Direct reference, cognitive significance and Fregean sense
This essay deals with certain problems in the theory of singular reference. The following question is taken as central: What role is to be assigned to nonempty and syntactically simple singular terms in fixing the semantic contents of utterances of declarative sentences in which they may occur? I focus on those aspects of the current dispute between Millian and neo-Fregean approaches to singular reference which are related to issues about the cognitive significance of language use; the following two issues are singled out as crucial: the issue about (alleged) potential differences in informativeness between sentences constructed out of co-referential singular terms; and the issue about (alleged) failures of substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential singular terms in propositional-attitude contexts. The general direction of my arguments is as follows. On the one hand, I argue that ~notational variance~ claims recently advanced on both sides of the dispute should be deemed unsound; and hence that one is really confronted with separate accounts of singular content. On the other, I argue that Milllanism does not provide us with a satisfactory solution to the problems about cognitive significance; and hence
Branquinho, JoĂŁo Miguel Biscaia Valadas
Cognition ; Philosophy ; Reference (Philosophy) ; Semantics (Philosophy) ; Sense (Philosophy)
Direct reference, cognitive significance and Fregean sense. This essay deals with certain problems in the theory of singular reference. The following question is taken as central: What role is to be assigned to nonempty and syntactically simple singular terms in fixing the semantic contents of utterances of declarative sentences in which they may occur? I focus on those aspects of the current dispute between Millian and neo-Fregean approaches to singular reference which are related to issues about the cognitive significance of language use; the following two issues are singled out as crucial: the issue about (alleged) potential differences in informativeness between sentences constructed out of co-referential singular terms; and the issue about (alleged) failures of substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential singular terms in propositional-attitude contexts. The general direction of my arguments is as follows. On the one hand, I argue that ~notational variance~ claims recently advanced on both sides of the dispute should be deemed unsound; and hence that one is really confronted with separate accounts of singular content. On the other, I argue that Milllanism does not provide us with a satisfactory solution to the problems about cognitive significance; and hence
direct_reference cognitive significance fregean sense essay deal certain problem theory singular reference follow_question take central_role assign syntactically simple singular term fix semantic_content utterance declarative sentence may_occur focus aspect current dispute neo fregean approach singular reference relate_issue cognitive significance language_use follow_two issue single crucial issue allege potential difference sentence construct referential singular term issue allege failure referential singular term propositional_attitude context general direction argument follow one_hand argue variance claim recently advance side dispute deem hence really separate account singular content argue provide satisfactory solution_problem cognitive significance hence