Rationality, welfare and liberty : a philosophical reconciliation
This thesis attempts to amorally defend certain conceptions of rationality, welfare and liberty and to reconcile them in the sense of showing that they need not clash in practice. This is motivated by the social scientific work (particularly in economics) that indicates that liberty and welfare are best promoted by the free market. There is a cluster of reasons that this defence is needed: there is no clear account of liberty or what it entails; preference utilitarianism (as a theory of welfare) is often invalidly attacked, or misinterpreted in practice; some economist's conclusions that liberty and welfare do not diverge in the free market are often questioned because based on an instrumental rationality which is thought unrealistic or vacuous; the theories of liberty and welfare in this thesis also need the instrumental rationality assumption. Chapter 1: An Austrian economic interpretation of the instrumental rationality assumption of standard economics (that agents are self-interested utility-maximisers) can be defended as fruitful, compatible with moral values though implying none, and the fundamental tautology that standard economics presupposes. Chapter 2: The preference-utilitarian conception of welfare
Lester, Jan Clifford
Philosophy
Rationality, welfare and liberty : a philosophical reconciliation. This thesis attempts to amorally defend certain conceptions of rationality, welfare and liberty and to reconcile them in the sense of showing that they need not clash in practice. This is motivated by the social scientific work (particularly in economics) that indicates that liberty and welfare are best promoted by the free market. There is a cluster of reasons that this defence is needed: there is no clear account of liberty or what it entails; preference utilitarianism (as a theory of welfare) is often invalidly attacked, or misinterpreted in practice; some economist's conclusions that liberty and welfare do not diverge in the free market are often questioned because based on an instrumental rationality which is thought unrealistic or vacuous; the theories of liberty and welfare in this thesis also need the instrumental rationality assumption. Chapter 1: An Austrian economic interpretation of the instrumental rationality assumption of standard economics (that agents are self-interested utility-maximisers) can be defended as fruitful, compatible with moral values though implying none, and the fundamental tautology that standard economics presupposes. Chapter 2: The preference-utilitarian conception of welfare
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