Habits in action : a corrective to the neglect of habits in contemporary philosophy of action
I propose that if we pay proper attention to habits, we can correct distortions in prevailing accounts of action, and make progress in a number of contemporary debates. First I describe the everyday phenomenon of habit, and sketch the context as we find it within contemporary analytic philosophy. I then develop a notion of habit which has its origins in Wittgenstein, Ryle and Aristotie. The generic notion upon which all three thinkers draw is that of a kind of behaviour which is repeated; automatic, in the sense that it does not involve deliberation or trying; and responsible, since it is under the agent's control. I call such behaviour habitual action. Third, I reject the widely held view that the class of rational actions and the class of actions which we perform ~for reasons~ are equivalent. This view, made popular by Davidson, distorts our conception of rational actions by taking deliberated actions to be the sole paradigm. I suggest that this is an ~intellectualist~ error, which gives too prominent a place to our deliberative capacity in our picture of rational actions. 1 argue, against this, that on many of the occasions that we act habitually, we do not act for reasons, although we do act rationally,
Pollard, William James
Habits in action : a corrective to the neglect of habits in contemporary philosophy of action. I propose that if we pay proper attention to habits, we can correct distortions in prevailing accounts of action, and make progress in a number of contemporary debates. First I describe the everyday phenomenon of habit, and sketch the context as we find it within contemporary analytic philosophy. I then develop a notion of habit which has its origins in Wittgenstein, Ryle and Aristotie. The generic notion upon which all three thinkers draw is that of a kind of behaviour which is repeated; automatic, in the sense that it does not involve deliberation or trying; and responsible, since it is under the agent's control. I call such behaviour habitual action. Third, I reject the widely held view that the class of rational actions and the class of actions which we perform ~for reasons~ are equivalent. This view, made popular by Davidson, distorts our conception of rational actions by taking deliberated actions to be the sole paradigm. I suggest that this is an ~intellectualist~ error, which gives too prominent a place to our deliberative capacity in our picture of rational actions. 1 argue, against this, that on many of the occasions that we act habitually, we do not act for reasons, although we do act rationally,
action corrective neglect habit contemporary_philosophy action propose pay proper attention habit correct distortion prevail account action make_progress number contemporary_debate first_describe everyday phenomenon habit sketch context within_contemporary analytic_philosophy develop notion habit origins wittgenstein generic notion upon thinker draw kind behaviour repeat automatic sense involve deliberation try responsible since agent control call behaviour habitual action third reject widely_hold view class rational action class action perform for reasons equivalent view make popular davidson distort conception rational action take action sole paradigm suggest error give prominent place deliberative capacity picture rational action argue many occasion act habitually act reason although act rationally