Moral arguments and the Frege-Geach problem
This thesis deals with the Frege-Geach problem, which is arguably the main objection faced by the expressivist view on moral discourse. The key idea of the Frege-Geach objection is that the expressivist cannot give an account of the meaning of conditionals sentences involving moral predicates and the validity of arguments involving moral sentences. After all, as traditionally understood, validity requires truth-aptness. Philosophers such as Crispin Wright and G. F. Schueler challenged the very idea according to which desire-like attitudes can stand in logical relations. They held that if the components of the moral modus ponens are not truth-apt, the argument cannot be properly categorised as âvalidâ. After presenting and critically examining five different attempts to solve the Frege-Geach problem, I provide a new way solution to it. My main goal is to develop an expressivist framework within which it is possible to give an account of evaluative conditionals and validity without relying on the contentious assumption that desire-like attitudes can stand in logical relations. My position is influenced by Griceâs notion of conversational implicature and Vranasâ logic of prescriptions. I further argue
D'Aversa, Rafael
Moral arguments and the Frege-Geach problem. This thesis deals with the Frege-Geach problem, which is arguably the main objection faced by the expressivist view on moral discourse. The key idea of the Frege-Geach objection is that the expressivist cannot give an account of the meaning of conditionals sentences involving moral predicates and the validity of arguments involving moral sentences. After all, as traditionally understood, validity requires truth-aptness. Philosophers such as Crispin Wright and G. F. Schueler challenged the very idea according to which desire-like attitudes can stand in logical relations. They held that if the components of the moral modus ponens are not truth-apt, the argument cannot be properly categorised as âvalidâ. After presenting and critically examining five different attempts to solve the Frege-Geach problem, I provide a new way solution to it. My main goal is to develop an expressivist framework within which it is possible to give an account of evaluative conditionals and validity without relying on the contentious assumption that desire-like attitudes can stand in logical relations. My position is influenced by Griceâs notion of conversational implicature and Vranasâ logic of prescriptions. I further argue
moral argument frege problem deal frege problem arguably main objection face expressivist view_moral discourse key idea frege objection expressivist give_account meaning sentence involve moral predicate validity argument involve moral sentence traditionally understood validity require truth philosophers wright challenge_idea accord desire like attitude stand logical relation hold component moral modus truth apt argument properly categorise valid present critically_examine different attempt_solve frege problem provide_new way solution main_goal develop expressivist framework_within possible give_account evaluative validity without rely contentious assumption desire like attitude stand logical relation position influence grice notion conversational implicature logic prescription argue