Self-knowledge in consciousness
When you enjoy a conscious mental state or episode, you can knowledgeably self-ascribe that state or episode, and your self-ascription will have a special security and authority (as well as several other distinctive features). This thesis argues for an epistemic but nonintrospectionist account of why such self-ascriptions count as knowledge, and why they have a special status. The first part of the thesis considers what general shape an account of self-knowledge must have. Against a deflationist challenge, I argue that your judgments about your own conscious states and episodes really do constitute knowledge, and that their distinctive features must be explained by the epistemic credentials that make them knowledge. However, the most historically influential non-deflationist accountâaccording to which such self-ascriptive judgments are based on introspective experiences of your conscious states and episodesâ misconstrues the unique perspective that you have on your own conscious mind. The second part of the thesis argues that the occurrence in your consciousness of a state or episode of a certain type, with a certain content, can itself suffice for you to have a reason to judge that you are enjoying a
McHugh, Conor
epistemology ; consciousness ; self-knowledge
Self-knowledge in consciousness. When you enjoy a conscious mental state or episode, you can knowledgeably self-ascribe that state or episode, and your self-ascription will have a special security and authority (as well as several other distinctive features). This thesis argues for an epistemic but nonintrospectionist account of why such self-ascriptions count as knowledge, and why they have a special status. The first part of the thesis considers what general shape an account of self-knowledge must have. Against a deflationist challenge, I argue that your judgments about your own conscious states and episodes really do constitute knowledge, and that their distinctive features must be explained by the epistemic credentials that make them knowledge. However, the most historically influential non-deflationist accountâaccording to which such self-ascriptive judgments are based on introspective experiences of your conscious states and episodesâ misconstrues the unique perspective that you have on your own conscious mind. The second part of the thesis argues that the occurrence in your consciousness of a state or episode of a certain type, with a certain content, can itself suffice for you to have a reason to judge that you are enjoying a
self_knowledge consciousness enjoy conscious mental_state episode self ascribe state episode self ascription special security authority well several distinctive_feature argues epistemic account self count knowledge special status first_part consider general shape account self_knowledge must have deflationist challenge argue judgment conscious state episodes really constitute knowledge distinctive_feature must_explain epistemic credential make knowledge however historically influential non deflationist account accord self judgment base introspective experience conscious state episode unique_perspective conscious mind second_part argue occurrence consciousness state episode certain_type certain content suffice reason judge enjoy