The value of pleasure in Plato's Philebus and Aristotle's Ethics
This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Platoâs Philebus, Aristotleâs EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Platoâs claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Platoâs position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotleâs response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotleâs
Aufderheide, Joachim
Pleasure ; Value ; Hedonism ; Aristotle ; Plato ; Philebus ; BJ1481.A8 ; Pleasure ; Plato. Philebus ; Aristotle. Ethica Nicomachea
The value of pleasure in Plato's Philebus and Aristotle's Ethics. This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Platoâs Philebus, Aristotleâs EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Platoâs claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Platoâs position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotleâs response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotleâs
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