Being reasonably moral : Prichard and the mistake of moral philosophy
The question âWhy ought we to do what we think we ought to do?â was said by H.A. Prichard to be an improper question, manifesting erroneous presuppositions about the nature of moral reasoning. Moral rationalists think it a legitimate question, and they maintain that we are rationally justified in acting as we are morally obliged to act. Anti-rationalists deny this claim: specifically, they deny that acting in accord with moral obligation is endorsed by practical rationality. In my dissertation I try to uncover the source of disagreement amongst these three views. I then propose a resolution by appealing to my interpretation of Platoâs version of moral rationalism. I argue that contemporary moral rationalists and antirationalists in fact share the presupposition(s) that Prichard regarded as erroneous and which are not found in Plato. However, Prichard misread Plato as a rationalist of the instrumental persuasion and also offered only the beginnings of a positive view on the nature of practical reason. Therefore he failed to recognize that Plato gives a good positive answer to the original question on which the rationality of morality does not depend upon endorsement from any external source. Even so,
Pryke, Miriam Jean Vivien Eve
Being reasonably moral : Prichard and the mistake of moral philosophy. The question âWhy ought we to do what we think we ought to do?â was said by H.A. Prichard to be an improper question, manifesting erroneous presuppositions about the nature of moral reasoning. Moral rationalists think it a legitimate question, and they maintain that we are rationally justified in acting as we are morally obliged to act. Anti-rationalists deny this claim: specifically, they deny that acting in accord with moral obligation is endorsed by practical rationality. In my dissertation I try to uncover the source of disagreement amongst these three views. I then propose a resolution by appealing to my interpretation of Platoâs version of moral rationalism. I argue that contemporary moral rationalists and antirationalists in fact share the presupposition(s) that Prichard regarded as erroneous and which are not found in Plato. However, Prichard misread Plato as a rationalist of the instrumental persuasion and also offered only the beginnings of a positive view on the nature of practical reason. Therefore he failed to recognize that Plato gives a good positive answer to the original question on which the rationality of morality does not depend upon endorsement from any external source. Even so,
reasonably moral mistake moral_philosophy question ought think ought say improper question manifest erroneous presupposition nature_moral reasoning moral rationalist think legitimate question maintain rationally justified act morally oblige act anti deny claim specifically deny act accord moral_obligation endorse practical_rationality try uncover source disagreement amongst view propose resolution appeal interpretation plato version moral rationalism argue contemporary moral rationalist fact share presupposition regard erroneous find plato however plato rationalist instrumental persuasion also_offer beginning positive view nature practical_reason therefore fail recognize plato give_good positive answer original question rationality morality depend_upon endorsement external source even