Reason in action : a realist account
This thesis argues against the Humean theory of practical reasons, criticising its foundations in philosophical and moral psychology. It develops a realist account of value-based reasons, underpinned by a distinctive cognitivist moral psychology, and a non-causalist account of the rational explanation of action. Contemporary Humeans reject Hume's own theory of thought, but this leaves the Humean theory of practical reasons without justification for a conception of desire as non-cognitive and not open to fundamental rational evaluation. Two possible strategies for filling this justificatory gap are (i) an appeal to grammatical considerations about the attribution of desires and their content, or (ii) an appeal to distinctions in respect of direction of fit. I argue that neither is successful. Kant's moral psychology provides the key to an alternative account, but is unsatisfactory due to its acceptance of a theory of thought which is relevantly similar to Hume's, and of non-compulsory rationalist presuppositions. Separated from these aspects, Kant's insights open a path to developing a conception of desire as essentially rationally evaluable. I argue that, in addition to such a conception, we should accept
Cohen, Ezra Benjamin
B0105.T54 Thought and thinking
Reason in action : a realist account. This thesis argues against the Humean theory of practical reasons, criticising its foundations in philosophical and moral psychology. It develops a realist account of value-based reasons, underpinned by a distinctive cognitivist moral psychology, and a non-causalist account of the rational explanation of action. Contemporary Humeans reject Hume's own theory of thought, but this leaves the Humean theory of practical reasons without justification for a conception of desire as non-cognitive and not open to fundamental rational evaluation. Two possible strategies for filling this justificatory gap are (i) an appeal to grammatical considerations about the attribution of desires and their content, or (ii) an appeal to distinctions in respect of direction of fit. I argue that neither is successful. Kant's moral psychology provides the key to an alternative account, but is unsatisfactory due to its acceptance of a theory of thought which is relevantly similar to Hume's, and of non-compulsory rationalist presuppositions. Separated from these aspects, Kant's insights open a path to developing a conception of desire as essentially rationally evaluable. I argue that, in addition to such a conception, we should accept
reason_action realist account argues humean theory practical_reason criticise foundation philosophical moral_psychology develops realist account value based reason underpin distinctive cognitivist moral_psychology non account rational explanation action contemporary reject hume theory thought leave humean theory practical_reason without justification conception desire non cognitive open fundamental rational evaluation possible strategy fill justificatory gap appeal grammatical consideration attribution desire content appeal distinction respect direction fit argue_neither successful kant moral psychology provide_key alternative_account unsatisfactory due acceptance theory think similar hume non compulsory rationalist presupposition separated aspect kant insight open path develop conception desire essentially rationally argue addition conception accept