Representationism and phenomenism : a critique of two approaches to explaining the relation between representational and phenomenal content
The aim of this thesis is to critique two approaches to explaining the relation between representational and phenomenal content. The first approach, representationism, holds that phenomenal content is entirely constituted by intentional or representational content. The second approach, phenomenism, holds that phenomenal content is not entirely constituted by intentional or representational content. There is something âmoreâ to phenomenal content than just intentional content. Two types of consideration are considered in order to evaluate these two approaches as follows: The first, considers two âmetaphysical speculationsâ, inverted spectra and inverted earth: The second, considers causal and explanatory implications of adopting either of these two approaches. Inverted spectrums and inverted earth provide prima facie grounds for rejecting representationism(Block, 1990, 1996; Shoemaker; 199 1); however, it will be demonstrated that both âspeculationsâ do not demonstrate representationism to fail. This thesis will argue that existing responses to inverted earth, for example, Lalor (1999), Lycan (1996), and Tye (1994, 1995b, 1998b) are inadequate. However, it provides a new response to inverted earth
Thompson, Hamish D.
representationism ; phenomenism ; representational content ; phenomenal content
Representationism and phenomenism : a critique of two approaches to explaining the relation between representational and phenomenal content. The aim of this thesis is to critique two approaches to explaining the relation between representational and phenomenal content. The first approach, representationism, holds that phenomenal content is entirely constituted by intentional or representational content. The second approach, phenomenism, holds that phenomenal content is not entirely constituted by intentional or representational content. There is something âmoreâ to phenomenal content than just intentional content. Two types of consideration are considered in order to evaluate these two approaches as follows: The first, considers two âmetaphysical speculationsâ, inverted spectra and inverted earth: The second, considers causal and explanatory implications of adopting either of these two approaches. Inverted spectrums and inverted earth provide prima facie grounds for rejecting representationism(Block, 1990, 1996; Shoemaker; 199 1); however, it will be demonstrated that both âspeculationsâ do not demonstrate representationism to fail. This thesis will argue that existing responses to inverted earth, for example, Lalor (1999), Lycan (1996), and Tye (1994, 1995b, 1998b) are inadequate. However, it provides a new response to inverted earth
critique two_approach explain relation representational phenomenal content aim critique two_approach explain relation representational phenomenal content first hold phenomenal content entirely constitute intentional representational content second hold phenomenal content entirely constitute intentional representational content something phenomenal content intentional content two_type consideration consider order_evaluate two_approach follow first_considers metaphysical speculation invert spectrum invert earth second_considers causal explanatory implication adopt either two_approach spectrum invert earth provide prima_facie ground reject block person however demonstrate speculation fail argue exist response earth example inadequate however provide_new response invert earth