'Dowding should go' : changes in leadership, strategy and tactics at Fighter Command, July to December 1940, with special reference to the Big Wing controversy
Between July and December 1940 three contests were fought in British skies. The first was a battle for aerial supremacy between the Luftwaffe and the RAF. The second was a struggle inside the Luftwaffe to plan and follow a coherent strategy of attack. Third was a controversy among senior RAF commanders over the tactics required for daylight defence. Until mid-September, the Luftwaffe attempted alone to defeat Britain first by overwhelming Fighter Command, then by heavy bombing. It failed, partly, by starting too late and waging an unprepared campaign with unsuitable equipment. Fighter Command, possessing the world's best aerial defensive system, fought a tenacious battle for which it had been designed, namely the protection of the Home Base. From mid-September the Luftwaffe changed largely to night bombing, confronting Britain with an offensive more difficult to counter. For some months the RAF, lacking a suitable night fighter, appeared impotent in defence. This weakness was a catalyst for reservations felt by the Air council over the leadership, strategy and tactics employed by Sir Hugh Dowding, C-in-C, Fighter Command, who, in their eyes, had been uncooperative since pre-war days. When Churchill and Beaverbrook,
Ray, John Philip
History
'Dowding should go' : changes in leadership, strategy and tactics at Fighter Command, July to December 1940, with special reference to the Big Wing controversy. Between July and December 1940 three contests were fought in British skies. The first was a battle for aerial supremacy between the Luftwaffe and the RAF. The second was a struggle inside the Luftwaffe to plan and follow a coherent strategy of attack. Third was a controversy among senior RAF commanders over the tactics required for daylight defence. Until mid-September, the Luftwaffe attempted alone to defeat Britain first by overwhelming Fighter Command, then by heavy bombing. It failed, partly, by starting too late and waging an unprepared campaign with unsuitable equipment. Fighter Command, possessing the world's best aerial defensive system, fought a tenacious battle for which it had been designed, namely the protection of the Home Base. From mid-September the Luftwaffe changed largely to night bombing, confronting Britain with an offensive more difficult to counter. For some months the RAF, lacking a suitable night fighter, appeared impotent in defence. This weakness was a catalyst for reservations felt by the Air council over the leadership, strategy and tactics employed by Sir Hugh Dowding, C-in-C, Fighter Command, who, in their eyes, had been uncooperative since pre-war days. When Churchill and Beaverbrook,
change leadership strategy_tactic command special_reference big wing controversy contest fight british first battle aerial supremacy raf second struggle inside plan follow coherent strategy attack third controversy among senior raf commander tactic require defence mid attempt alone defeat britain first overwhelm command heavy fail partly start late campaign unsuitable equipment command possess world best aerial defensive system fought battle design namely protection home base mid change largely night confront britain offensive difficult counter month raf lack suitable night appear defence weakness catalyst reservation felt air council leadership strategy_tactic employ sir command eye since