Time, tense, & rationality
In this thesis I try to advance our understanding of the nature of time. In particular I defend the idea that there is an objective difference between the past, the present, and the future; a metaphysical tense. This is in opposition to the idea that these distinctions merely mark an aspect of our perspective on entities in time. I argue that tensed beliefs â beliefs that go hand-in-hand with tensed language â are essential to our lives as rational animals. Firstly, they are essential to our practices of providing reasons for action and acting for reasons. Secondly, they are essential for our lives as emotional animals whose emotions are appropriately responsive to the world. Perry has argued that indexical â including tensed â beliefs are essential for actions. In order to attend my meeting, it is not enough that I know that it is at 2pm, I must also know that it is now 1:55pm. Examining Perryâs argument I show that its proper conclusion is that tensed and first-personal beliefs are necessary for rational actions. I argue that reasons are facts (not belief/desire complexes or intensional entities). Further, the rationality of an action derives solely from these reasons, so that when an agent is
Pearson, Francis Oliver Charles He
Time, tense, & rationality. In this thesis I try to advance our understanding of the nature of time. In particular I defend the idea that there is an objective difference between the past, the present, and the future; a metaphysical tense. This is in opposition to the idea that these distinctions merely mark an aspect of our perspective on entities in time. I argue that tensed beliefs â beliefs that go hand-in-hand with tensed language â are essential to our lives as rational animals. Firstly, they are essential to our practices of providing reasons for action and acting for reasons. Secondly, they are essential for our lives as emotional animals whose emotions are appropriately responsive to the world. Perry has argued that indexical â including tensed â beliefs are essential for actions. In order to attend my meeting, it is not enough that I know that it is at 2pm, I must also know that it is now 1:55pm. Examining Perryâs argument I show that its proper conclusion is that tensed and first-personal beliefs are necessary for rational actions. I argue that reasons are facts (not belief/desire complexes or intensional entities). Further, the rationality of an action derives solely from these reasons, so that when an agent is
time tense rationality try advance nature time particular defend idea objective difference past_present_future metaphysical tense opposition idea distinction merely mark aspect perspective entity time argue tense belief belief hand hand language essential live rational animal firstly essential practice provide reason_action act reason secondly essential live emotional animal whose emotion appropriately responsive world argue indexical include beliefs essential action order attend meeting enough know must also_know examining argument show proper conclusion tense first personal belief necessary rational action argue reason fact belief_desire complex intensional entity rationality action derive solely reason agent