The nature of testimonial justification
It's generally agreed that testimony can be a source of knowledge and justified belief. The epistemology of testimony concerns itself with explaining how this can be the case. This thesis begins by identifying three types of explanation. According to the first explanation, my testimony can induce a justified belief in you because you use the reasons that you have available to you to infer the truth of what I say from the fact that I said it. According to the second explanation, my testimony can induce a justified belief in you because the processes involved in you forming the belief on the basis of my testimony are suitably reliable. And according to the third explanation, my testimony can induce a justified belief in you because I have justification for what I say and my testimony allows you to form a belief that's supported by this justification. Having identified three different types of explanation, I argue that neither the first nor the second type of explanation can give a full account of testimony as a source of justified belief. The idea is that a notion of justification transmission is indispensable to a complete epistemology of testimony. I begin by establishing what justification transmission amounts
Wright, Stephen
The nature of testimonial justification. It's generally agreed that testimony can be a source of knowledge and justified belief. The epistemology of testimony concerns itself with explaining how this can be the case. This thesis begins by identifying three types of explanation. According to the first explanation, my testimony can induce a justified belief in you because you use the reasons that you have available to you to infer the truth of what I say from the fact that I said it. According to the second explanation, my testimony can induce a justified belief in you because the processes involved in you forming the belief on the basis of my testimony are suitably reliable. And according to the third explanation, my testimony can induce a justified belief in you because I have justification for what I say and my testimony allows you to form a belief that's supported by this justification. Having identified three different types of explanation, I argue that neither the first nor the second type of explanation can give a full account of testimony as a source of justified belief. The idea is that a notion of justification transmission is indispensable to a complete epistemology of testimony. I begin by establishing what justification transmission amounts
nature testimonial justification generally_agree testimony source knowledge justified belief epistemology testimony concern explain case begin_identify three_type explanation according first explanation testimony induce justified belief use reason available infer truth say fact say according second explanation testimony induce justified belief process_involve forming belief basis testimony suitably reliable accord third explanation testimony induce justified belief justification say testimony allows form belief support justification identify three_different type explanation_argue neither first_second type explanation give_full account testimony source justified belief idea notion justification transmission indispensable complete epistemology testimony begin establish justification transmission amount