Ontological categories, existence statements, and metaphysical modality
What is the content of the claim that tropes a and b are co-instantiated if there is no such thing as tropes? I begin this thesis by arguing that a sentence expressing such a claim would be deficient in content and would, therefore, not be truth-apt. I use this claim to set up a general presupposition problem for the truth-apt sentences of our language. I argue that all truth-apt sentences presuppose the existence of the kinds of things which are to serve as the semantic values of their terms. Understanding the content of such a presupposition requires understanding the content of a categorial existence claim. However, I argue, it is incredibly difficult to provide a construal of categorial existence claims which does not presuppose the existence of the very things that they would be used to assert the existence of. I argue that to provide a satisfactory construal, we need to appeal to the notion of an ontological category. I contend that the notion of an ontological category with which we can provide a satisfactory construal of existence claims is a broadly Lowean one. I show that, as it stands, Loweâs construal is not adequate to the task but that it can be modified so that it is. Making use of such a
Moriarty, Siobhan
Ontological categories, existence statements, and metaphysical modality. What is the content of the claim that tropes a and b are co-instantiated if there is no such thing as tropes? I begin this thesis by arguing that a sentence expressing such a claim would be deficient in content and would, therefore, not be truth-apt. I use this claim to set up a general presupposition problem for the truth-apt sentences of our language. I argue that all truth-apt sentences presuppose the existence of the kinds of things which are to serve as the semantic values of their terms. Understanding the content of such a presupposition requires understanding the content of a categorial existence claim. However, I argue, it is incredibly difficult to provide a construal of categorial existence claims which does not presuppose the existence of the very things that they would be used to assert the existence of. I argue that to provide a satisfactory construal, we need to appeal to the notion of an ontological category. I contend that the notion of an ontological category with which we can provide a satisfactory construal of existence claims is a broadly Lowean one. I show that, as it stands, Loweâs construal is not adequate to the task but that it can be modified so that it is. Making use of such a
ontological category existence statement metaphysical modality content claim trope thing trope begin argue sentence express claim would deficient content would therefore truth apt use claim set general presupposition problem truth apt sentence language argue truth apt sentence presuppose existence kind thing serve semantic_value term content presupposition require content categorial existence claim however_argue difficult provide construal categorial existence claim presuppose existence thing would use assert existence argue provide satisfactory construal need appeal notion ontological category contend notion ontological category provide satisfactory construal existence claim broadly show stand construal adequate task modify making use