Universals as respects of sameness
This thesis argues for realism about universalsâthe view that, in addition to particular things, there exist universals instantiated by those particular things. The first half presents a positive case for realism. Here it is claimed that universals are needed in our ontology to serve as the respects in which things are the same, and the features or characteristics that things have in common.This argument is defended against nominalist responses, first, that our apparent âontological commitmentâ to features and characteristics is not genuine; and second, that the same theoretical work can be achieved by treating respects of sameness as sets of particulars or sets of tropes rather than sui generis universals.The second half of the thesis defends the realist against the most serious objections to an ontology of universals. These are the problems arising from the realistâs obligation to ascribe referential function to predicates, and the family of difficulties known as ââBradleyâs Regressââ. By addressing both the reasons to believe in universals, and the alleged reasons not to believe in universals, it is hoped that a coherent case for realism is achieved.
Peacock, H. J. J.
Universals as respects of sameness. This thesis argues for realism about universalsâthe view that, in addition to particular things, there exist universals instantiated by those particular things. The first half presents a positive case for realism. Here it is claimed that universals are needed in our ontology to serve as the respects in which things are the same, and the features or characteristics that things have in common.This argument is defended against nominalist responses, first, that our apparent âontological commitmentâ to features and characteristics is not genuine; and second, that the same theoretical work can be achieved by treating respects of sameness as sets of particulars or sets of tropes rather than sui generis universals.The second half of the thesis defends the realist against the most serious objections to an ontology of universals. These are the problems arising from the realistâs obligation to ascribe referential function to predicates, and the family of difficulties known as ââBradleyâs Regressââ. By addressing both the reasons to believe in universals, and the alleged reasons not to believe in universals, it is hoped that a coherent case for realism is achieved.
universals respect sameness argues realism universal view addition particular thing exist universal instantiate particular thing first_half present positive case realism claim universal need ontology serve respect thing feature characteristics thing argument defend response first apparent ontological_commitment feature characteristic genuine second theoretical work achieve respect sameness set set rather sui_generis second_half defends realist serious objection ontology universal problem_arise realist obligation ascribe referential function predicate family difficulty know address reason_believe universal allege reason_believe universal hop coherent case realism achieve