Phenomenological realism, superconductivity and quantum mechanics
The central aim of this thesis is to present a new kind of realism that is driven not from the traditional realism/anti-realism debate but from the practice of physicists. The usual debate focuses on discussions about the truth of theories and how they relate with nature, while the real practices of the scientists are forgotten. The position I shall defend is called ~phenomenological realism~. The realist doctrine was recently undermined by the argument from pessimistic meta-induction, also known as the argument from scientific revolutions. I argue that phenomenological realism is a new kind of scientific realism that can overcome the problem generated by the pessimistic meta-induction, and which reflects scientific practice. The realist has tried to overcome the pessimistic meta-induction by suggesting various types of theory dichotomy. I claim that the different types of dichotomy normally presented by realists do not overcome the problem, for these dichotomies cut through theory vertically. I argue for a different kind of dichotomy, one that cuts horizontally, between high-level and low-level theoretical representations. I claim that theoretical forms in physics have two distinct types depending on the
Shomar, Towfic Louis Elias
SUPERCONDUCTIVITY; QUANTUM MECHANICS
Phenomenological realism, superconductivity and quantum mechanics. The central aim of this thesis is to present a new kind of realism that is driven not from the traditional realism/anti-realism debate but from the practice of physicists. The usual debate focuses on discussions about the truth of theories and how they relate with nature, while the real practices of the scientists are forgotten. The position I shall defend is called ~phenomenological realism~. The realist doctrine was recently undermined by the argument from pessimistic meta-induction, also known as the argument from scientific revolutions. I argue that phenomenological realism is a new kind of scientific realism that can overcome the problem generated by the pessimistic meta-induction, and which reflects scientific practice. The realist has tried to overcome the pessimistic meta-induction by suggesting various types of theory dichotomy. I claim that the different types of dichotomy normally presented by realists do not overcome the problem, for these dichotomies cut through theory vertically. I argue for a different kind of dichotomy, one that cuts horizontally, between high-level and low-level theoretical representations. I claim that theoretical forms in physics have two distinct types depending on the
phenomenological realism quantum_mechanic central aim_present new_kind realism drive traditional realism_anti realism debate practice physicist usual debate focus discussion truth theory relate nature real practice scientist forget position shall defend call phenomenological realism realist doctrine recently undermine argument pessimistic meta induction also_know argument scientific_revolution argue phenomenological realism new_kind scientific_realism overcome_problem generate pessimistic meta induction reflect scientific practice realist try overcome pessimistic meta induction suggest various_type theory dichotomy claim different_type dichotomy normally present realists overcome_problem dichotomy cut theory argue different_kind dichotomy cut high_level low_level theoretical representation claim theoretical form physic two_distinct type depend