Thought without illusion
This thesis targets the part of Gareth Evansâs and John McDowellâs view of singular thought which involves the claim that there can be illusions of thought. Singular thought is, according to Evans and McDowell, an object-dependent thought-content; such thought-content could not be entertained unless the object it is about exists. Nevertheless, in a case of perceptual hallucination, where a subject mistakenly takes it that there is an object in front of him or her, Evans and McDowell think that it can seem to a subject exactly as though he or she is having an object-dependent thought, although the subject is in fact not thinking at all due to the absence of any object to think about. The thesis argues for a rejection of this idea of illusions of object-dependent thought. It is further argued that the idea of illusions of thought can be eliminated from Evansâs and McDowellâs view without abandoning their fundamental insight about how singular thought-content is object-dependent. Following specifically McDowellâs development of the view, it is suggested that singular thought is about the world in virtue of how things cognitively appear to the subject. It is suggested that in an alleged case of illusion
Aasen, S.
Thought without illusion. This thesis targets the part of Gareth Evansâs and John McDowellâs view of singular thought which involves the claim that there can be illusions of thought. Singular thought is, according to Evans and McDowell, an object-dependent thought-content; such thought-content could not be entertained unless the object it is about exists. Nevertheless, in a case of perceptual hallucination, where a subject mistakenly takes it that there is an object in front of him or her, Evans and McDowell think that it can seem to a subject exactly as though he or she is having an object-dependent thought, although the subject is in fact not thinking at all due to the absence of any object to think about. The thesis argues for a rejection of this idea of illusions of object-dependent thought. It is further argued that the idea of illusions of thought can be eliminated from Evansâs and McDowellâs view without abandoning their fundamental insight about how singular thought-content is object-dependent. Following specifically McDowellâs development of the view, it is suggested that singular thought is about the world in virtue of how things cognitively appear to the subject. It is suggested that in an alleged case of illusion
thought without illusion target part evans john_mcdowell view singular thought involve claim illusion think singular thought accord evans mcdowell object dependent thought content thought content could entertain unless object exists nevertheless case perceptual hallucination subject mistakenly take object front evans mcdowell think seem subject exactly though object dependent thought although subject fact think due absence object think about argues rejection idea illusion object dependent thought argue idea illusion think eliminate evans mcdowell view without abandon fundamental_insight singular thought content object dependent following specifically mcdowell development view suggest singular think world virtue thing cognitively appear subject suggest alleged case illusion