Moral judgement in the theology of John Henry Newman
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse moral judgement in Newman's theology by examining his religious epistemology of the judgement of faith which he regularly illustrates with a moral analogy. Chapter one explains the philosophical and theological parameters of his religious epistemology in the 'University Sermons', and 'The Idea of a University'. This shows the primacy of the implicit reason of faith, and the secondary, but indispensable, function of explicit reason, manifest in Newmnan's explanation of liberal knowledge. Chapter two refines this by examining the 'Grammar of Assent, to show the objectivity and normativity of his epistemology in the concrete faith judgement of the illative sense. I show the primacy of personal assent in relation to the indispensable, but secondary, function of inferential investigation. Chapter three adopts the epistemology of the 'Grammar of Assent' to explain moral judgement. I introduce the term 'illative moral judgement' to show that concrete moral judgement can be a speculative truth of implicit reason which elicits a real assent of the imagination. There is a creative tension between concrete moral judgement and the abstract moral judgement entailed by the objective
Magill, Gerard
Newman, John Henry, 1801-1890 ; Judgment (Ethics)
Moral judgement in the theology of John Henry Newman. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse moral judgement in Newman's theology by examining his religious epistemology of the judgement of faith which he regularly illustrates with a moral analogy. Chapter one explains the philosophical and theological parameters of his religious epistemology in the 'University Sermons', and 'The Idea of a University'. This shows the primacy of the implicit reason of faith, and the secondary, but indispensable, function of explicit reason, manifest in Newmnan's explanation of liberal knowledge. Chapter two refines this by examining the 'Grammar of Assent, to show the objectivity and normativity of his epistemology in the concrete faith judgement of the illative sense. I show the primacy of personal assent in relation to the indispensable, but secondary, function of inferential investigation. Chapter three adopts the epistemology of the 'Grammar of Assent' to explain moral judgement. I introduce the term 'illative moral judgement' to show that concrete moral judgement can be a speculative truth of implicit reason which elicits a real assent of the imagination. There is a creative tension between concrete moral judgement and the abstract moral judgement entailed by the objective
moral_judgement theology john_henry_newman purpose analyse moral_judgement newman theology examine religious epistemology judgement faith regularly illustrate moral analogy explain philosophical_theological parameter religious epistemology university the idea university show primacy implicit reason faith secondary indispensable function explicit reason manifest explanation liberal knowledge examine grammar show objectivity normativity epistemology concrete faith judgement sense show primacy personal relation indispensable secondary function inferential investigation adopts epistemology grammar explain moral_judgement introduce term moral_judgement show concrete moral_judgement speculative truth implicit reason real imagination creative tension concrete moral_judgement abstract moral_judgement entail objective