A critical comparison of William James and SĂžren Kierkegaard on religious belief
This thesis is a critical comparison of the accounts of religious belief proposed by William James and SĂžren Kierkegaard. Both James and Kierkegaard greatly emphasize the subjective aspects of religious belief. In view of this fact, surprisingly little comparative work has been done in this area. I contribute to this literature in two ways. Firstly, I make a brief assessment of what James knew of Kierkegaardâs work. Secondly, I draw four comparisons between Kierkegaard and James. In Chapter One I examine the claim that Kierkegaard proposes a pragmatist account of faith of the kind that James sets out in his essay The Will To Believe. I argue that this claim rests on a misunderstanding of Kierkegaardâs argument that to have faith is to take a risk. In the following chapter I discuss Jamesâs and Kierkegaardâs views on formal proofs for the existence of God. Both philosophers reject the notion that faith can be based on such proofs. I distinguish between their positions, and argue in favour of Kierkegaardâs. In the third chapter I compare Kierkegaardâs and Jamesâs accounts of religious experience. James views religious experiences as a special kind of evidence for the existence of God. For Kierkegaard
Chipp, Jonathan
BL Religion
A critical comparison of William James and SĂžren Kierkegaard on religious belief. This thesis is a critical comparison of the accounts of religious belief proposed by William James and SĂžren Kierkegaard. Both James and Kierkegaard greatly emphasize the subjective aspects of religious belief. In view of this fact, surprisingly little comparative work has been done in this area. I contribute to this literature in two ways. Firstly, I make a brief assessment of what James knew of Kierkegaardâs work. Secondly, I draw four comparisons between Kierkegaard and James. In Chapter One I examine the claim that Kierkegaard proposes a pragmatist account of faith of the kind that James sets out in his essay The Will To Believe. I argue that this claim rests on a misunderstanding of Kierkegaardâs argument that to have faith is to take a risk. In the following chapter I discuss Jamesâs and Kierkegaardâs views on formal proofs for the existence of God. Both philosophers reject the notion that faith can be based on such proofs. I distinguish between their positions, and argue in favour of Kierkegaardâs. In the third chapter I compare Kierkegaardâs and Jamesâs accounts of religious experience. James views religious experiences as a special kind of evidence for the existence of God. For Kierkegaard
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