Bodily awareness and the elusive self : an investigation
My dissertation examines two apparently opposing views â the well-established view that<i> the self</i> (is systematically elusive (the âElusiveness Thesisâ or âETâ), and the more recent claim that bodily awareness âfrom the insideâ can amount to perceptual <i>self-</i>awareness. I introduce these distinctions: <i>Broad</i> Self-Consciousness is awareness of the thing one is âas meâ; this just means awareness of oneâs body in a way immune to error through misidentification. <i>Narrow</i> Self-Consciousness is awareness of the thing one is as a subject. In turn, there are two possible conceptions of âsubjectâ here â oneself as a point of view on the world (Self (PoV)), and oneself as the bearer of psychological properties (I call that Self (Psych)). The main claims I defend are: (1) There seems no principled basis for the Self as subject to be regarded as systematically elusive. On the other hand, recent arguments that bodily awareness amounts to Narrow Self-Consciousness have not been made out either; (2) However bodily awareness does amount to Broad Self-Consciousness. In Chapter 3 I examine and endorse an old argument (resurrected by Shoemaker) that self-consciousness cannot <i>just</i>
Evans, G. L.
Bodily awareness and the elusive self : an investigation. My dissertation examines two apparently opposing views â the well-established view that<i> the self</i> (is systematically elusive (the âElusiveness Thesisâ or âETâ), and the more recent claim that bodily awareness âfrom the insideâ can amount to perceptual <i>self-</i>awareness. I introduce these distinctions: <i>Broad</i> Self-Consciousness is awareness of the thing one is âas meâ; this just means awareness of oneâs body in a way immune to error through misidentification. <i>Narrow</i> Self-Consciousness is awareness of the thing one is as a subject. In turn, there are two possible conceptions of âsubjectâ here â oneself as a point of view on the world (Self (PoV)), and oneself as the bearer of psychological properties (I call that Self (Psych)). The main claims I defend are: (1) There seems no principled basis for the Self as subject to be regarded as systematically elusive. On the other hand, recent arguments that bodily awareness amounts to Narrow Self-Consciousness have not been made out either; (2) However bodily awareness does amount to Broad Self-Consciousness. In Chapter 3 I examine and endorse an old argument (resurrected by Shoemaker) that self-consciousness cannot <i>just</i>
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