Conspiracies and lyes : scepticism and the epistemology of testimony
In Conspiracies and Lyes I aim to provide an epistemological account of testimony as one of our facilities of knowledge. I compare testimony to perception and memory. Its similarity to both these faculties is recognised. A fundamental difference is stressed: it can be rational to not accept testimony even if testimony is fulfilling its proper epistemic function because it can be rational for a speaker to not express a belief; or, as I say, it can be rational for a speaker to lye. This difference in epistemic function provides the basis for a sceptical argument against testimony. Scepticism is presented as a method rather than a problem: considering how to refute the sceptical argument is taken to be a means of evaluating theories as to how testimonial beliefs are warranted. I consider two strategies for refuting scepticism and, correlatively, two accounts of how testimonial beliefs are warranted. I show these accounts to be neutral across all theories of justification that entertain the project of investigating our faculties of knowledge. A reductionist account explains the warrant supporting our testimonial beliefs in terms of our inductive ground for accepting testimony. An anti-reductionist account explains
Faulkner, Paul R. J.
Philosophy
Conspiracies and lyes : scepticism and the epistemology of testimony. In Conspiracies and Lyes I aim to provide an epistemological account of testimony as one of our facilities of knowledge. I compare testimony to perception and memory. Its similarity to both these faculties is recognised. A fundamental difference is stressed: it can be rational to not accept testimony even if testimony is fulfilling its proper epistemic function because it can be rational for a speaker to not express a belief; or, as I say, it can be rational for a speaker to lye. This difference in epistemic function provides the basis for a sceptical argument against testimony. Scepticism is presented as a method rather than a problem: considering how to refute the sceptical argument is taken to be a means of evaluating theories as to how testimonial beliefs are warranted. I consider two strategies for refuting scepticism and, correlatively, two accounts of how testimonial beliefs are warranted. I show these accounts to be neutral across all theories of justification that entertain the project of investigating our faculties of knowledge. A reductionist account explains the warrant supporting our testimonial beliefs in terms of our inductive ground for accepting testimony. An anti-reductionist account explains
scepticism epistemology testimony aim_provide epistemological account testimony facility knowledge compare testimony perception memory similarity faculty recognise fundamental_difference stress rational accept testimony even testimony fulfil proper epistemic function rational speaker express belief say rational speaker difference epistemic function provide_basis sceptical_argument testimony scepticism present method rather problem consider refute sceptical_argument take mean evaluate theory testimonial belief warrant consider strategy refute scepticism account testimonial belief warrant show account neutral across theory justification entertain project_investigate faculty knowledge reductionist account explain warrant support testimonial belief term inductive ground accept testimony anti reductionist account explains