Semantics, meta-semantics, and ontology : a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics
In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean (semantic) criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I argue that the metaphysically primary truth bearers are not propositions, but rather concrete representations, either beliefs or sentences. I show, in chapter 2, that we can give sense to a truth predicate applying to sentences, given a truth operator and quantification into sentence position. I argue that this strategy does not commit us to the existence of propositions serving as truth bearers. In Part II I argue that although we must assign semantic values to sentences and/or predicates, the meaningfulness of these expressions is not thereby explained. In chapter 3 I articulate Davidsonâs problem of predication and his solution, but argue that he was wrong to attribute this solution to Tarski. In chapter
Ball, Brian A.
Metaphysics ; semantics ; ontology ; philosophy of language ; metaphysics
Semantics, meta-semantics, and ontology : a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean (semantic) criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I argue that the metaphysically primary truth bearers are not propositions, but rather concrete representations, either beliefs or sentences. I show, in chapter 2, that we can give sense to a truth predicate applying to sentences, given a truth operator and quantification into sentence position. I argue that this strategy does not commit us to the existence of propositions serving as truth bearers. In Part II I argue that although we must assign semantic values to sentences and/or predicates, the meaningfulness of these expressions is not thereby explained. In chapter 3 I articulate Davidsonâs problem of predication and his solution, but argue that he was wrong to attribute this solution to Tarski. In chapter
semantics meta semantics ontology critique method truth metaphysics semantics meta semantics ontology provide critique method truth metaphysics davidson suggest determine metaphysical nature structure reality semantic investigation contrast argue semantics meta semantics reveals metaphysically necessary_sufficient truth_condition claim consequence reject semantic criterion ontological_commitment part argue metaphysically primary truth bearer proposition rather concrete representation either beliefs sentence show give sense truth predicate apply sentence give truth operator quantification sentence position argue strategy commit existence proposition serve truth bearer part argue_although must assign semantic_value sentence and predicate meaningfulness expression thereby explain articulate davidson problem predication solution argue wrong attribute solution