Kant on self-consciousness
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an account of Kant's view on self-consciousness. I give an answer, from the perspective of Kant's philosophy, to the questions of what are the features of self-consciousness and how it participates in making knowledge possible. I argue that Kant's view on self-consciousness is developed along two lines of argument. In the first, self-consciousness is constrained by the account of how the categories necessarily agree with the objects of experience. Thinking - the manifestation of self-consciousness par excellence - is shown to be objective insofar as the categories establish a relation between representations and its objects. This point helps to explain the main feature of Kant's view on self-consciousness: its self-sufficiency. Self-consciousness does not need, for its possibility, empirical criteria for the identification of a subject of experience. The second line of argument concerns what conditions the categories in their work. Kant, in this respect, claims that transcendental apperception is the a priori ground of all concepts, and this issue involves the notion of a transcendental subject. I show that transcendental apperception, in the guise of the transcendental
Klaudat, Andre Nilo
Philosophy
Kant on self-consciousness. The purpose of this thesis is to provide an account of Kant's view on self-consciousness. I give an answer, from the perspective of Kant's philosophy, to the questions of what are the features of self-consciousness and how it participates in making knowledge possible. I argue that Kant's view on self-consciousness is developed along two lines of argument. In the first, self-consciousness is constrained by the account of how the categories necessarily agree with the objects of experience. Thinking - the manifestation of self-consciousness par excellence - is shown to be objective insofar as the categories establish a relation between representations and its objects. This point helps to explain the main feature of Kant's view on self-consciousness: its self-sufficiency. Self-consciousness does not need, for its possibility, empirical criteria for the identification of a subject of experience. The second line of argument concerns what conditions the categories in their work. Kant, in this respect, claims that transcendental apperception is the a priori ground of all concepts, and this issue involves the notion of a transcendental subject. I show that transcendental apperception, in the guise of the transcendental
kant self_consciousness purpose_provide account kant view_self consciousness give answer perspective kant_philosophy question feature self_consciousness make knowledge possible argue_kant view_self consciousness develop_along line_argument first self_consciousness constrain account category necessarily agree object experience thinking manifestation self_consciousness par_excellence show objective insofar category establish relation representation object point help_explain main_feature kant view_self consciousness self_sufficiency self_consciousness need possibility empirical criterion identification subject_experience second line_argument concern_condition category work kant respect claim transcendental priori ground concept issue_involve notion transcendental subject show transcendental guise transcendental