Dialogical empiricism : the burden of proof upon metaphysical methods
Drawing on Douglas Waltonâs typology of dialogues, I analyse a representative sample of philosophical dialogues, finding that over 95% of them instantiate a type of dialogue aimed at persuading oneâs opponent. I then argue that this goal entails the prudential requirement that any assertion questioned in philosophical dialogue be either supported or else retracted, and that no assertion is privileged over the burden of proof imposed by its questioning. This in turn renders it prudent to avoid the employment of premises that, if questioned, could never be supported. Such unsupportable premises in particular include bridge premises across inference barriers (e.g. Humeâs is/ought separation). Dialogical Empiricism is the resultant thesis that any assertion questioned in philosophical dialogue must prudently be supported by the asserting party without crossing any inference barrier. I focus on the inference barrier between psychological or linguistic content and the world beyond such content, arguing that much common philosophical evidence consists of psycho-linguistic content (e.g. intuitions) and thus cannot prudently be employed in support of hypotheses expressing claims about the world beyond such content.
Rhode, Conny
Dialogical empiricism : the burden of proof upon metaphysical methods. Drawing on Douglas Waltonâs typology of dialogues, I analyse a representative sample of philosophical dialogues, finding that over 95% of them instantiate a type of dialogue aimed at persuading oneâs opponent. I then argue that this goal entails the prudential requirement that any assertion questioned in philosophical dialogue be either supported or else retracted, and that no assertion is privileged over the burden of proof imposed by its questioning. This in turn renders it prudent to avoid the employment of premises that, if questioned, could never be supported. Such unsupportable premises in particular include bridge premises across inference barriers (e.g. Humeâs is/ought separation). Dialogical Empiricism is the resultant thesis that any assertion questioned in philosophical dialogue must prudently be supported by the asserting party without crossing any inference barrier. I focus on the inference barrier between psychological or linguistic content and the world beyond such content, arguing that much common philosophical evidence consists of psycho-linguistic content (e.g. intuitions) and thus cannot prudently be employed in support of hypotheses expressing claims about the world beyond such content.
dialogical empiricism burden proof upon metaphysical method drawing douglas typology dialogue_analyse representative_sample philosophical dialogue find instantiate type dialogue aim persuade opponent argue goal entail requirement assertion question philosophical dialogue either support else assertion privilege burden proof impose questioning turn render avoid employment premise question could never support premise particular include bridge premise across inference barrier hume ought separation dialogical empiricism resultant assertion question philosophical dialogue must support assert party without cross inference barrier focus inference barrier psychological linguistic content world beyond content argue much common philosophical evidence consist psycho linguistic content intuition thus employ support_hypothesis express claim world beyond content