Minds in Prehistory : Conceptual Issues in the Archaeology and Evolution of Mind
Interest in questions about the minds of people in the past has come' to take centre stage, not just within the discipline of archaeology, but more widely. This thesis argues that, to date, attempts to fashion and practice an archaeology of mind have been fundamentally undermined, if not rendered entirely incoherent, by conceptual confusions regarding the phenomena of mind with which they are interested. Such confusions have led to mistakes of varying severity effecting both the identification of mental phenomena from the evidence of the archaeological record, and subsequent attempts to explain the presence and nature of such phenomena. Here, following the insights of Wittgenstein (1958a), it is argued that conceptual clarity is a necessary foundation for a successful empirical endeavour, and that sucn clarity can only be achieved by paying attention to the use words have in our language. In this light, the conceptual confusions present in, and negative implications resulting from, two of the central approaches (the cognitivist [e.g., Wynn 2002] and Iingualist [e.g., Noble and Davidson 1996]) to the archaeology of mind are explored. Arising from these two critiques are a number of positive conceptual points
Samphire, Benjamin Robert
Minds in Prehistory : Conceptual Issues in the Archaeology and Evolution of Mind. Interest in questions about the minds of people in the past has come' to take centre stage, not just within the discipline of archaeology, but more widely. This thesis argues that, to date, attempts to fashion and practice an archaeology of mind have been fundamentally undermined, if not rendered entirely incoherent, by conceptual confusions regarding the phenomena of mind with which they are interested. Such confusions have led to mistakes of varying severity effecting both the identification of mental phenomena from the evidence of the archaeological record, and subsequent attempts to explain the presence and nature of such phenomena. Here, following the insights of Wittgenstein (1958a), it is argued that conceptual clarity is a necessary foundation for a successful empirical endeavour, and that sucn clarity can only be achieved by paying attention to the use words have in our language. In this light, the conceptual confusions present in, and negative implications resulting from, two of the central approaches (the cognitivist [e.g., Wynn 2002] and Iingualist [e.g., Noble and Davidson 1996]) to the archaeology of mind are explored. Arising from these two critiques are a number of positive conceptual points
prehistory conceptual issues archaeology evolution mind interest question mind people_past come take centre_stage within_discipline archaeology widely argues date attempt fashion practice archaeology mind fundamentally undermine render entirely incoherent conceptual confusion regard phenomenon mind interested confusion lead mistake vary severity effect identification mental phenomena evidence archaeological_record subsequent attempt_explain presence nature phenomenon follow insight wittgenstein argue_conceptual clarity necessary foundation successful empirical endeavour clarity achieve pay_attention use_word language light conceptual confusion present negative implication result central approach cognitivist noble davidson archaeology mind explore critique number positive conceptual point