience final analysis admit internal distinction within supposedly simple neutral entity shall call covert dualism james radical empiricism archetype russell early commitment neutral monism lead assert distinctive kind entity sensation neutral image subjective objective