Universality and particularity of Aristotelian substances
The primary question of this project is whether Aristotelian substantial forms are universals or particulars, or neither or both. In other words, the question is whether Aristotelian forms are peculiar to each particular being, or whether they are identical for all particular members of a kind. My position is that substantial forms are both universal and particular. I argue the primary question cannot be answered if the status of form in Aristotelian ontology is considered alone. I address the problem by looking at the ontological relation between universal and particular entities, besides their substantiality. This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first and second chapters cover the Aristotelian background to the problem. In the third and fourth chapters, I discuss some important entities of the Four-Category Ontology of Jonathan Lowe, and the relations between three of these entities: form, universals and particulars. Jonathan Lowe defends a version of Aristotelian metaphysics. Especially, Lowe claims that both particulars and universals are substantial, since the ontological relation between universal and particular is symmetrical rather than asymmetrical. Next, in the fifth and sixth chapters,
Kar, Erman
Universality and particularity of Aristotelian substances. The primary question of this project is whether Aristotelian substantial forms are universals or particulars, or neither or both. In other words, the question is whether Aristotelian forms are peculiar to each particular being, or whether they are identical for all particular members of a kind. My position is that substantial forms are both universal and particular. I argue the primary question cannot be answered if the status of form in Aristotelian ontology is considered alone. I address the problem by looking at the ontological relation between universal and particular entities, besides their substantiality. This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first and second chapters cover the Aristotelian background to the problem. In the third and fourth chapters, I discuss some important entities of the Four-Category Ontology of Jonathan Lowe, and the relations between three of these entities: form, universals and particulars. Jonathan Lowe defends a version of Aristotelian metaphysics. Especially, Lowe claims that both particulars and universals are substantial, since the ontological relation between universal and particular is symmetrical rather than asymmetrical. Next, in the fifth and sixth chapters,
universality particularity aristotelian substance primary question project whether aristotelian substantial form universal particular neither both word question_whether aristotelian form peculiar particular whether identical particular member kind position substantial form universal particular argue primary question_answer status form aristotelian ontology consider alone address_problem look ontological relation universal particular entity besides divide_six chapter first_second cover aristotelian background problem third_fourth discuss important entity four_category ontology relation entity form universals particular defend version aristotelian metaphysics especially claim particular universals substantial since ontological relation universal particular rather asymmetrical next