A defence of the Kaplanian theory of sentence truth
When David Kaplan put forward his theory of sentence truth incorporating demonstratives, initially proposed in âDthat' (1978) and later developed in âDemonstratives' (1989a) and âAfterthoughts' (1989b), it was, to his mind, simply a matter of book-keeping, a job that had been pushed aside as a complication when a truth conditional semantics had been proposed. The challenges considered in this thesis are challenges to the effect that Kaplan's theory of sentence truth is, for one reason or another, inadequate. My overarching aim is to defend Kaplan's theory of sentence truth against these challenges. In chapter one I am concerned only with setting out some preliminary considerations. In chapter two I defend Kaplan's theory of sentence truth against a general challenge, motivated by linguistic data from âcontextualists' and ârelativists'. I argue that the methods and data employed by proponents of contextualism and relativism are lacking and as such should not be taken to have seriously challenged Kaplan's theory of sentence truth. In chapter three I defend Kaplan's theory of sentence truth against challenges to the effect that his theory is not suited to delivering on its initial purposeâto provide
Sweeney, Paula
A defence of the Kaplanian theory of sentence truth. When David Kaplan put forward his theory of sentence truth incorporating demonstratives, initially proposed in âDthat' (1978) and later developed in âDemonstratives' (1989a) and âAfterthoughts' (1989b), it was, to his mind, simply a matter of book-keeping, a job that had been pushed aside as a complication when a truth conditional semantics had been proposed. The challenges considered in this thesis are challenges to the effect that Kaplan's theory of sentence truth is, for one reason or another, inadequate. My overarching aim is to defend Kaplan's theory of sentence truth against these challenges. In chapter one I am concerned only with setting out some preliminary considerations. In chapter two I defend Kaplan's theory of sentence truth against a general challenge, motivated by linguistic data from âcontextualists' and ârelativists'. I argue that the methods and data employed by proponents of contextualism and relativism are lacking and as such should not be taken to have seriously challenged Kaplan's theory of sentence truth. In chapter three I defend Kaplan's theory of sentence truth against challenges to the effect that his theory is not suited to delivering on its initial purposeâto provide
defence theory sentence_truth put_forward theory sentence_truth incorporate demonstrative initially propose person later develop person person mind simply matter book keeping job push aside truth_conditional semantics propose challenge consider challenge effect theory sentence_truth one_reason another inadequate overarch_aim defend theory sentence_truth challenge concerned set preliminary consideration defend theory sentence_truth general challenge motivate linguistic data contextualists argue method data employ proponent contextualism relativism lack take_seriously challenged theory sentence_truth defend theory sentence_truth challenge effect theory suit deliver initial purpose_provide