Perspective taking in definite reference resolution
This thesis explores the roles of common ground and Theory of Mind in processes for definite reference resolution. It examines the proposals due to Herb Clark and colleagues that common ground is common-knowledge of discourse relevant facts and that it serves as the main constraint on definite referential processes. The thesis contrasts that view with an alternative where common ground emerges from shared interactions as a result of low-level, or automatic memory mechanisms that are constrained by what has been in shared attention. The thesis presents two experiments that verify the effect of memory-based mechanism on referential processes, and also shows that memory-based mechanisms function only where the cue to previous shared experience is itself in shared attention. Given that common ground only weakly constrains definite referential processes, it is argued that Theory of Mind inferences play a critical role in on-line referential processes where interlocutors have different perspective information. The thesis argues that research using the perspective-taking task did not distinguish between the role of common ground and inferences about the speaker's ignorance of certain objects. Experiment 3 shows that
Zheng, X.
Perspective taking in definite reference resolution. This thesis explores the roles of common ground and Theory of Mind in processes for definite reference resolution. It examines the proposals due to Herb Clark and colleagues that common ground is common-knowledge of discourse relevant facts and that it serves as the main constraint on definite referential processes. The thesis contrasts that view with an alternative where common ground emerges from shared interactions as a result of low-level, or automatic memory mechanisms that are constrained by what has been in shared attention. The thesis presents two experiments that verify the effect of memory-based mechanism on referential processes, and also shows that memory-based mechanisms function only where the cue to previous shared experience is itself in shared attention. Given that common ground only weakly constrains definite referential processes, it is argued that Theory of Mind inferences play a critical role in on-line referential processes where interlocutors have different perspective information. The thesis argues that research using the perspective-taking task did not distinguish between the role of common ground and inferences about the speaker's ignorance of certain objects. Experiment 3 shows that
perspective take definite reference resolution explores roles common_ground theory_mind process definite reference resolution examines proposal due clark colleague common_ground common knowledge discourse relevant facts serf main constraint definite referential process contrast view alternative common_ground emerge share interaction low_level automatic memory mechanism constrain share attention present verify effect memory based mechanism referential process also_show memory based mechanism function cue previous share_experience share attention given common_ground constrains definite referential process argue theory_mind inference play critical role line referential process interlocutor different_perspective information argues use perspective taking task distinguish role common_ground inference speaker ignorance certain object show