Making sense of response-dependence
This thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wrightâs, Mark Johnstonâs, and Philip Pettitâs. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), and response-dependence of concepts only (Pettit). I develop Pettitâs âethocentricâ story of concept acquisition into an account of concept evolution that suggests answers to a range of hard questions about language, reality, and the relation between them. I argue that while response-dependence theses of subject matter can be motivated in very different ways, the resulting theses are less different than they might seem. I suggest that the traditional ways of distinguishing response-dependent subject matters from response-independent ones â in terms of a priori biconditionals connecting facts of the disputed class with responses
Busck Gundersen, Eline
Response-dependence ; Realism ; Anti-realism ; Dispositions ; Secondary qualities ; Colours ; B835.G86 ; Realism
Making sense of response-dependence. This thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wrightâs, Mark Johnstonâs, and Philip Pettitâs. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), and response-dependence of concepts only (Pettit). I develop Pettitâs âethocentricâ story of concept acquisition into an account of concept evolution that suggests answers to a range of hard questions about language, reality, and the relation between them. I argue that while response-dependence theses of subject matter can be motivated in very different ways, the resulting theses are less different than they might seem. I suggest that the traditional ways of distinguishing response-dependent subject matters from response-independent ones â in terms of a priori biconditionals connecting facts of the disputed class with responses
making_sense response dependence investigates distinction distinction response_dependent response independent concept subject_matter present discus_three influential version distinction crispin_wright mark argue version compete single job supplement system different distinction useful single distinction distinguish_two main paradigms response dependence response dependence subject_matter wright response dependence concept develop story concept acquisition account concept evolution suggest answer range hard question language reality relation them argue response dependence thesis subject_matter motivate different_way result thesis less different might seem suggest traditional way distinguish response_dependent subject_matter response independent term priori connect fact dispute class response