Classification and explanation at the crossroads of the social and natural sciences
This thesis looks at a number of debates relating to how practices of classification and explanation in the social sciences differ from those in the natural sciences. Against the background of an extant discussion that is fragmented and sometimes contradictory, my thesis develops the notion of hybrid kinds as a key unifying concept for understanding and resolving a range of debates on the relationship between the natural and social sciences. Chapter 1 sets out my account of hybrid kinds. By critically evaluating the discussion of Searle's theory of social kinds, I argue that the social kinds in question are best understood as hybrid kinds that are constituted of a base kind and a status kind linked by a relation of status conferral. Chapter 2 applies the hybrid kind account to Epstein's grounding-anchoring model of social kinds and argues that the latter is fundamentally flawed. Chapter 3 turns to the question of moral and political values in the semantics and ontology of social kinds and explores how the direct and indirect influence of such values could be justified. Chapter 4 marks the move from largely ontological considerations to exploring the role of hybrid kinds in scientific contexts. Against the
Laimann, Jessica M.
Human kinds ; Social kinds ; Classification ; Social ontology ; Social science ; social explanation
Classification and explanation at the crossroads of the social and natural sciences. This thesis looks at a number of debates relating to how practices of classification and explanation in the social sciences differ from those in the natural sciences. Against the background of an extant discussion that is fragmented and sometimes contradictory, my thesis develops the notion of hybrid kinds as a key unifying concept for understanding and resolving a range of debates on the relationship between the natural and social sciences. Chapter 1 sets out my account of hybrid kinds. By critically evaluating the discussion of Searle's theory of social kinds, I argue that the social kinds in question are best understood as hybrid kinds that are constituted of a base kind and a status kind linked by a relation of status conferral. Chapter 2 applies the hybrid kind account to Epstein's grounding-anchoring model of social kinds and argues that the latter is fundamentally flawed. Chapter 3 turns to the question of moral and political values in the semantics and ontology of social kinds and explores how the direct and indirect influence of such values could be justified. Chapter 4 marks the move from largely ontological considerations to exploring the role of hybrid kinds in scientific contexts. Against the
classification explanation crossroad social natural look number debate relate practice classification explanation social_sciences differ natural_science background extant discussion fragment sometimes contradictory develops notion hybrid kind key unifying concept resolve range debate relationship natural social_sciences set account hybrid kind critically_evaluate discussion searle theory social kind argue social kind question best_understood hybrid kind constitute base kind status kind link relation status applies hybrid kind account grounding model social kind argue_latter fundamentally flaw turn question moral_political value semantics ontology social kind explores direct_indirect influence value could justify marks move largely ontological consideration explore_role hybrid kind scientific context