The jurisprudence of 'ordinary language' : a study of epistemology in legal theory
<i>Part 1</i>: The distinction between a social rule and convergence of behaviour does not depict the internal point of view regarding behaviour in traditional rural social groups. Nor does it depict how people actually behave. It is ideological, contingent on the modern era and the emancipation of the individual. It is a matter of the theorist's presuming a logic, a form of life, that stipulates what may count as a reason for action. <i>Part 2</i>: Linguistic jurisprudence, as ordinary language philosophy that it is, does not expect, regarding the conceptual, to find a reality independent of society and the happenstance of society's language. In a positivist fashion, it merely describes social reality. The distinctions it comes up with (and so the one Part 1 was about) are factual instead, part of the logic/ form of life of modern Western society. - Yet social reality is complex and many sided, not a coherent theory. Existing assumptions/distinctions in social reality/ language are contradictory and interminable. - Linguistic jurisprudence is not concerned with all assumptions that may exist as possibilities, only with the typical ones that form the network of assumptions, which communication presupposes.
Roumeliotis, Michael D.
The jurisprudence of 'ordinary language' : a study of epistemology in legal theory. <i>Part 1</i>: The distinction between a social rule and convergence of behaviour does not depict the internal point of view regarding behaviour in traditional rural social groups. Nor does it depict how people actually behave. It is ideological, contingent on the modern era and the emancipation of the individual. It is a matter of the theorist's presuming a logic, a form of life, that stipulates what may count as a reason for action. <i>Part 2</i>: Linguistic jurisprudence, as ordinary language philosophy that it is, does not expect, regarding the conceptual, to find a reality independent of society and the happenstance of society's language. In a positivist fashion, it merely describes social reality. The distinctions it comes up with (and so the one Part 1 was about) are factual instead, part of the logic/ form of life of modern Western society. - Yet social reality is complex and many sided, not a coherent theory. Existing assumptions/distinctions in social reality/ language are contradictory and interminable. - Linguistic jurisprudence is not concerned with all assumptions that may exist as possibilities, only with the typical ones that form the network of assumptions, which communication presupposes.
jurisprudence ordinary language study epistemology legal theory part distinction social rule convergence behaviour depict internal point_view regard behaviour traditional rural social_group depict people actually behave ideological contingent modern_era emancipation individual matter theorist presume logic form_life may count reason_action part linguistic jurisprudence ordinary language philosophy expect regard conceptual reality independent society society language positivist fashion merely describe social_reality distinction come part factual instead part logic form_life modern_western society yet social_reality complex many side coherent theory existing social_reality language contradictory linguistic jurisprudence concern assumption may exist possibility typical form network assumption communication presupposes